The Resumption of the War on Gaza: New Equation for Its Risks and Objectives

After both parties reached a ceasefire agreement on January 19, the Israeli Army resumed fighting in the Gaza Strip on March 18. Between those two dates, several prisoners and detainees were exchanged as part of the first phase before negotiations that were supposed to move the agreement to the second phase were stalled.

However, the return of the war came in light of other changes and reasons, not limited to technical and negotiation matters. Foremost among these is the shift of the displacement rhetoric from the realm of conceptualization to practical steps and actions. This occurred amidst the complex realities faced by various war fronts in Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Iran, and under the backdrop of a U.S.-Israeli consensus regarding the goals and steps to be taken.

The Israeli Scene Accompanying the Return of the War

Israel’s announcement that it would resume the war in the Gaza Strip came alongside a series of changes at both the military and political levels.

1. Military Changes

On January 21, Israeli army Chief of the General Staff Herzi Halevi announced his intention to resign on March 6. On February 1, it was announced that Eyal Zamir would replace Halevi, which took effect on March 5.  This was the second high-level change within the Israeli military institution during the war, following the November 5, 2024 dismissal of Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and subsequent appointment of Israel Katz on November 8, 2024.

2. Political Changes

These changes in the leadership of the Israeli military occurred alongside shifts at both the security and political levels. In February, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appointed Minister of Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer as head of the negotiation delegation, replacing Mossad Director David Barnea and excluding Ronen Bar, the head of Israel’s Security Agency (Shabak or Shin Bet), from the negotiation team. One month later, on March 20, Bar was dismissed from his position as Security Agency director.

With the March 19 return of far-right politician Itamar Ben-Gvir to his position as minister of National Security following his January 21 resignation, it can be expected that the recently resumed war has entered a more complicated phase. Israel aims to resolve several issues it previously considered impossible: disarming Hamas; expelling, imprisoning, or assassinating its leaders; or even the ultimate displacement of Gaza’s residents.

3. Consequences

 Following the changes listed above, the government and military leadership have become more aligned, with both sides characterized by increasingly extreme ideas and goals. Meanwhile, the security level, represented by Mossad and Shabak, has been excluded from negotiations. This level had been more inclined to reach an agreement with Hamas to end the war, which caused disagreements between them and some government factions, one of the results being Bar’s dismissal.

The War Enters a Decisive and Sensitive Stage 

Many observers and analysts considered the resumption of the war was unlikely since that the ceasefire agreement was signed by both parties, backed by American support, and arose from the agreed-upon necessity for all sides to end a conflict that had entered its second year.

Despite the numerous complications surrounding the negotiations, which led to predictions of failure, observers noted that the war was no longer viewed as an effective means to achieve agreed-upon goals. Even with the potential for renewed conflict, there remains a prevailing impression among politicians and analysts that the war aims to intensify Israeli pressure on Hamas, compelling it to make concessions, possibly regarding its governance of the Gaza Strip or leading to the surrender of its weapons and the expulsion of its high command, particularly military leaders.

However, it has been clear since the outbreak of the war on October 7, 2023, that it involved a matrix of goals and risks for both sides. This equation guided Israel’s assessment of the war and the determination of its objectives. In light of this, the war continued despite the consequences it caused, including internal Israeli disagreements within both its military and political establishment that were exacerbated after the resignation of Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot from the Israeli war cabinet on June 9, 2024.

Moreover, the periodic protests by the families of the detainees continue, alongside a shift in the international and United Nation’s stance toward Israel that has manifested in various forms, including UN judicial decisions regarding the provisional measures issued by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the context of examining the charge of Israel committing genocide.

Additionally, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant, his former Defense minister, on November 21, 2024. Furthermore, the collective European stance toward the Palestinians changed with several European countries recognizing the Palestinian state after the ICJ issued an advisory opinion on July 19, 2024, declaring “the ongoing violation by Israel of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination” by its “prolonged occupation, settlement and annexation of the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967.” This shift also included the stance of Western public opinion, with demonstrations and protests as well as movements in American and European universities, supporting the Palestinian cause and calling for an end to the war.

Those issues that were once thought to be potential factors in halting the war no longer hold the same degree of influence over its course. On the contrary, the war has resumed amid a more unified political leadership in Israel that is increasingly aligned with the military establishment, and in the context of unconditional and unlimited U.S. support—particularly with U.S. President Donald Trump’s endorsement of the displacement proposal.

Moreover, the Israeli government appears to be more stable today, especially after the Israeli Knesset approved the 2025 budget law by a majority of 66 votes to 52 on March 25. This both reflects governmental stability and reduces the prospect of early elections and their accompanying scenarios.

Geographical and Demographic Risks in the Gaza Strip

 The resumption of the war in Gaza occurred amid U.S.-Israeli rhetoric focused on the displacement of Gaza’s residents. This proposal has been present since the first day of the war and entered a new phase with renewed discussion by Trump during the first stage of the ceasefire agreement on January 19, 2025, followed by his inauguration on January 20.

In early February, Trump advocated the displacement of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip. Israel interpreted this as a green light to begin planning and executing the displacement on the ground. Thus, with its renewal, the war has entered a new phase carrying far more dangerous dimensions as part of an Israeli project aimed at redrawing the map of the Gaza Strip and redistributing its population.

One of the indicators of this shift was the March 23 establishment of an official Israeli body to manage the displacement of Palestinians from Gaza, aimed at facilitating the so-called “voluntary departure” of the population. In parallel, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported that the resumption of military operations seeks to impose a new reality in Gaza that includes the displacement of its residents and the establishment of a military government to manage the sector’s affairs following the dismantling of any Palestinian self-rule. Additionally, there have been revelations of secret Israeli talks with African and European countries to accept refugees from the Gaza Strip.

On March 26, Netanyahu acknowledged that one of the objectives of the attacks on Gaza was to occupy parts of the Gaza Strip until Hamas released the hostages. On April 2, the prime minister announced the goal of controlling what he referred to as the Morag Corridor that separates Rafah from Khan Younis, saying that the Israeli army occupies the land and controls the Morag Corridor, which will become the second Philadelphia axis, indicating the dismantling of the area to increase pressure on Hamas.

This comes in conjunction with the announcement by Katz, the Israeli Defense minister, regarding the expansion of military activities in the southern part of the Gaza Strip, following the Israeli military’s attempt to establish a larger security zone by issuing evacuation orders for the entire city of Rafah for the first time since the start of the war.

The on-the-ground and living conditions in the Gaza Strip reinforce the risks of forcibly displacing its population, especially with Israel’s continued heavy military pressure on the region and the ongoing suffocating blockade on its residents after Israel closed Gaza’s crossings on March 2, preventing goods and aid from entering. This led to an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. The situation is further complicated by the lack of a post-war plan, the complexities of reconstruction, and the challenges facing the Arab plan for such reconstruction, especially with the renewed outbreak of the war.
Theoretically, displacement could be achieved through further military operations that prevent Gaza’s society from recovering. It could also be achieved “voluntarily” by encouraging other countries to accept the residents of Gaza, especially since, in theory, all of them meet the requirements for living in a safer and more stable environment. Some countries might begin to join Canada, which has been issuing temporary visas to Gaza residents since January 2024.
Moreover, Gaza’s dire economic situation and destroyed infrastructure make it imperative—not just optional—for the population to leave the region for work, education, and medical treatment. This is particularly urgent given the soaring unemployment and poverty rates, which have reached unprecedented levels, and the collapse of educational and healthcare institutions. This could push residents to seek opportunities outside the borders of the devastated and besieged Gaza Strip in search of better living and future prospects.

Finally, Israel’s resumption of military operations in the Gaza Strip comes after the breakdown of negotiations and reflects strategic objectives that go beyond merely responding to the deadlock. These objectives aim to redraw goals and reshape the geographic and demographic structure of the Strip through policies of displacement, occupation, and the imposition of military rule.