"Mutual Obstruction" of the Disarmament Track in the Gaza Strip

For the first time in its history, Hamas announced that it had agreed to enter into a process that could ultimately lead to handing over its weapons. The announcement coincided with the Board of Peace’s issuance, on July 30, 2026, of a detailed roadmap for implementing the second phase of U.S. President Donald Trump’s Comprehensive Peace Plan for the Gaza Strip. The roadmap consists of 15 operational points and provides an executive and practical framework for implementing the plan proposed by Trump on September 29, 2025.

The development came after months of negotiating deadlock following the entry into force of the first phase of the agreement on October 10, 2025. The transition to the second phase had remained stalled, particularly over disagreements concerning the disarmament of Hamas and the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Hamas’s acceptance of the roadmap therefore represents a notable shift from its previous position on the issue of weapons, although that acceptance remains tied to an implementation process and reciprocal conditions, most notably the cessation of Israeli operations and Israel’s withdrawal from the Strip.

The Roadmap’s Content and Context

The "Roadmap" consists of 15 points centered on transferring the civil and security administration of the Gaza Strip from Hamas to the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), in parallel with the establishment of the International Stabilization Force (ISF) tasked with supporting security and monitoring the ceasefire. This would be followed by the dismantling of heavy weapons, tunnels, and the military infrastructure of armed factions, with the weapons placed in storage under the supervision of the NCAG.

In return, Israel would commit to a phased withdrawal synchronized with progress on disarmament. Meanwhile, the NCAG would unify the police and public services and enforce the principle of "one authority, one law, and one weapon." Progression between phases would be subject to an international verification mechanism to assess compliance with implementation, thereby linking the transfer of governance, disarmament, and withdrawal within a single, gradual process. In parallel, arrangements for reconstruction and financing would begin.

The "Roadmap" emerged in the context of months of negotiations in Cairo between Hamas and the Board of Peace over how to transition to the second phase, particularly the transfer of the Strip’s administration, disarmament, the Israeli withdrawal, and the role of the ISF. It also came against the backdrop of several developments, including the selection of 15 technocrats and independents to serve as members of the NCAG, with Ali Shaath appointed as its head in January 2026. The committee is expected to assume its responsibilities pursuant to the UN Security Council resolution that adopted Trump’s peace plan on November 17, 2025. However, Israel’s rejection of the Roadmap on August 9 has complicated the transition to the stage of establishing timelines and implementation mechanisms.

Nevertheless, Hamas’s announcement, for the first time, that it had agreed to a process that would ultimately lead to the gradual dismantling of its military infrastructure was particularly notable. Although the announcement was framed in terms that entail obstacles and challenges, it represents a significant development when viewed against the movement’s previous positions. Hamas’s position has gradually evolved from an outright refusal to hand over its weapons to stipulating that any handover would be to an independent and sovereign Palestinian state. Another formula subsequently emerged involving the concealment or storage of weapons, or a pledge not to use them, before the discussion shifted toward inventorying its heavy weapons—including rockets and anti-tank weapons—and placing them in storage under Palestinian or international arrangements and supervision.

Challenges Facing Hamas in the Gaza Strip

Hamas faces significant challenges. At the administrative level, the movement is struggling to govern the Gaza Strip and ensure the provision of various services. According to United Nations data, 94% of the Strip’s population is in need of shelter, while more than 3,000 areas across the Strip are classified as high-risk according to assessments by pest control teams. The population also lacks basic necessities, including fuel, energy, and household supplies. Most of the Strip’s population is concentrated west of the Yellow Line, within an area comprising less than half of the Gaza Strip. Amid these conditions, Hamas lacks the actual capacity to provide services to the population or administer their affairs in the Strip. It also faces additional challenges in paying the salaries of 30,000 civil servants. Reports indicate that the movement is paying approximately 20% of prewar salary levels. With rising inflation and worsening food and water shortages, Hamas has faced growing public discontent, particularly among its own support base.

Accordingly, the prospect of Hamas remaining in charge of administering the Strip has become an existential threat to the movement, no less consequential than the repercussions of the war itself or the prospect of handing over its weapons. For this reason, one of its first decisions following the ceasefire was to announce its readiness to relinquish the administration of the Strip to the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG). In January 2026, Hamas announced that the protocols, files, and committees required for the transfer of administration were ready. On July 6, the movement dissolved the Government Emergency Committee, while several of its administrative officials resigned, including the head of the government apparatus.

At the military level, since October 7, Hamas has lost its most prominent leaders and officials, including Saleh al-Arouri, Ismail Haniyeh, Mohammed Deif, and Yahya Sinwar. Israel also assassinated Izz al-Din al-Haddad, commander of the movement’s military wing, and his successor, Mohammed Odeh. The series of assassinations targeting the movement’s second- and third-tier leaders also remains ongoing. On July 25, 2026, the Israeli military announced the assassination of three of the movement’s most prominent leaders: Raed al-Amsi, commander of the Aerial Reconnaissance Platoon; Nabhan al-Amsi, chief of military intelligence; and Hammoud Abu Ghazal, commander of one of the movement’s Nukhba cells.

At the movement and organizational level, Hamas faces complex challenges. For more than a year and ten months, it remained without a head of its political bureau following the assassination of Yahya Sinwar on October 16, 2024, until Khalil al-Hayya was elected on August 5. This points, on the one hand, to a decline in the movement’s structural capacity and, on the other, to growing divisions among its internal currents, particularly between the current close to Iran, now led by al-Hayya, and the current close to Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood, led by Khaled Mashal. Hamas’s position toward the joint U.S.-Israeli war against Iran on February 28, 2026, further reveals these internal divisions. While the movement’s political bureau in Qatar called on Iran to "avoid targeting neighboring countries," the movement’s military spokesman in the Gaza Strip praised "Iranian military efforts".

"Mutual Obstruction": Between Disarmament and Israeli Withdrawal

The disarmament track appears to be separate from, and more complex than, the administrative and institutional arrangements. The agreement signed in July 2026 distinguishes between the stages of handing over weapons and dismantling the military infrastructure, on the one hand, and transferring administrative control, on the other. This naturally requires Hamas’s announcement that it accepts handing over its weapons to be assessed separately from its proactive acceptance of transferring administrative control, particularly as the movement has already taken steps to facilitate and accelerate the latter process.

In this context, Hamas has long promoted, even during the war, attempts to replicate Hezbollah’s model in Lebanon or its own experience in the Gaza Strip prior to 2007 by relinquishing administrative control while remaining a parallel military force. Its declared willingness to give up its weapons does not necessarily amount to actual acceptance of doing so. On many occasions, the movement has responded to pressure on the ground and pressure from mediators by accepting the wording of draft agreements, but such agreement does not necessarily mean that it is willing or able to implement them. For example, when Hamas announced its acceptance of Trump’s peace plan, its statement published on October 3 of the same year reflected a flexible position oscillating between conditional agreement and implicit reservations.

Similarly, Hamas’s announcement that it accepts a process leading to the handover of its weapons can be understood in the same context. Its acceptance was limited to its heavy weapons and conditioned on a complete, rather than gradual, Israeli withdrawal. This "Mutual Obstruction" ,whereby each party conditions its own step on the other party fully completing its corresponding step, has become a feature across multiple fronts. It has come to represent the last line of defense and the remaining tactical minimum around which the complex calculations of the parties associated with the "Unity of the Arenas" meet.

Like Hamas, Hezbollah conditions the handover of its weapons on a complete Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, while Iraqi factions condition the handover of their weapons to the Iraqi state on the withdrawal of U.S. forces. Israel, by contrast, insists on dismantling the military infrastructure of both Hamas and Hezbollah and disarming them before withdrawing. It assesses that an early withdrawal before these steps are completed would deprive it of its military pressure card and recreate conditions that previously allowed both groups to maneuver and reposition themselves. Hamas has repeatedly demonstrated exceptional flexibility in restoring its military infrastructure and rebuilding its arsenal after each round of escalation. Even in its current state of exhaustion and despite losing a vital part of its capabilities, its administrative and organizational structure remains the most cohesive, organized, and influential within the Yellow Line.

Nevertheless, this tactical maneuvering, particularly by Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah, is contingent on the time factor and on the ability of their local support bases to endure. In the past, both groups possessed financial capabilities, sustained economic support, and a continuous Iranian supply of weapons, enabling them to underwrite reconstruction and compensation after periods of escalation and war while preparing for subsequent rounds of confrontation. In the current landscape, however, they have become an obstacle to the gradual return of local populations to normal life, whether in the Gaza Strip or southern Lebanon, as the United States links reconstruction to the groups handing over their weapons and dismantling their military infrastructure.

In addition to the general harm to the public, this situation directly affects the two groups’ social support bases, which have been fragmented by the war. The social and geographical environments that once provided them with strongholds and networks of social and military support have changed substantially. For example, Shuja’iyya constituted one of Hamas’s most prominent social and military strongholds. Statistics indicate that its prewar population ranged between 100,000 and 120,000 people, but by November 2024 more than 80% of its residents had been displaced, leaving it “almost empty,” with fewer than 50 families currently residing there. The same applies to the Jabalia refugee camp, which is considered one of Hamas’s most important traditional strongholds and from which most of its leaders and cadres emerged. Its urban fabric has suffered extensive damage, with approximately 70% of its buildings and civilian infrastructure completely destroyed by May 2024, exceeding the level of destruction in any other area of the Gaza Strip.

Israeli Rejection: The Fine Line Between War and Negotiations

The Israeli government rejected the roadmap, insisting that disarmament must precede any withdrawal, whether gradual or complete. In practice, while Israel continues to prioritize security arrangements, it is simultaneously exploring ways to ease its military burdens, particularly amid multiple fronts and the risk that they could turn into prolonged theaters of attrition.

In the Gaza Strip, Israel faces challenges arising from the gap between its vision for the day after and the realities on the ground, amid uncertainty surrounding governance and administrative arrangements and the international forces tasked with maintaining security and ensuring the restriction of arms. This keeps the Israeli military permanently deployed in areas beyond the Yellow Line, where two divisions are operating inside Gaza—the 143rd Gaza Division and the 99th Reserve Infantry Division—with other units rotating in and out.

With multiple fronts in southern Lebanon and southern Syria, the scope of Israel’s military commitments is expanding. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Israel’s military expenditure rose from 5.4% of GDP in 2022 to 8.8% in 2024. This places significant pressure on economic indicators. According to the Bank of Israel, public debt increased from 61.5% of GDP at the end of 2023 to 86.5% at the end of 2025. Moreover, as a result of the continued mobilization of approximately 360,000 reservists, each week of absence from work results in losses equivalent to 6% of weekly GDP.

On the other hand, the gap between Israel’s vision for the day after and that of the United States is widening, as the U.S. administration presses for the implementation of the roadmap. According to the Israeli Public Broadcasting Corporation, Washington is pressuring Israel to agree to a two-week ceasefire in the Gaza Strip to begin implementing a plan to disarm Hamas, amid opposition from the Israeli government. The central disagreement between the two countries lies in the mechanism for disarmament: Washington is calling for a gradual and verifiable disarmament process in parallel with a phased Israeli withdrawal, while the Israeli government insists on the complete disarmament of Hamas before Israel withdraws.

In addition, Washington is pushing for the initiation of arrangements for the day after, including the formation of a Palestinian technocratic government, the formulation of international arrangements for security and reconstruction, and the establishment of the ISF to assist with security, training, and aid distribution. Israel, meanwhile, appears to insist on maintaining direct security control. While the Israeli military had controlled approximately 64% of the Gaza Strip, in late May 2026 the government instructed the military to expand the area under its control to approximately 70% of Gaza’s territory.

Meanwhile, Israel appears to have three main considerations. First, maintaining its military deployment and the buffer zones that have expanded over the course of the war to provide security depth, even if temporarily, in order to ensure that the threat does not re-emerge before disarmament arrangements are completed. Second, preserving room for autonomy in its security and military decision-making, without reaching a point at which the United States is compelled to impose a settlement on Israel or turn the disagreement into direct strategic pressure. Third, devising a path that ensures the military deployment does not turn into a protracted war of attrition, as the presence of Israeli forces in a hostile environment without a decisive outcome could transform Israel’s military superiority into cumulative attrition.

Accordingly, Israel is pursuing a complex pattern that combines the negotiating and operational tracks. On the one hand, it preserves its operational freedom, while on the other, it keeps both Hezbollah and Hamas engaged in a negotiating process that they urgently need. This also provides Israel with a justification for maintaining its military deployment until the security and political arrangements are completed. In this sense, Israel is managing the situation along the fine line between war and settlement: it neither seeks a return to war at its previous intensity nor wants the negotiations to succeed in producing irreversible arrangements and commitments.

Israel therefore introduces changing complications at each stage of the negotiations. Resolving the issue of disarmament may open a discussion over verification mechanisms, followed by the international force, then policing and security, and subsequently borders and deployment zones, allowing the negotiating process to become protracted.

The significance of this approach lies in the fact that it enables Israel both to retain control over the U.S.-led track while remaining within the broader U.S. framework. Israel raises reservations over specific, relatively minor details rather than the broader frameworks proposed by Washington, thereby keeping disagreements between the two sides manageable and preventing them from spilling over into strategic issues.

Here, Hamas benefits from this Israeli approach. For the movement, prolonging the negotiations allows it to retain its weapons and influence within the Yellow Line, provides it with legitimacy to confront armed factions opposed to it, and redirects the domestic pressure it faces toward the NCAG. It also places the next move in Israel’s court. For Israel, meanwhile, this allows it to preserve the Palestinian geographic and administrative divide and prevents the Palestinian Authority from returning to the Gaza Strip or pressing for such a return.

Finally, the scenario of field stalemate and prolonged, non-consensus negotiations continues to define the situation in the Gaza Strip. Hamas benefits from this by maintaining its influence within the Yellow Line and directing its military focus toward armed factions and militias. In contrast, Israel maintains its military deployment outside the Yellow Line and, through Hamas’s continued presence, ensures an internal Palestinian barrier without the international community calling for the rehabilitation of the Palestinian Authority to administratively unify the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.