“Operation Iron Wall” and the Permanent Crisis Policies

On January 21, 2025, Israel launched “Operation Iron Wall,” a large-scale military operation in the northern West Bank that displaced 40,000 Palestinians from refugee camps in or near Jenin, Tubas, and Tulkarm. The massive operation involved large contingents of the Israel army, the Israel Security Agency (Shabak), and border guards, including four units of the Israeli army’s Kfir Brigade and a unit of commandos supported by air cover from helicopters and drones.

The operation, as of February 6, killed 44 Palestinians and involved the injury and arrests of dozens more, as well as the demolition of Palestinian houses and facilities. Three Israeli soldiers were killed in the Jenin camp and the Tayasir checkpoint in the northern Jordan Valley.

The assault, a political decision following a January 17 meeting of the Israeli cabinet, raises several questions regarding the possibility of Israel expanding its scope to others areas of the West Bank, especially in light of far-right Finance Minister and Deputy Defense Minister Bezalel Smotrich January 21 declaration: “We have begun to change the security concept in Judea and Samaria [the Biblical term many Israelis use to describe the West Bank] and in the campaign to eradicate terrorism in the region.”

Operation’s Timing in the Israeli context

The Israeli operation was launched two days after a negotiated ceasefire in Gaza entered into force on January 19. The ceasefire, rejected by Israeli extremist far-right parties,

exacerbated ongoing disputes within the Israeli government. Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir led his party to resign from the government on January 19, while Smotrich preferred to stay in the government after he had “received a commitment to completely change the method of war,” including “through a gradual takeover of the entire Gaza Strip, the lifting of the restrictions imposed on us by the Biden administration, and full control of the Strip, so that humanitarian aid will not reach Hamas as it has been until now.”

Ben Gvir’s resignation strengthened Smotrich and his party’s influence in the government, especially since the withdrawal of the far-right Jewish Power Party is insufficient to overthrow the government as long as it is not accompanied by the withdrawal of the Religious Zionist Party led by Smotrich. As deputy minister of Defense and head of civil administration in the West Bank, Smotrich is in effect minister of settlements with powers that extend, to a degree, over the lives of West Bank Palestinians as well. Hence, the military operation in the west Bank is linked to the Israeli government’s directions. In fact, the Israel Broadcasting Authority reported in mid-January that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu offered Smotrich and Ben Gvir the construction and expansion of settlements in the West Bank in exchange for their agreeing to a ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip.

The operation also comes in the light of an escalating Israeli rhetoric towards the West Bank, especially by Smotrich, who threatened in November 2024 that 2025 would be the year of “sovereignty in the West Bank.” In December 2024, he revealed a series of measures to annex 60% of the West Bank to Israeli sovereignty, including imposing sovereignty over the settlements before completing it over the rest of the West Bank, as well as closing the Israeli Civil Administration unit in the West Bank.

The Complex Field Reality in the West Bank

Since the outbreak of the war in the Gaza Strip on October 7, 2023, the West Bank, compared to the intensity of escalation witnessed in other secondary fronts, has maintained a state of controlled escalation. Despite repeated attempts by Hamas and Islamic Jihad to intensify the clashes there, along with efforts from Iran and Hezbollah to provide military support to armed groups, the West Bank remains a strategic arena in the confrontation with Israel. The incursions and clashes in the West Bank have remained below the level that would necessitate its transformation into a main war front, unlike the subsequent developments on the Lebanese front.

However, the West Bank suffers from a very complex, interconnected, and fragile security situation. Operation Iron Wall comes after a security campaign carried out by the Palestinian Authority on December 5, 2024, in the Jenin refugee camp under the name of “Operation Protect the Homeland” that lasted 47 days. The Authority described it as part of its efforts to restore order and law in the camp after it witnessed an escalation in the activities of armed groups, especially the Jenin Battalion affiliated with the Islamic Jihad Movement.

Operation Iron Wall is a continuation of a series of previous Israeli military operations: “Operation Summer Camps” in August 2024, “Operation House and Garden” in July 2023, and “Operation Breakwater” in 2022.

However, the current operation, given the context and timing, is clearly different from its predecessors. It comes after the end of the war in Lebanon on November 27, 2024, just days after the ceasefire agreement in Gaza went into effect, and at the start of the exchange of Israeli detainees in Gaza for Palestinian held in Israeli jails. Moreover, officials in U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration have reiterated their support for annexing the West Bank to Israeli sovereignty. In addition, Trump’s initial executive decisions included lifting the ban on settlers accused of committing crimes against human rights.

These circumstances place the current operation at an intersection of Israel’s short- and medium-term objectives. On one hand, there is an Israeli concern that the release of Palestinian prisoners may trigger individual operations and armed clashes, especially since the majority of the prisoners scheduled for release are from the West Bank. On the other hand, the operation coincides with the escalation of Israeli rhetoric regarding the annexation of Area C in the West Bank. It is likely that Operation Iron Wall aims to deter any factors that could lead to popular movements or armed actions in the West Bank.

What to Expect Post-Operation Iron Wall

The Israeli rhetoric includes indications that the ongoing military operation may not be limited to certain areas in the northern West Bank, but could extend to various areas in the West Bank. As Netanyahu stated, the objective of the operation, which he described as “extensive and significant,” is “to eradicate terrorism” in the entire region. Moreover, Defense Minister Israel Katz warned that “the operation could last for months.” This rhetoric is met with field measures that reinforce the reality of the operation’s expansion and depth.

First, the Israeli army naming the operation indicates that what is happening goes beyond repeated incursions and airstrikes, and that there are military objectives that the army seeks to achieve. It is likely that Israel plans to change the ground reality in the West Bank, similar to its experience in Lebanon (“Operation Northern Arrows”) and Gaza (“Operation Iron Swords”), and to reduce infiltration of Palestinians into settlements and Israeli cities, which is suggested by the name given to the operation.

Second, the operation was accompanied by unprecedented field measures, including tightening the closure of various towns and cities in the West Bank, doubling the number of iron gates and earthen berms at their entrances, and establishing new checkpoints and roadblocks across the West Bank. According to data from the Palestinian Colonization & Wall Resistance Commission, the Israeli has set up more than 898 military checkpoints, barriers, and gates in the West Bank, with more than 18 checkpoints added since early 2025.

Third, the Israeli army follows different military strategies from those it used during its previous military operations in Jenin and the West Bank. Katz stated that the army now applies the lessons learned from its operations in the Gaza Strip, and UNRWA revealed that Israel uses advanced weapons in its operation in Jenin.

The separation and division of the West Bank indicate that the military operation tends to be more intensive compared to the Operation Summer Camps that was launched in three main areas: Tulkarem, Jenin, and Tubas. This was done by intensifying the operations in a specific geographic area, which currently includes Jenin, Tubas, and Tulkarm, before expanding to other areas. This seems to be similar to the Israeli army’s tactics on the ground in the Gaza Strip.

Fourth, various areas of the West Bank are witnessing extensive and intensive arrest campaigns, along with field investigations. For the first time, the Israeli army is using white clothing for detainees in Jenin and its refugee camp, similar to what was used in Gaza. This seems to indicate the same classification of detainees and suggests the transfer of the war from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank.

Fifth, there has been an increase in the number of attacks against Palestinians by Israeli settlers. According to Haaretz, an Israeli newspaper, the Israeli security establishment has observed a sharp increase of settlers’ attacks following the ceasefire deal in Gaza Strip. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported settler raids from January14–20 on 11 Palestinian towns and villages in the West Bank’s Qalqilya governorate that injured 17 Palestinians, including two children, and damaged scores of homes (three were set on fire), 30 vehicles, and 440 trees (mostly olive).

In conclusion, whether Operation Iron Wall ends within its current scope or expands further, it is highly unlikely to lead to a definitive security resolution in the West Bank or change the field realities there. The operation seems more like part of the permanent crisis policies by the Israeli far-right government, seeing the crisis as a price for the current government’s survival and a guarantee against its collapse. Israel does not appear to be in a position to open a new comprehensive front like the Gaza Strip, especially given the need for its citizenry, economy, and military to first recover from the war in the Gaza Strip.