Palestinian Individual Operations Since the Outbreak of War in the Gaza Strip

Individual operations—including shootings, car ramming, stabbings, and other violent incidents—have become a concurrent activity alongside developments in the Gaza Strip war. From the outbreak of the conflict until mid–August 2024, these operations have targeted a wide geographic area encompassing the West Bank and Israeli cities. This has occurred despite proactive Israeli military and security campaigns that include near-daily incursions, arrest operations, and the increased use of drones to assassinate leaders of armed Palestinian groups in the northern area of the West Bank.

The variation in factors and conditions across different areas of Palestinian armed activity—whether in Gaza, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, or Israeli cities—raises questions about the significance, motivations, and implications of these incidents. This includes their connection to the Gaza Strip war and the unprecedented humanitarian suffering, as well as calls from leaders of various armed factions, both military and political, to their supporters and sympathizers outside Gaza to engage in the operations of October 7. Additionally, the impact of increased Israeli security and military measures in both the interior of Israel and the West Bank needs to be assessed to understand how these measures affect the frequency of operations, be it by increasing or decreasing their number.

 Individual Operations In the Context of the War and Diagnosis

The attacks launched by Hamas and other Palestinian factions in the Gaza Strip against settlements and military sites in the Gaza Envelope on October 7, 2023, were part of a broader vision of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Through this operation, the factions aimed to extend their efforts to include all Palestinian territories, including Gaza, the West Bank, and the Green Line areas.

Initial statements from al-Qassam Brigades and Hamas leaders in the aftermath of October 7 collectively called for intensifying activities against Israeli targets and creating what is known as “the unity of the arenas” both internally and across all fronts of the commonly called Axis of Resistance. This message was particularly underscored in the televised speech delivered that morning by the head of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Mohammed Deif, who Israel claims to have killed July 13 in an air raid it launched in a humanitarian zone in southern Gaza’s Khan Younis that massacred 88 Palestinians. Despite Israel’s claims, Osama Hamdan, a Hamas senior official, confirmed on August 15 that Hamdan is “fine.”

In the context of the cumulative research conducted by the STRATEGIECS Institute on the concept of the unity of the arenas and its applications, it is crucial to highlight the activity within the internal arenas, which, according to the perspective of Palestinian factions, includes the West Bank, Jerusalem, and inside Israel while excluding the main arena of the war in the Gaza Strip. There has been a lack of coverage regarding the level, type, and frequency of Palestinian military operations against Israeli targets in these areas since the outbreak of the Gaza conflict. This research aims to clarify the behavior, trends, and extent of activities in these arenas, and how they have been influenced by the developments of the war.

Both theoretically and objectively, it is not possible to explain the escalation in the West Bank from both the Palestinian and Israeli perspectives solely in the context of the calls from armed factions in the Gaza Strip to intensify armed activity against Israeli targets. Nor is it possible to separate it from the broader Gaza conflict. Many Palestinians in the West Bank and Israel feel the need to show solidarity with the people of Gaza and to react against Israeli practices.

However, focusing exclusively on the war might also overlook the underlying factors fueling the escalation in both the West Bank and in Israel, including political, economic, security, and general living conditions. This escalation manifests in two main forms: organized and individual operations.

While the term individual operations is broad in concept and description, it primarily refers to those operations, carried out by one or more executors, that do not escalate to full-scale confrontations. These operations lack a clear tactic or specific strategy, and most perpetrators do not leave messages or record statements before carrying them out. There is no requirement for adherence to a particular ideological discourse, and the operations use various offensive methods, including shootings, stabbings, car ramming, and explosive device detonations.

These individual operations are distinct from the ongoing clashes between Palestinian groups and the Israeli army in the northern West Bank. It is therefore important to consider the different terminologies used to describe them. They are referred to as “individual operations,” or “fedayeen operations” in some contexts, while Israel labels this type of activity as “individual terrorism” or “isolated terrorism.”

What distinguishes this type of operation is its decentralized nature in terms of planning, guidance, and execution, irrespective of the executor’s affiliation with an organizational structure or chain of command. Over the past three years, various factions or armed groups have adopted individual operations.

For instance, Hamas claimed responsibility for the March 2023 suicide bombing of the Dizengoff Center in Tel Aviv that was carried out by a lone Palestinian gunman. Likewise, the Mujahideen Brigades claimed responsibility for the car-ramming operation in Ramla, Israel on July 14 that was carried out by a lone individual who injured four Israeli soldiers in a double operation involving car ramming and shooting. Many other individual operations may have also received financial and media support  without explicitly acknowledging or revealing such support.

On the other hand, recent individual operations have been carried out by members of field-based armed groups active in the northern West Bank, such as the Palestinian militant group Lions’ Den in Nablus and the Jenin and Tulkarem Brigades, among others. Hence, separate incidents alongside but separate from the war can be categorized as individual operations, even if the perpetrator is part of an organizational structure.

Often, the perpetrator acts independently, sometimes contrary to given instructions. Notable examples include the shooting of detainees by Hamas guards, as stated in a written announcement by the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades published August 12. Additionally, in atypical cases, a Palestinian police officer carried out a shooting operation this year between Nablus and Ramallah on February 29, and, in an unprecedented incident, on April 30 a Turkish tourist executed a stabbing operation in Jerusalem.

Since the outbreak of the Gaza war, the STRATEGIECS Institute has documented at least 37 individual operations based on both open and proprietary sources. This number is considered sufficiently accurate for reliance, given the comparison with reports from both Palestinian and Israeli sources. The data includes specific details, such as the number of casualties, the type of weapon used, the location, and the timing of each operation.

Our detailed reading of the frequency and patterns of individual operations during the Gaza war, from its outbreak in October 2023 to mid–August 2024, will compare these findings with open-source data on individual operations from previous years, specifically since 2014, when such operations surged in conjunction with the Gaza war. The comparison will also include the 2021 conflict and the current war.

Individual Operations: Frequency, Types, and Scope

The number of individual operations during the Gaza war reveals changes in this type of armed activity since its emergence in 2015 in a wave pattern that fluctuates in intensity according to the dynamics of the conflict and specific pivotal events.

Given the new conditions imposed by the war and the stringent Israeli measures in the West Bank and towards Palestinians within Israel, it is essential to study the frequency of these operations in terms of their numbers and distribution across the ten months of the conflict. We will also examine their correlation with events during the war, such as Israeli airstrikes that caused significant casualties in Gaza, comparing periods of ceasefire, intensification of the war, and negotiation times.

Additionally, it is important to analyze the types of operations, including the tools used in the operations, methods of execution, and the entities claiming responsibility. Finally, the geographical scope of the operations, whether in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, or Israeli cities.

First: Frequency of the Operations

Since the outbreak of the Gaza war on October 7, 2023, up to mid–August 2024, there have been approximately 37 individual operations. March 2024 recorded the highest number of individual operations: six. This is followed by November and December 2023, and April 2024, each with five operations. Conversely, May and June 2024 each saw the fewest number of operations: one.

Overall, the individual operations have resulted in the deaths of 24 Israelis and at least 103 injuries.

During the first three months of the war, there were 12 individual operations. In contrast, the subsequent eight months of 2024 saw an increase to 25 individual operations. This indicates that the frequency of individual operations was higher in the initial months of the war compared to the early months of 2024.

November and December were the second-highest months with five operations apiece. March experienced the most with six. The importance of highlighting these months lies in the significant events that concurrently occurred during the war. In November, Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip began with Israeli forces taking control of Salah al-Din Street in the central Gaza Strip and advancing towards Al-Rasheed Street. Additionally, individual operations continued even during the first ceasefire period from the 24th to the 30th of November. Notably, on November 30, two operations were carried out, one in Jerusalem and the other in Jericho, despite the calm that prevailed in other regions, particularly in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen.

The decline in individual operations in May and June 2024 can be attributed to significant military and strategic developments. This period, for instance, followed Israel’s May 7 invasion of Rafah, which killed seven Palestinian children, and the closure of the crucial border crossing, as well as Israel taking control of the Philadelphi corridor exactly one month later on June 7. During this same period, Israel announced its transition to a third phase of the war: from high-intensity operations to lower-intensity tactical battles. This phase marked a critical turning point in the Gaza war, with the Israeli army operationally controlling various areas of the Gaza Strip.

During the period of the Israeli military siege on the Shifa Hospital, March 18–April 1, 2024, four individual operations were carried out. On March 19, a gunman fired at Shabak (Israeli Security Agency) personnel near the Beit Fajjar junction south of Bethlehem. On March 22, an Israeli soldier was killed and six Israelis were injured in a shooting in Ramallah. On March 28, a shooting occurred in Jericho, resulting in the injury of three Israelis. And on March 31, a stabbing operation took place in the Be’er Sheva area, resulting in injuries to two people, one of them an Israeli army officer.

Following the Israeli bombing of the Al-Mawasi area in Khan Yunis on July 13, 2024, which resulted in at least 90 casualties, a double individual operation involving a vehicle ramming and shooting was carried out in the Ramla area on July 14, resulting in the injury of an officer and three soldiers. The Mujahideen Brigades claimed responsibility, stating that it was in response to the “massacres and crimes committed by the Israeli occupation against the Palestinian people everywhere, including the recent massacres in Al-Mawasi in Khan Yunis and the beach and Nuseirat camps.”

Following the Israeli bombing of the Al-Tabeen School on August 10, 2024, which resulted in more than 100 casualties, two related incidents occurred. On August 11, a shooting operation took place in the settlement of Nahliel in the northern Jordan valley, targeting a military vehicle. This operation resulted in the death of an Israeli soldier and the injury of another. Hamas claimed responsibility, stating that it was in response to the bombing of the Al-Tabeen School. On August 12, two Hamas members responsible for guarding detainees in the Gaza Strip opened fire on three of them, killing one Israeli detainee and seriously injuring two others. Abu Ubaida, a spokesperson for the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, linked the shooting to the Israeli “massacres,” including the recent attack on the Al-Tabeen School.

Second: Type of the Operations

The individual operations were distributed as follows: 17 shooting operations, 12 stabbing operations, five car ramming operations, and three double operations involving the use of two methods.

Among the 37 individual operations, the shooting operation in Jerusalem on November 30, 2024, resulted in the highest number of casualties, with four deaths.

1- Shooting

Shooting operations resulted in the highest number of casualties, with 21 killed and approximately 53 injured.

There were 16 shooting incidents in the West Bank and Jerusalem, and only one in Israel: the Ashdod operation on February 16 this year. Additionally, shooting was used in three double operations carried out in Israel: the Ramla operation on July 14 and two operations in Tel Aviv, one on January 15, 2024, and the other on August 4, 2024.

The most shooting incidents occurred in Ramallah and its vicinity, Jerusalem, Qalqilya, and Nablus, with three incidents in each.

2- Stabbing

These resulted in seven deaths and approximately 12 injuries. Eight of the stabbing operations occurred in the West Bank and Jerusalem, and four took place in Israel. Stabbing was used as a secondary method in two operations in Israel, both of which were in Tel Aviv.

3- Car Ramming

These resulted in two deaths and 21 injuries. Three car ramming operations occurred in the West Bank and two took place in Israel.

4- Double Operations

These resulted in three deaths and approximately 24 injuries. Three double operations occurred in Israel, involving a combination of shooting, car ramming, and stabbing. Out of the three double operations, two were carried out in Tel Aviv and one in Ramla.

Third: Scope of Operations

Individual operations were carried out in 17 different locations, with 27 operations in the West Bank and Jerusalem, and 10 in Israel.

Their geographic scope includes Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, Tira, Be’er Sheva, Ashdod, southern Negev, Ramla, Tulkarm, Qalqilya, Nablus, Jenin, Ramallah, Al-Bireh, Jericho, Hebron, Bethlehem, and the northern Jordan Valley. Nine operations occurred in Jerusalem, followed by at least four operations in the central West Bank areas around Ramallah and Al-Bireh. The operations were distributed across the West Bank’s geographic scope, with five operations in the northern West Bank areas of Nablus and Jenin, four operations in Qalqilya in the western West Bank, two in the southern West Bank in Hebron and Bethlehem, and three in Jericho and the northern Jordan Valley. In Israel, there were two operations each in Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Ashdod, and one operation each in Be’er Sheva, southern Negev, Ramla, and Karmiel in the Upper Galilee.

Operational Data:

The distribution of Israeli fatalities by geographic scope resulting from individual operations is as follows: seven in Jerusalem, four in Nablus, three each in Tel Aviv and Ashdod, two in the Upper Galilee and Qalqilya, and one each in Ramallah, the northern Jordan Valley, and the Negev.

Armed factions claimed responsibility for three individual operations. Two of them—in Jerusalem on November 30, 2023 and the Nahliel Israeli settlement in the northern Jordan Valley on August 11, 2024—were claimed by the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas. The Brigades’ operations resulted in five deaths, with shooting used as the primary or secondary method in all cases. The Mujahideen Brigades claimed responsibility for the third operation, which occured in the Ramla area of Israel on July 14, 2024.

Most of the operations were carried out by a single individual, except for four operations executed by two individuals each, three of which were in Jerusalem and the West Bank, and one in Tel Aviv. The perpetrators of three operations, two of which occurred in Tel Aviv and one in Haifa, managed to illegally infiltrate from the West Bank into Israel.

Palestinians from within Israel carried out five individual operations, including three stabbings, one car ramming, and one double operation, the last of which was claimed by the Mujahideen Brigades.

A Comparative Overview

The previous data reveals the following:

- There was an increase in the number of individual operations from October 7, 2023, to August 19, 2024, compared to the year 2022 and the first nine months of 2023. In 2022, there were approximately 12 operations, and up until September 2023 there were approximately 22 operations. This increase can be explained in the context of the Gaza Strip conflict, especially since there are clear operations that are responses to events in Gaza. However, the rise in the frequency of these operations remains within a controlled escalation, aligning with the broader escalation of various military and civilian activities in the West Bank in opposition to the war in Gaza. This trend does not resemble the “uprising” style of individual operations seen during the years 2015–2016.

- Secondly, the previous data reveals that the rate of individual operations was lower compared to years of heightened escalation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including the escalation series that began in 2014, which was linked to attempts to divide Jerusalem and an increase in settler attacks against Palestinian residents. Most infamous were the July 2, 2014 burning, bludgeoning, and murder by Israeli citizens of 16-year-old Mohammed Abu Khdeir, a Palestinian boy living in the Shufat camp in Jerusalem, and the burning to death of 18-month-old Ali Dawabsheh and his parents, Saad and Riham, who died both a week later in the hospital, after Israeli settlers firebombed their home in the village of Duma in Nablus on July 31, 2015. This led to confrontations collectively known as the “Jerusalem Intifada” or “Knife Uprising.” In total, by the end of 2015, there were approximately 186 stabbing and 42 vehicle ramming operations, which then significantly decreased in 2016 to 50 stabbing and 10 vehicle ramming operations.

Likewise, the escalation in 2021, following a series of events that included Israel’s attempts to expel Palestinian residents of Sheikh Jarrah in Jerusalem and Israel’s installation of steel barriers around the famed Al-Aqsa Mosque in East Jerusalem, led to clashes known as the “May Uprising” or the “Sword of Jerusalem.” This unrest affected Gaza, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Palestinians living in Israel. Not coincidentally, according to open sources there were approximately 47 individual operations in 2021: 12 shooting, 30 stabbing, and five vehicle ramming. This is a noticeable variation in the frequency of individual operations, between their rise and decline, and their connection to events and developments on the Palestinian scene and their priorities. The frequency of these operations increased significantly during events that either threatened to or did alter the status quo as well as attempts at displacement. During such periods, individual operations were carried out at a higher rate compared to incidents and developments in other areas, whether in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip.

Conclusion

This explanation seems to apply to the results regarding the scope and frequency of operations during the analysis period. Jerusalem witnessed the highest number of individual operations during the war. Regarding the frequency, the increase in November can be attributed to the rise in Israeli rhetoric and plans for the displacement of Gaza’s residents. In late October, Israeli daily Calcalist leaked an internal document circulated by Israeli Intelligence Minister Gila Gamliel that presented a plan to relocate Gaza’s population to Sinai.

In November, Knesset members launched an initiative to evacuate Gaza residents to countries willing to accept them. That same month, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich declared that evacuating Palestinian residents from their homes, which he called “voluntary migration,” was the “right humanitarian solution” for them and the region. Prior to this statement, Smotrich had called for isolating West Bank Palestinians, and it is likely that his assuming administrative control over the West Bank intensified fears among West Bank residents of the displacement option being reintroduced as an Israeli solution to the conflict.

In the context of the current war, the stringent Israeli measures in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and against Palestinians within Israel—including intensified monitoring, security, and intelligence operations; targeted assassinations; arrests; preemptive raids; increased checkpoints; and intensive home and bodily searches—cannot be overlooked. As a result of these measures, it is likely that a number of operations equivalent to or exceeding those recorded may have fallen into the category of thwarted operations discovered before or at the moment of their execution.

Despite the overall decrease in the frequency of individual operations during the current war, or their fluctuation compared to previous years, the nature of these operations has exhibited new characteristics. They have shifted from a context of spontaneity to one of organization and planning. For example, there have been operations involving infiltration from the West Bank into Israel. Although such attempts risk failure due to the potential for arrest or thwarting of the operation, they also demonstrate the capability to conduct operations within Israel.

This was evident in three infiltration attempts in which the executors entered with illegal permits, despite Israel canceling hundreds of works permits for West Bank residents to limit individual operations. This was an attempt to disrupt the Israeli security system. Additionally, the geographic scope of operations expanded during the war, covering a wide range of locations across various cities and areas in the West Bank as well as in seven Israeli sites and cities.

What stands out during the analysis period is the significant increase in individual operations that employed guns; shooting ranked first compared to stabbing and ramming operations. This is a relatively new practice on the Palestinian scene compared to the 2015–2020 period, which mostly relied on readily available tools such as bladed weapons or vehicles. This shift suggests a connection between individual operations and armed field groups, as well as an increase in the availability of firearms.

The exceptional nature of this development occurs within the context of the aforementioned intensified Israeli measures in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and against Palestinians within Israel. Additionally, there have been restrictions on movement, increased checkpoint searches, and blockades on certain camps and cities. For instance, the Israeli army declared the Jenin area and its refugee camp a “closed military zone” multiple times, including in November 2023 and June 2024.

Finally, the previous results clearly indicate the impact of the Palestinian political and geographic division on operating as a unified and common arena. The exception are cases that directly address the most central issues of the Palestinian cause, such as the status of East Jerusalem and Islamic holy sites, as well as concerns about displacement, which are tied to the memory of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The analysis also shows a direct correlation between individual operations and the war in the Gaza Strip, indicating that this correlation is contributory and reinforcing rather than being an independent or primary cause. When comparing the frequency, scope, and nature of these operations to their form since their inception in 2015, it is evident that these operations maintain their continuity due to the weakness of armed groups in the West Bank. The frequency of individual operations increases or decreases according to the overall trajectory of the conflict, which explains their limited rise during the Gaza war.