Does the Arab Reconstruction Plan Overcome Its Operational Challenges?

On February 12, Egypt’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it is collaborating with other Arab nations to prepare a comprehensive plan for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. This plan is part of Arab efforts to present a viable alternative to the one proposed by former U.S. President Donald Trump that involved the displacement of Gazan residents, which they consider unviable. The Arab plan was first mentioned in a statement by King Abdullah II of Jordan during his February 11 meeting with Trump at the White House.

This plan will be the main topic of discussion at the March 4 Arab Summit in Cairo, and it is expected to gain full Arab consensus. Earlier, on February 21, a smaller Arab meeting between the leaders of the Gulf States, Jordan, and Egypt was held in Riyadh to discuss the Arab plan before presenting it at the Arab Summit.

The Arab countries are presenting a plan based on precise political and security calculations, as well as historical sensitivities dating back to the first displacement of the Palestinian people in 1948, which remains a continuing issue for the countries that hosted them at that time. However, reconstruction plans in conflict zones in general, and specifically in the Gaza Strip, face complex difficulties and challenges, particularly when considering the previous reconstruction efforts in the region since 2007, many of whose projects and programs are still pending. This is further complicated by the scale of the destruction in the Strip due to the current war, which greatly exacerbates the challenges and complexities.

The Arab Reconstruction Plan: General Frameworks

The details of the plan coordinated between Egypt and various Arab countries are expected to be presented at the Arab Summit. As of now, only its general frameworks have been mentioned in the context of statements made by Arab officials. These frameworks address post-war administration, border protection measures, reconstruction operations, aid, the timeline for implementation and its stages, donor partners, and funding sources.

First: Duration, Stages of Implementation, and Funding Methods 

The reconstruction process is expected to take between three to five years. During this period, Arab countries will collaborate with United Nations (UN) agencies and private companies to remove debris and rubble, and make use of it in rehabilitating basic services such as healthcare, education, vital facilities, and infrastructure like water and electricity networks. Additionally, 20 temporary residential areas will be established during the reconstruction phase.

According to Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdel Atti, the reconstruction process is divided into three stages. The first is the early six-month recovery phase, during which debris removal and the construction of temporary housing will take place. The second stage is the main reconstruction phase, where the necessary financial resources, estimated at around $20 billion, will be mobilized to implement essential infrastructure projects. The third stage includes a political path paving the way for broader negotiations to achieve a two-state solution.

Financial contributions from countries in the region will play a major role in funding the reconstruction efforts. Given the general nature of reconstruction operations, it is anticipated that a special reconstruction fund for the Gaza Strip will be established. Additionally, an international conference will likely be held to secure the necessary funding from a broad range of international parties, particularly from European Union countries, Islamic nations, and East Asian countries such as China and Japan.

Second: Features of Implementation and Security Protection Frameworks

Previous statements regarding the plan indicate that both Arab and international private companies will undertake the implementation of reconstruction projects for residential areas, infrastructure, and vital facilities. Additionally, a prominent role will be played by the Egyptian Engineers Syndicate, its Palestinian counterpart, and the Gaza Contractors Union, all three of which are already working on studies regarding the mechanisms of reconstruction.

The responsibility for managing the reconstruction process will be entrusted to a committee under the Palestinian National Authority. There has been no mention of the involvement of Hamas or other armed factions in the Gaza Strip within this committee. An Arab or international security force will likely be deployed to secure the implementation projects and ensure the safety of the process.

The plan also includes the establishment of a buffer zone and a physical barrier on the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt to counter attempts to dig tunnels used by armed factions, as reported by Reuters.

The Arab Option: Motivations and Strategies

The move by Arab countries to respond quickly to Trump’s proposals by presenting a more logical and realistic alternative is being shaped by Egypt, which is working to transform a set of agreed-upon frameworks into a detailed action plan with clear criteria. This move, which can be considered emergency and urgent, comes within the context of confronting the risks posed by the U.S. president’s ongoing rhetoric calling for the displacement of Gazan residents, as well as concerns that Israel might exploit these calls and proactively push them into an actionable plan that could be implemented with U.S. support.

Thus, Arab countries responded by working on the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip rather than dealing later with the repercussions and risks associated with displacement at various levels. This response particularly concerns neighboring countries, specifically Jordan and Egypt, which are the primary targets of Trump’s rhetoric and the current and historical Israeli plans. New waves of Palestinian refugees into these countries poses a threat to their economies and social systems, potentially escalating to destabilize the entire Middle East at a time when the region is already facing pressing and urgent issues, including the transformation in Syria following the fall of the Ba’ath regime.

Arab countries are aware of Israeli and U.S. attempts to reshape the balance of power in the region by positioning Israel as the architect of the emerging regional order. Accepting displacement or being lenient in deterring it would reinforce this assumption and put Arab countries, especially those central to the region, in direct confrontation with Israeli ambitions and plans. These ambitions are not limited to Palestinian territories; they have expanded first into parts of southern Lebanon, then into southern Syria, and are now attempting to impose a new reality on the Arab geography, which has consequences for various Arab countries.

In addition, U.S. and Israeli displacement rhetoric comes at a time when Arab and European issues intersect: Trump is also threatening to extend U.S. control over Greenland, a territory of Denmark, and to annex Canada into the United States, disregarding Canada’s status as part of the British Commonwealth. This not only threatens Canada but also the United Kingdom. The European reluctance to address the displacement rhetoric in Gaza could reinforce a fait accompli approach and impose power through force, which would have repercussions for European countries.

This also comes at a time when Arab and European interests converge on one of the most sensitive issues for Arab countries: Saudi Arabia hosting Russian-American talks about the war in Ukraine, making Saudi Arabia the most reliable partner for Europe in this matter.

Reconstruction: Challenges and Complexities

The Arab efforts to reconstruct the Gaza Strip face multiple and complex technical, logistical, security, political, and economic challenges. These challenges are further compounded by the scale of the destruction in the region due to the war, which has affected various aspects of life, including housing, infrastructure, and vital facilities. This has placed the residents of Gaza amid an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. The most significant of these challenges include:

- Technical and Logistical Challenges

The field conditions in Gaza represent the most significant challenge to initiating reconstruction efforts, as the level of destruction and rubble is unprecedented compared to previous wars in the region. According to a February 12 United Nations (UN) report, approximately 60% of the houses in the Gaza Strip are destroyed. This results in repercussions that affect both the environment and the people.

UN reports have also indicated that the approximate 50 million tons of rubble scattered throughout the region contains hundreds of thousands of tons of asbestos—a group of mineral fibers classified by the World Health Organization as hazardous materials, exposure to which can lead to severe illness and death. The spread of this material not only poses a threat to the residents of Gaza but also to the construction teams involved in the reconstruction efforts. Additionally, the destruction of sewage systems in Gaza has led to the contamination of its beaches, soil, and water, according to assessments by the United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East.

In addition to the challenge posed by unexploded ordnance, estimated by the Washington Institute of Near East Policy in December 2024 to be around 6,000 to 9,000 unexploded items (not including artillery shells, rockets, or mortar shells), these ordnances pose a long-term threat to civilian lives in the area. They also present a significant obstacle to reconstruction teams, hindering their efforts. This requires initial studies to assess the quantity, distribution, and types of these ordnances. Detecting them amid tons of rubble necessitates advanced surveying techniques and tools that operate both from the air and on the ground. The Israeli military must take responsibility for disclosing the data records of its air and ground strikes in the Gaza Strip, including the weapons used, to facilitate the work of specialized teams.

In addition, reconstruction efforts face the obstacle of the military infrastructure of Hamas, especially its vast network of underground tunnels, which the movement considers a strategic asset that should not be damaged. This network could play a negative role in hindering the reconstruction process by raising doubts about the security motives of the field teams, as well as the projects or companies involved in the process. Such concerns could lead some groups in the Gaza Strip to view the workers negatively, placing them amid security risks and a complex operational environment.

- Palestinian-Israeli Political Challenges

The reconstruction plans for the Gaza Strip face fundamental political challenges related to the relationship between the Palestinian factions in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank on one hand, and the Palestinian-Israeli relationship on the other. Before discussing reconstruction, there are other equally important issues, one of which is the post-war system of government in the Gaza Strip. Israel rejects any role for the PA in governing and managing Gaza, and it is expected to oppose any PA’s involvement in reconstruction projects.

This creates a gap between the plan’s requirements and the political reality on the ground, especially given the lack of a ready, qualified, and internationally and nationally agreed-upon Palestinian alternative. The Trump administration may have supported Israel in this stipulation, unlike the Biden administration, which proposed that the PA assume governance after implementing reforms. This was evident February 19 when Trump halted funding for the PA’s security services. 

This dilemma will be faced by Arab countries, as moving forward with reconstruction without a major role for the Palestinian Authority would reinforce the geographic division between the West Bank and Gaza, exacerbating the challenges facing the “two-state solution.” More generally, this ties into more complex issues, given that the Palestinian territories, and particularly Gaza, need a legitimate authority that not only supervises reconstruction but also manages daily life, including law enforcement and maintaining security. Without this, reconstruction projects will face a fragile and difficult security environment, and donor countries and organizations will hesitate to contribute in fear that these projects might be exploited or held hostage by Palestinian armed factions.

Security and Military Challenges

The reconstruction process relies on a complete and sustainable ceasefire, alongside the withdrawal of the Israeli military from various areas of the Gaza Strip. However, this condition faces a challenge that has emerged as negotiations moved into the second phase of the agreement, as well as the difficulties encountered in the implementation of the first phase. The Israeli discourse about resuming the war has escalated once again, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stating on February 18: “We reserve the right to resume the war if necessary.”

However, the resumption of the war in Gaza is not the only security challenge facing reconstruction. Arab and European countries have previously experienced multiple rounds of reconstruction efforts in the Gaza Strip. While this round is the largest and most in need of funding, various countries will seek to find ways to achieve it more sustainably. Ensuring that their investments in reconstruction will not be undermined by any future military or security escalation, especially given the repeated and frequent cycles of escalation since the 2008 war up until 2021, which saw four wars.

These wars required reconstruction efforts estimated at $10 billion, and the current conflict has destroyed the economic, vital, and housing projects implemented during previous reconstruction efforts. Thus, ensuring the sustainability of the reconstruction process is a critical factor in its execution, financing, and determining the nature of its projects.

However, given Israel’s failure to guarantee against the resumption of war or the start of a new conflict after several years, coupled with the widespread availability of weapons among Palestinian factions in the Gaza Strip, there is a significant risk of their use in renewed confrontations with Israel, clashes between the factions themselves, or even conflicts with any future security and political authority that may govern the Gaza Strip, as occurred in 2006. As a result, donor countries and organizations will likely hesitate to support the reconstruction process, except for offering assistance for early recovery.

- Post-Recovery Challenges

The Arab plan focuses on a limited scope of reconstruction, aiming to support the Gaza Strip in remaining viable and to prevent ideas and schemes of displacement that use the situation on the ground as a pretext. Therefore, the funding allocated to the plan, estimated at around $20 billion, represents only a portion of the total funding required to make the Gaza Strip a safe and healthy environment for its inhabitants and to support their livelihoods, which is estimated by the United Nations to exceed $53 billion.

In addition, the plan does not clarify essential matters that play a central role in determining the future of the Gaza Strip. For example, urban planning before the war did not support the transformation of the Gaza Strip into a developed urban environment. Similarly, the structure of the economy, which was previously dependent on aid, needs to shift towards a structure that supports reconstruction through a market-oriented approach. This shift could move the plan from short-term recovery to long-term economic development.

In contrast, if the Gaza Strip after the war and reconstruction remains as it was before October 7, this will achieve little in terms of community, economy, and self-governance. It will remain susceptible to the dominance of factions over its authority in the future, which in itself undermines the reconstruction process and prevents the Gaza Strip from utilizing the available capabilities and resources in sectors such as tourism, energy, or the development of advanced and strategic infrastructure like ports and airports.                       

To resolve this dilemma, the reconstruction process must be accompanied by serious negotiations that ensure the lifting of the blockade and a solution that guarantees the Palestinians the ability to determine their future. Strategic projects could be offered to the future administration as grants or loans to integrate the Gaza economy into the global financial economy, serving as guarantees for the incoming administration to preserve the achievements of the reconstruction process.

Finally, it is clear that the Arab countries are serious about agreeing on a plan for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip that achieves recovery for its residents, refutes Trump’s pretexts for displacing its citizens, and thwarts Israeli plans in this regard. However, consensus on the plan seems to be the easiest part compared to the security, political, economic, and procedural challenges that will arise during its implementation.