Complications of the Gaza Ceasefire Agreement

The ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel entered into force on January 19, 2025, in a pivotal step to end the war that broke out on October 7, 2023, after Hamas attacked Israeli bases and settlements inside the Gaza envelope. In a breakthrough achieved by the mediators—Qatar, Egypt, and the United States—after dozens of previous attempts to reach an agreement between the two parties faltered. In fact, the agreement coincides with regional and international changes, but it is also accompanied by complications in the implementation of its provisions and field difficulties that place a sustainable ceasefire amidst many challenges.

 The Regional and International Landscape Accompanying The Agreement

The agreement of the two parties to the ceasefire came after months spent negotiating, specifically in the period following the temporary ceasefire (humanitarian truce) on November 22, 2023. As the framework for a deal drafted by the mediators—Egypt, Qatar, and the United States—along with Israel stalled in France on January 28, 2024, the negotiations reached an advanced stage in early May 2024. Hamas agreed to a proposal for a ceasefire on May 6, 2024, before it faltered as a result of Israel’s rejection, its move to launch a military offensive in Rafah, and controlling of its crossing on May 7, 2024.

This did not prevent the outgoing U.S. President Joe Biden from presenting a plan similar to a phased vision for stability in the Middle East on May 31, 2024, that included ending the war in the Gaza Strip. However the terms of negotiation between the two parties and the details prevented its execution. During that period, negotiations between the two sides stalled until the tripartite declaration of the mediators revived them on August 15, 2024, but without real chances of success at the time.

Nevertheless, the recent agreement on the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip comes within the context of a series of significant regional and international shifts that contributed to creating the conditions that pushed the parties to agree to it. Additionally, less than two months before this agreement, a similar one was reached on the Lebanese front on November 27, 2024, that led to the withdrawal of Hezbollah from participating in the “unification of the arenas” after the armed group suffered losses in its military infrastructure and leadership structure.

These losses negatively impacted the effectiveness of what the parties of the unification of areanas Front called Support Fronts, leaving the Houthis as the sole participants. Especially after the decline in attacks from Iraqi armed factions and the increasing risks surrounding Iran, particularly after the Israeli airstrikes on October 26, 2024, against ballistic missile facilities in response to the Iranian missile attacks in early October.

In a related context, Syria, which was a member of the so-called Axis of Resistance and played a pivotal and logistical role in the unification of the arenas, underwent dramatic transformations. Several armed organizations, calling themselves the Military Operations Administration, moved from Idlib toward southern and eastern Syria as part of what they called the Deterrence of Aggression, which ultimately resulted in their control over the capital, Damascus, and the establishment of a transitional administration, effectively removing Syria from the Axis of Resistance.

Moreover, it seems that the shifts in the United States played a major role in the push toward a ceasefire, particularly with the victory of former President Donald Trump in the presidential election in early November 2023. During his campaign, Trump promised to end the war in the Gaza Strip and the broader escalation in the region. He had previously threatened that “all hell will break out in the Middle East” if Hamas did not release the Israeli detainees in Gaza before his inauguration on January 20, 2025.

On January 10, Trump sent his envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, to apply pressure for a ceasefire agreement. The Wall Street Journal revealed that Trump, through Witkoff, sent a serious message to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu regarding the need to make a decision on the ceasefire. Indeed, the announcement of a ceasefire came a day before Trump’s presidential inauguration.

Complexities of Executing the Agreement Across Its Three Stages

The ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip consists of three stages, which will end the war that has been ongoing since October 7, 2023, by graduating from a temporary to a sustainable ceasefire during the stages of the agreement. In the first stage, which will last for 42 days, the two parties temporarily cease fighting, during which Israeli forces withdraw from residential areas. In return, Hamas releases 33 Israeli detainees, including women (soldiers and civilians), children, the elderly, and the sick. Also Israel will release a number of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons according to four equations.

In addition, Israel will facilitate the entry of humanitarian aid to the people of the Gaza Strip and, during the first phase, Hamas and Israel will complete negotiations on the details of the second and third phases.

In the second phase, which will constitute a permanent ceasefire according to the proposed agreement, Hamas will release all living Israeli detainees in its custody in exchange for Israel releasing a number Palestinian prisoners, including those sentenced to more than 15 years in prison. This phase will also witness a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip.

The third phase includes the reconstruction process and returning the remains of the Israeli detainees held by Hamas who lost their lives during the war.

In reality, the agreement between the two parties marks a development in the conflict after months of stalled negotiations. However, despite the mediators not providing further details regarding the second and third phases of the agreement, the differences in the negotiating positions of both parties appear evident after the approval and implementation of the agreement. On one hand, Netanyahu stated that Israel views the ceasefire as “temporary” and reserves “the right to resume fighting.” On the other hand, Hamas has consistently rejected any agreement with Israel that does not lead to a complete and sustainable end to the war, along with the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all areas of the Gaza Strip.

There is also disagreement between the two parties regarding the details of the second and third phases, which are still under negotiation. Israeli officials continue to emphasize their refusal to allow Hamas to resume its control over the Gaza Strip, as this would undermine Israel’s objectives for the war. This stance is viewed in light of the agreement that ended the war in Lebanon, which pushed Hezbollah beyond the Litani River and included a practical implementation of the withdrawal of its weapons from the southern and border areas. Following the announcement of the agreement on January 17, 2025, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar firmly declared: “I emphasized that we will not accept Hamas rule over Gaza after the war.”

His declaration raises questions about the sustainability of the agreement and the phases that can be implemented. For instance, will Hamas remain part of the third phase, which involves future issues like reconstruction? This would imply that Hamas continues to have authority or participate in governance, contrary to the claims of the Israeli government.

In contrast, the situation in Lebanon differs from the reality in Gaza, as the distribution of the release of detainees between the first and second phases leads Israel to continue negotiating the second phase, which involves the release of Israeli soldiers. This challenge is further complicated by the Israeli public’s rejection of a deal that does not guarantee the return of all detainees from the Gaza Strip.

Moreover, it seems that the execution of the agreement will not be entirely smooth, especially during its initial phase. On the first day of its enforcement, Israel refused to comply with it before Hamas delivered a list of detainees to be released. The scheduled time for agreement was delayed for almost three hours, from 8:30 AM local time in Gaza to 11:15 AM. Hamas indicated that the delay in delivering the lists was due to technical and field-related reasons.

In the complex reality on the ground in the Gaza Strip, it is likely that the various aspects of the agreement will face difficult conditions, delays, and surprises that may lead to consequences threatening the agreement and obstructing its execution. This is especially true since not all of the hostages to be released during the first phase of the agreement are held by Hamas; some are in the custody of other armed factions like the Islamic Jihad Movement. Although this did not pose an obstacle during the ceasefire in November 2023, it may be a challenge now.

The Palestinian Post-War Landscape

The future of the Palestinian landscape after the war is primarily linked to the outcomes of the negotiations on the second and third phases, particularly regarding the roles of actors in the post-war governance arrangements of the Gaza Strip. The continued presence of Hamas as a key part of that governance within regional and international agreements would exacerbate the rift in relations with the Palestinian Authority (PA), which has not concealed its desire to manage the Gaza Strip after the war even if it is within a participatory framework with Hamas.

In addition, assigning the Palestinian Authority the main responsibility for administering the Gaza Strip, with secondary participation from Hamas, could help narrow the gap between the two parties and reunify Palestinian territories under the PA’s leadership. This is particularly important given the calls and movements aimed at introducing reforms to the PA’s structure and leadership.

Thus, it is in the PA’s interest for the war to end with political arrangements that guarantee its return to administering the Gaza Strip. It is likely that the PA will become more diplomatically and politically active during negotiations for the second phase to both ensure that it does not remain a marginal player in settling the issue of governance and to prevent Hamas from regaining dominance over the Gaza Strip.

Nevertheless, the Palestinian landscape faces a major challenge in Israel’s attempts to impose a new geography and a divided leadership for the Palestinian territories, especially in light of far-right extremists in the Israeli government who seek to weaken the Palestinian Authority and marginalize its role in order to control the West Bank. The Israeli government has exploited the war in the Gaza Strip to impose further challenges on the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and refuses to allow its role to expand to include the administration of Gaza, despite efforts by the Biden administration to present it as an alternative to Hamas’s governance.

However, the role of the Palestinian Authority may become more prominent in the future, as indicated by the statements of Arab and international officials. The continued existence of the PA is seen as a cornerstone and a shared interest for various parties, but it is essential that for this role to be played by a revamped Palestinian Authority, one capable of implementing political, financial, administrative, and security reforms. This, however, this remains questionable.

Otherwise, the Palestinian landscape may face serious challenges, including Israel’s potential move to annex the areas classified as Area C, which include Israeli settlements, to its sovereignty. This could be a bargaining chip that Trump might have offered the Israeli government in exchange for the stopping  of the war in the Gaza Strip.

Additionally, Netanyahu may present this offer to the far-right extreme Zionist factions in order to encourage them not to resign, particularly Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, whose apparent reluctance to heed calls for resignation from Defense Minister Itamar Ben Gvir seems to stem from Smotrich’s aspirations to achieve his goals in the West Bank. In addition, the situation in the Gaza Strip faces not only the risks of the return of war but also the continued suffering of the population without the basic necessities for life, such as healthcare, education, and public services, especially if the agreement falters in its second or third phases.

Finally, the context surrounding the first day of the ceasefire appears complex and multifaceted. The general framework of the agreement does not differ significantly from previous ones. However, with the detailed negotiations expected to unfold in later phases, the likelihood that its implementation will face serious challenges that threaten its continuity remains a real possibility. This is especially true considering the need of the warring parties and various actors to end the conflict, regardless of the costs involved, in order to focus on issues that are no less important than the war in Gaza. For Israel, this issue is Iran, while for Trump, it is China.