Trump 2.0: Political Directions and Regional Changes

The 2024 U.S. presidential election marked a new phase in the American political landscape, with Donald Trump returning to the White House for a second term. This comes amid significant international and domestic attention on the ongoing war in Gaza and Lebanon, within a highly complex and intricate regional scene, which is expected to top the priorities of the incoming U.S. administration. Analysts have largely leaned towards evaluating Trump’s effectiveness by reflecting on his first term in office, with one major distinction in this assessment: first, the difference in the personalities chosen for Trump’s second-term team and their roles in decision-making, and second, the evolving regional and international context compared to the situation Trump faced during his first administration. This raises key questions about the direction of the U.S. administration’s approach to the war in Gaza and Lebanon, as well as other critical issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the stance on Iran, and the expansion of the Arab-Israeli peace agreements.

The Next Administration’s Opening: The War in Gaza and Lebanon

Donald Trump’s victory in the 2024 U.S. presidential election coincided with a changing series of events surrounding the wars in Gaza and Lebanon. The situation in Gaza seems to be heading toward a prolonged war of attrition with neither side able to secure a decisive military victory. This, alongside the complexity surrounding ceasefire negotiations, persists despite the intensified pressure from U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration and international mediators on both the Israeli government and Hamas, which continues to this day.

In contrast, the Lebanese front is moving toward a ceasefire, as Hezbollah has been weakened by precise strikes and is no longer able to maintain Iran’s “Unification of the arenas” strategy. This comes amid the military challenges Israel faced during the first and second phases of its ground operations in southern Lebanon. The likelihood is that the negotiations of  ending the  war in Gaza will face greater obstacles than in Lebanon, where a clearer path toward a political resolution is beginning to take shape.

This is further reinforced when considering the changes in the Israeli government that accompanied the U.S. elections, particularly the prime minister’s dismissal of Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, who was seen as the link between the Israeli government and the Biden administration, and who was more aligned with a traditional strategy of achieving Israeli goals through a conventional approach to managing the conflict. Netanyahu replaced Gallant with Israel Katz, who is known for his previous ties to the Trump administration when he served as Israel’s foreign minister from 2019–2020. These changes were, in fact, interpreted as a response to and preparation for Trump’s return to office in January 2025.

Trump’s victory was widely welcomed by members of the Israeli government, particularly its more extreme factions represented by National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich. This is to be expected, given the steps Trump took during his first term that supported the policies of Israel’s far-right: recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and moving the U.S. embassy there from Tel Aviv in 2017; halting funding for UNRWA and closing the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s Washington office in March 2019; recognizing in March 2017 Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights—territory Israel has occupied since 1967 and illegally annexed in 1981—and declaring in November 2019 that he, Trump, did not consider Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank to be a violation of international law.

Thus, Trump’s latest appointments clearly demonstrate that he is once again following a pattern that diverges from the traditional U.S. policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and from the stance of the international community and international law.

In light of this, the Trump administration will begin its new term in January by addressing the issue of ending the war in Gaza and the political settlement following a ceasefire in Lebanon. Throughout his campaign, Trump repeatedly pledged to end the conflict on both fronts, without specifying how his approach would differ from that of the Biden administration or the price various parties would need to pay in order to accept a political deal that would halt the fighting or conclude in a more comprehensive agreement.

To determine his expected policy in this regard, it is essential to first examine the composition of Trump’s nominees for key positions in his administration, particularly those responsible for Middle Eastern affairs. The backgrounds and positions of these nominees provide insights into the new U.S. administration’s approach to the Middle East. It is also crucial to assess the practicality of their proposed solutions in light of developments in the region between Trump’s first and second terms, and to consider the viability of implementing his agenda, visions, and ambitions, especially after the wars in Gaza and Lebanon have served to further intertwine Middle Eastern issues. These include not only the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but also the U.S. approach to Iran and the continuation of Arab-Israeli peace agreements.

The Directions of Trump’s Second Administration Team

The completion of Trump announcing his top appointments allows for a closer examination of the plans and positions likely to be adopted during his second term, especially with regard to the region. In fact, Trump’s team is aligned in terms of background and outlook on three key issues: the stance on Iranian foreign policy and its nuclear weapons program; Arab-Israeli relations, particularly within the framework of economic and military cooperation; and U.S. policies toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, especially concerning the war in Gaza and the day after.

Among the most prominent nominees are Sen. Marco Rubio as secretary of State, Rep. Michael Waltz as National Security advisor, Mike Huckabee as U.S. ambassador to Israel, Rep. Elise Stefanik as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Rep. John Ratcliffe as director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Steven Witkoff as special envoy for the Middle East, and Massad Boulos as senior advisor for Arab and Middle Eastern affairs. With the exception of Witkoff and Boulos, who both come from investment backgrounds, the political nominees share almost identical views regarding the endorsement of the U.S. “Maximum Pressure Act” against Iran, regional Arab-Israeli integration, and unconditional support for Israel’s sovereignty over Palestinian territories.

When examining their positions, we find, for example, their alignment on Iran. Rubio, for instance, introduced the “Stop Harboring Iranian Petroleum (SHIP) Act” and co-sponsored the “End Iranian Terrorism Act 2024.” Trump described Waltz as an “expert on the threats posed by China, Russia, Iran, and global terrorism.” In 2021, Waltz helped spearhead a bipartisan letter to the Biden administration urging it not to ignore Iran’s “nuclear program, their ballistic missile program, and their funding of terrorism.” He also supported Israel conducting strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities at Natanz in response to the Iranian missile attack on Israel in early October. Meanwhile, Ratcliffe, also a supporter of anti-Iran policies, has repeatedly accused the Biden administration of shifting U.S. intelligence assets and priorities away from groups like Hamas, which, he said, led to the failure to predict or thwart the October attacks.

Their positions also converge on the war in Gaza and the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Rubio played a leading role in advocating for the U.S. embassy’s relocation to Jerusalem. Waltz, after his nomination, stated that the new administration should “let Israel finish the job.” Stefanik has called the United Nations biased against Israel and, in a speech delivered at the Israeli Knesset in May 2024, demanded unconditional support for Israel to “achieve total victory in the face of evil.” Huckabee, a self-described “Christian Zionist” and staunch supporter of Israeli settlement expansion, has rejected the two-state solution, stating that the West Bank belongs to Israel: “The title deed was given by God to Abraham and to his heirs.”

Trump Between Two Administrations: A Shift in Realities and Contexts

It can be said that a second Trump administration would not differ significantly in its policies compared to his first, particularly regarding the three main issues previously mentioned. Observers tend to view the situation as a continuation of his initial policies, with a focus on resolving key regional challenges, notably the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, the prevailing notion that this team will deliver what the far-right in Israel wants is highly complex, especially considering the strong interconnection between the three issues, due in large part to the ongoing war in Gaza and Lebanon.

On one hand, Israel portrays the war as being fought on seven fronts led by Iran, with its actions becoming clearer after it expanded its war against Hezbollah in Lebanon and intensified its strikes in Syria, aiming to undermine the armed factions in its vicinity. In doing so, Israel seeks to disrupt Iran’s “Unification of the arenas” strategy, which is tied to Iran’s foreign policy tools in the region. This was also a goal of the first Trump administration, which adopted a more hardline approach towards Iran’s regional behavior. This approach manifested in the imposition of stringent economic sanctions targeting Iran’s oil exports, significantly reducing Iranian oil exports by 90%. This culminated in the assassination of Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force, in a U.S. airstrike in January 2020.

However, Trump will face a different regional reality compared to his first term, particularly with the end of the broader conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran. This shift occurred after the two countries resumed diplomatic relations brokered by China in March 2023. The Iranian threat had been a cornerstone of Trump’s strategy toward the region, as well as a key starting point for regional countries in shaping their relations and alliances. In general, the reconciliation process that began in 2021 has proven to be a strategic choice and a solid path for the countries of the region. It has led to enhanced coordination, especially between former rivals. For example, the Egyptian-Qatari cooperation in the Gaza ceasefire negotiations and the alignment of Saudi and Iranian positions on the call for a ceasefire illustrate this growing cooperation.

On the other hand, Israel is attempting to exploit the war in Gaza to advance it’s plan for “liquidating the Palestinian cause” by gaining security and social control over the Gaza Strip, opposing the unification of the administration in the West Bank and Gaza under the Palestinian Authority, and moving towards reliance on private security companies to enforce order and the rule of law, especially in the northern areas of the Strip.

 This is happening alongside renewed talks about applying sovereignty over the West Bank. On November 11, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich announced that 2025 would be “The year of sovereignty in Judea and Samaria” Following the appointment of settler Yechiel Leiter as Israel’s ambassador to the United States, Huckabee, U.S. ambassador-designate to Israel, suggested on November 13 that Washington would approve the annexation plan. The talk of annexation intensified after Trump’s statement during his election campaign regarding the expansion of Israel, aligning with the vision of his first administration’s 2021 “Peace to Prosperity” plan to resolve the conflict and remove it from the broader regional agenda, under the assumption that the Palestinian cause had lost its regional and international significance—a view that was later proven wrong.

The pursuit of this vision, however, faces other equally important issues, including the fate of the Saudi-American-Israeli peace negotiations. Riyadh remains committed to its condition of the establishment of a Palestinian state based on the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative and the relevant international and UN frameworks for concluding a peace agreement with Israel. This condition has become a commitment for Saudi Arabia, especially it launched the “Global Alliance for Implementation of the Two-State Solution” in September 2024. This unified regional vision to prevent Israel from exploiting the war to decisively resolve the conflict will continue to be an obstacle for the Trump administration in reconciling its own agenda with regional requirements, particularly with allied countries that have peace agreements with Israel.

The important question now is whether Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his current government still see the events of October 7 as an exceptional opportunity to completely reshape the Middle East. In light of his rejection of calls for a ceasefire, is Netanyahu pushing for what he vowed in a fiery speech this July before the U.S. Congress would be a “total victory” over Hamas no matter the cost?

This suggests a scenario of continued military operations in Gaza, a long-term security presence in the northern Gaza Strip, and a reshuffling of the situation in Lebanon—despite the ceasefire agreement—while maintaining a broader strategy aimed at neutralizing Iran’s proxies in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, as well as ending the concept of the Iranian nuclear threat and missile program. All of this would align with a strong desire to finally eliminate the two-state solution once and for all.

It is important to note, however, that military and security assessments indicate that the war has ended and achieved its objectives, and that Israel may need to step back slightly to create space for a political agreement.

The Changing U.S. Approach Regarding the War

The Biden administration has defined its stance on the war in Gaza based on three key pillars. The first is the rejection of a ceasefire until Hamas is completely eradicated. The second is the rejection of Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip or any territorial changes within it. The third is preventing the geographical expansion of the war, particularly into Lebanon, and avoiding the risk of a broader regional conflict.

Despite the dramatic shifts that were evident on secondary battlefronts and the clear trend towards greater independence of these fronts, especially on the Lebanese front, from the main theater of the war in Gaza in terms of goals and developments, the Biden administration continued to integrate all fronts into a unified approach. This was reflected in the joint statement America, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy released this August calling for an end to the war in Gaza. This came amid the U.S. effort to deter Hezbollah and Iran from retaliating for the assassination of Fouad Shukur, a senior Hezbollah official, and Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas’s Political Bureau, on July 31.

However, it is likely that the first changes under a second Trump administration would involve adopting an approach that separates the Gaza front from the outcomes of the war in Lebanon. This would not only be in terms of operational context within the framework of the “Unification of the arenas,” but also in terms of the independence of U.S. strategy and objectives towards each arena. The Trump administration may view the war in Gaza as part of the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while linking the outcomes of the war in Lebanon to the U.S. stance on Iran, seeing it as part of efforts to undermine and contain Iran’s influence.

The independence of action not only influences the course of both wars but also their aftermath and the days that follow them. While Trump vowed to end the war in Gaza, the manner in which this will be achieved remains unclear. On one hand, Israel is moving forward with unilaterally shaping the post-war landscape. On the other hand, the negotiations remain complex, as both sides hold firm to their positions.

This is particularly the case given Hamas’s inability to make an independent decision to halt the war in the same way it initiated the October attacks, especially after Gaza has suffered an unprecedented humanitarian crisis that significantly limits the movement’s ability to engage with the Israeli stance that insists on maintaining its forces and infrastructure in the sector. This situation puts Hamas in a difficult position, facing popular accountability from the people of Gaza regarding the effectiveness of the war and its attacks.

Israeli measures, meanwhile, indicate plans for a long-term presence in the Gaza Strip, and it seems unlikely that Israel will withdraw before securing an alternative to Hamas that can manage and ensure security in the area. Both internal and external pressures in Israel are mounting regarding the readiness of the timing to finalize a deal for the release of Israeli hostages, prompting the negotiating parties to search for temporary ceasefire frameworks under the supervision of a team led by Trump.

Amid these developments, Trump recently threatened “all hell to pay” if the Israeli hostages are not released. This seems to be a message aimed at Hamas and its supporters, particularly Iran, signaling that the prospects for relying on negotiations have become limited in the final rounds, and the failure to achieve a resolution may lead to new actors, including the United States, engaging either through intelligence or possibly direct military involvement in Gaza.

In general, the incoming administration seems more responsive to Israeli demands compared to the current administration, particularly regarding Israel’s operational and security control over Gaza, and the direction towards resolving other political and economic issues, such as reconstruction and the establishment of an alternative governance framework by de facto rule. At the same time, Trump appears to be leaving open the possibility of a two-state solution, keeping the idea of a return to Palestinian rule in Gaza as a potential outcome.

The same applies to the West Bank. While discussions about applying Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank are increasing, assuming that the Trump administration would approve such plans is premature. This is not only because it would be an obstacle to expanding peace agreements between Arab states and Israel, but also because it would be difficult for Israel to gain international legitimacy for annexation. In addition, such a move could disadvantage Israel legally and internationally. Trump’s administration has refrained from endorsing unilateral action that lacks Arab acceptance or Palestinian participation.

Some members of Trump’s team have described annexation as an Israeli decision, leaving the door open for the incoming U.S. administration to either use it as a bargaining chip, to gain flexibility in legitimizing annexation, or to reject or divide it. It remains possible to explore partial agreements, such as U.S. recognition of Israeli sovereignty over Area C, which constitutes more than 60% of the West Bank, and which is recognized under the Oslo Accords as part of Israel’s security and political sovereignty, without undermining the Palestinian Authority and keeping the two-state solution as a viable option.

American approaches toward Lebanon are varied; some focus on domestic Lebanese issues while others are centered on the U.S. stance towards Iran. From a Lebanese perspective, following the weakening of Hezbollah, it is likely that Washington will seek to remove Lebanon from the broader regional equation and the “axis of resistance,” regardless of whether Hezbollah remains militarily or politically active. This could involve pressure to negotiate a final resolution for Lebanon, not just a ceasefire, which would include re-negotiating disputed land borders.

The United States might recognize Israel’s sovereignty over these areas, similar to its recognition of Israel’s sovereignty over the occupied Golan Heights. Resolving this issue through negotiations would signal a growing trend of mutual recognition between the two countries following their agreement on maritime border demarcation in 2022. This could lead to further steps, such as signing a non-aggression pact that would pave the way for normalization of relations between the two countries. This scenario becomes more likely as other Lebanese political factions position themselves in the void left by Hezbollah’s retreat.

On the other hand, Hezbollah is considered a key component of Iran’s regional network. Its participation in the conflict followed the October 2023 attacks carried out by Hamas against settlements and military bases in the Gaza envelope. The movement is part of a broader involvement of various parties in the “axis of resistance” escalation, particularly in Yemen, Iraq, and even Iran itself, which carried out direct attacks on Israel in mid-April and early October. For conservatives, this presents an additional reason to tighten the noose around Iran, either by reconsidering the development of the maximum pressure campaign in a way that aligns with the current situation in Iran or by exploiting Iran’s declining geopolitical position to extract strategic concessions from it, whether in its regional policies or its military and nuclear programs.

This would also involve intensifying pressure on its proxies, especially after the war in Lebanon demonstrated the potential to damage Iran’s foreign policy assets. Israeli strikes in Syria and Lebanon against Iranian military leaders and Hezbollah commanders, including Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, have weakened the party’s strength and presence. It is likely that Washington will tighten its measures against other Iranian proxies, such as the U.S. State Department re-designating the Houthi rebels in Yemen as an official foreign terrorist organization, which would threaten their supporters and collaborators with U.S. sanctions and prevent recognition of them as a legitimate local force in Yemen.

In the coming period, we may witness intensified efforts to cement the changes in the balance of power in Syria, particularly after the gap created by Israeli strikes against Iran’s strategic positioning just as Tehran was seeking to fill the vacuum left by the relative decline of a Russian military presence in Syria. Arab countries, for example, are now actively working to leverage these changes toward establishing sustainable solutions in Syria, both politically and developmentally, and to separate the Syrian arena from Iranian influence. Reuters reported that the United States and the United Arab Emirates are engaged in discussions aimed at lifting sanctions on Syria in exchange for neutralizing it from the Iranian axis and preventing Syrian territory from becoming a route for supplying Hezbollah with Iranian weapons.

In contrast, armed groups have sought to exploit these changes by launching a strategic deterrence of aggression operation aimed at controlling a geographical area that includes the city of Aleppo and stretches to the borders of Hama as of December 2, 2024. This ongoing and potentially evolving operation has been attributed by the Biden administration to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s refusal to engage in a political settlement. As a result, Iraq remains the only arena in the “axis of resistance” that maintains its connection to Iran and the other fronts in Syria and Lebanon without significant damage or changes. This suggests an increased likelihood of intensifying military pressure and retaliatory strikes against armed factions in Iraq.

Finally, the second-term policies of the Trump administration toward regional issues appear more constrained by developments that occurred in the region between his two terms, particularly on key issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the expansion of Arab-Israeli peace agreements. Meanwhile, the war zones in Gaza and Lebanon provide the Trump administration with an opportunity to bring about changes in their respective contexts, especially politically, and on critical issues such as the future of Lebanese-Israeli relations or the governance and administration of the Gaza Strip. This suggests that while the second Trump administration may have the ability to address wartime issues, it would not necessarily resolve the more strategic questions underlying these conflicts.