The Decision to Ban the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan: the Hand of the Law Against Transnational Ideologies

The relationship between Jordan and the Muslim Brotherhood entered a new phase after the government announced its decision April 23 to outlaw the group, prohibit all its activities, and criminalize affiliation with or promotion of its ideas. Jordan then cordoned off its headquarters, seized documents, and activated a committee to confiscate its assets. The move represents the practical enforcement of a previous ruling issued July 2020 that declared the group dissolved and illegal.

These actions came after Jordan’s General Intelligence Department revealed on April 15 the existence of cells ideologically and organizationally linked to the group, which were allegedly planning to undermine Jordan’s national security. The incident reignited concerns over the activities, agenda, and directions of the dissolved group, particularly in light of the instability surrounding Jordan and the broader region.

In reality, while the government’s response was triggered by evolving security developments, it also marked the end of a long-standing trajectory of the Muslim Brotherhood’s internal maneuvers and its network of external relations, channels it had used to disrupt the domestic equation and exploit Jordan’s strategic geographic position in the region. 

A Reading of the Ban Decision

The ban decision represents the enforcement of a 2020 judicial ruling issued by Jordan’s supreme court, the Court of Cassation, that the group did not comply with the legal requirements for licensing charitable organizations as outlined in Jordan’s amended Associations Law of 2014. In 2021, a committee was formed to dissolve the Muslim Brotherhood, inventory its assets, and confiscate its property, an effort the government has recently instructed to accelerate. During this period, the state had granted the banned group an opportunity to rectify its legal status and return to its charitable and religious functions. The activation of this latest decision stems from a security-driven approach rather than a political one.

The ban came just days after law enforcement authorities announced the arrest of members of the so-called “chaos cells” working to manufacture weapons and use them to undermine Jordan’s national security. Sixteen individuals involved were referred to Jordan’s State Security Court. Although Jordan has historically faced various attempts to destabilize its security and stability, this incident underscored the emergence of new threats and the broader spectrum of risks linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. These developments included unprecedented elements, most notably their lack of connection to the ongoing war in Gaza. Law enforcement forces have been tracking these cells since 2021, a year the government has emphasized as particularly significant.

The individuals involved operated in separate units across four major cases: attempts to manufacture weapons inside Jordan; possession of automatic weapons and high-powered explosives smuggled from abroad, including the concealment of a ready-to-launch missile; a project to manufacture drones with foreign assistance; and the recruitment and training of individuals both inside and outside the Kingdom, particularly in Lebanon.

The incident revealed the dual nature of the group’s operations: public activity and covert action, both ideologically and organizationally. This duplicity had already been confirmed by previous incidents, including the foiling by security forces of an attempt to smuggle Iranian weapons through Syria in May 2024. These weapons were sent to a cell affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, which maintained ties with Hamas and aimed to carry out acts of sabotage.

Additionally, on October 18, 2024, two members of the group carried out a shooting in the southern Dead Sea area, a highly coordinated operation that required logistical support and intensified suspicions about a broader organizational role behind it. The attackers followed common practices associated with members of armed or terrorist Islamist organizations: both used jihadist noms de guerre and recorded video wills. In addition to their ability to successfully cross heavily secured borders, they also possessed weapons, demonstrated proficiency in their use, and managed to injure two Israeli soldiers.

These events occurred amid other similar incidents in 2024, including the discovery of a large quantity of explosive materials in a house in Marka on June 19, followed five days later by the discovery of another explosive storage site in a commercial store in Abu Alanda, and, on September 8, a Jordanian truck driver carried out a shooting at the Allenby Bridge border crossing. That operation, which appeared to be ideologically linked to Salafi-Jihadism, was praised by the banned group.

The Ban Decision: the Group’s Transnational Context

The decision to ban the Muslim Brotherhood came a day after Hamas called for the release of members of the chaos cells, which was widely viewed as interference in Jordan’s internal and security affairs. This move reignited the issue of the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, whose offices in Jordan were shut down in 1999 due to activities and practices that violated the law, including attempts to establish an illegal organization and the seizure of weapons in the possession of individuals linked to the group.

It has become increasingly clear that this relationship once again poses a security threat to Jordan, as reflected in the Brotherhood’s stance during the war and its mobilization rhetoric, which on several occasions incited confrontations between its members and public security forces. This threat is further underscored by the joint coordination between the two groups in mobilizing protests and unrest on Jordanian streets.

In general, Hamas’s rhetoric directed toward Jordan has become increasingly noticeable, particularly through the efforts of its leaders—Mohammed Deif, Khaled Meshal, and Abu Ubaida—to influence the Jordanian public and incite citizens to join what Hamas calls the “Al-Aqsa Flood” war. On March 29, 2024, during an event organized by the banned group, Meshaal, the head of Hamas abroad, delivered a video speech urging Jordanians to take to the streets in the millions. Similarly, Hamas military spokesperson Abu Ubaida issued both political and military messages to the Jordanian public, referring to the country as the “Jordanian front” in several speeches and describing Jordan’s popular base as “the most important arena.”

Hamas has relied on the Brotherhood to translate its rhetoric into action on the ground, with the group successfully steering protests from spontaneous demonstrations to deliberate incitement. Hamas’s discourse began to dominate protest chants before the demonstrations crossed red lines by insulting the country’s leadership and security institutions, vandalizing public property, and clashing with public security forces.

Matters escalated to an unprecedented level amid reports of external communications—presumably from Iran—aimed at pushing the Jordanian public toward further escalation against the state and political system, especially following the March 2024 protests in Rabieh. This was accompanied by a surge in activity by foreign-run social media accounts calling for participation in those protests. In response, on March 31, 2024, the Public Security Directorate confirmed incidents of misconduct, insults, and attempts to assault public security personnel during some gatherings and demonstrations.

In general, the banned group has attempted to present itself as operating independently, outside the framework and oversight of the state. As it has continued to call on the public to head toward the western border and the Jordan Valley areas—the most recent call occurring on April 11 this year—despite the Ministry of Interior’s firm stance since October 13, 2023, that such actions would not be permitted.

In the early hours following the shooting incident in the southern Dead Sea area, the Muslim Brotherhood was quick to claim the attackers as its own, only to later deny any affiliation, without waiting for information or an official statement from state authorities, who chose to monitor developments before issuing a response.

More broadly, it has become increasingly evident that the Brotherhood does not adhere to the idea of a nation state, embracing instead a transnational vision that disregards national borders—particularly as its activities have increasingly overlapped with Iran’s “Unification of the Arenas” strategy, which from the outset of the war has sought to draw Jordan’s geography into the conflict.

Regional threats surrounding the country have worsened. There has been a surge in attempts to smuggle drugs, weapons, and explosives from southern Syria into Jordan. Additional threats have come from ballistic missiles and drones launched by the Houthis from their positions in Yemen or by Iraqi armed factions through the Jordanian airspace, some of which have fallen within Jordanian territory.

Equally significant is the growing wave of hostile rhetoric targeting Jordan directly. The country has been accused of allowing its territory to be used to supply the Israeli military with U.S. weapons and for Israeli aircraft to refuel mid-air. It has also been accused of facilitating a land bridge transporting goods from UAE ports through Jordan and into Israel. Moreover, groups associated with the so-called Axis of Resistance have accused Jordan of intercepting weapons destined for Palestinian factions in the West Bank and of thwarting the Iranian missile strike against Isreal that violated Jordanian airspace.

Iran has sought to reinforce this narrative through actions on the ground. Hundreds of members of the Popular Mobilization Forces and Saraya al-Salam gathered at the Trebil border crossing between Jordan and Iraq, calling for the opening of a route to the Jordanian-Israeli border. On April 1, 2024, Abu Ali al-Askari, the security official for Iraq’s Hezbollah Brigades, an Iranian proxy militia, threatened to arm 12,000 Jordanians to attack Irael: “The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has prepared supplies for our brothers in the Islamic Resistance in Jordan sufficient to support 12,000 fighters.” Iran also issued threats in April 2024 that “Jordan will be the next target” if it participates in intercepting Iranian strikes.

It appears that the Muslim Brotherhood has responded to these developments. While its involvement has not reached the level of direct engagement in the war, as seen with the “Islamic Group” in Lebanon, it has been no less significant. The group has been implicated in smuggling, possessing, and storing money and weapons inside Jordan; providing political and media support; mobilizing the public against the state; and ultimately carrying out individual operations on October 18, 2024. This culminated in the formation of chaos cells whose members may have received training and funding from parties in Lebanon possibly linked to Hamas or the Islamic Group.

What Comes After the Ban

Charting the course for the next phase largely depends on the outcomes of ongoing security investigations and what the authorities uncover regarding the Brotherhood’s suspicious activities and the extent of the Islamic Action Front (IAF) party’s involvement. Notably, the banned group hastily destroyed large volumes of documents at its headquarters on the night the chaos cells were announced.

Nonetheless, the likely trajectories of the coming phase can be narrowed down to three possibilities: the ban remains limited to the group itself; it extends to include its political wing (the party) if its complicity is confirmed; or the scope broadens toward the complete eradication of both entities. The evolution of any of these paths presents a series of complex challenges and issues.

One: The Ban Remains Limited to the Group

Banning the Muslim Brotherhood while allowing its political arm, the IAF, to operate legally and actively would create new dynamics in the relationship between the two entities. The party is well aware that the banned Brotherhood serves as its principal support base, playing a major role in its election campaigns and in selecting its candidates—an indication of the group’s significant grassroots presence, especially given that the party’s official membership does not exceed 1,230 members.

In this scenario, the IAF would face limited options. Chief among them is to distance itself from current developments and sever its ties with Brotherhood in a genuine and comprehensive manner. While this would be a legally sound decision that could serve to rehabilitate the party’s image and trajectory, it would also weaken its size and influence. The party would lose access to the Brotherhood’s traditional electoral base, its ability to mobilize and organize support, and even its election campaign funding—roles that it has historically fulfilled.

However, the possibility remains that the IAF may attempt to circumvent the ban by quietly absorbing sympathizers, supporters, and Brotherhood members not involved in the security-related cases. This could occur either through formal party membership or by opening alternative channels of communication with them outside the framework of the Brotherhood. In either case, this trend could be monitored by tracking a noticeable increase in the party’s membership or through changes made to its leadership structure that include figures with popular appeal, particularly among the youth.

Still, pursuing this path would bring about significant challenges and consequences. Most importantly, the party would essentially become the ideological incubator that produced the earlier security incidents while maintaining the banned group’s external networks. This could result in the Muslim Brotherhood being contained within the framework of a legally licensed political party, ultimately implicating the party and placing it in confrontation with the forces of the law.

Two: Extending the Ban to Include IAF’s Political Wing

If IAF party involvement is proven (a possibility given the implication of three of its members in the chaos cells), then the Jordanian political scene will face a fundamental transformation, not only in terms of the fate of the House of Representatives and the future of the government, but also in the trajectory of political reform as a whole. This is the same warning previously noted in our reading of the 20th parliamentary landscape and the prospects for political modernization.

In addition to the continuous negative impact of regional security conditions on the paths of reform and modernization historically, the party’s representation and participation in the modernization process raises questions about the feasibility of continuing on that path or the possibility of turning to alternative options for managing the political landscape in the future.

Moreover, the dividing lines between the various trends within Islamic movements are often blurred, particularly regarding what is considered conservative, centrist, moderate, or leaning toward liberalism. Many active Islamic parties in the Jordanian political arena were formed through a series of historical splits from the Muslim Brotherhood. The concerns surrounding this approach are twofold: first, individuals from the banned group and the party may go on to establish licensed political parties, associations, or civil society organizations, and second, members of the group may attempt to join officially licensed Islamic political parties. Such affiliations could be motivated either by a genuine desire to participate politically and correct the course of affairs or by a covert attempt to infiltrate these parties.

Three: Complete Eradication of Both the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF

While this path represents the most decisive option for resolving the issue of the banned group and eliminating its presence in public life—extending to various intellectual, cultural, educational, social, media, and political levels—a dual eradication raises several complications. Chief among them is the need for a clear legal foundation, particularly given that the Brotherhood has embedded itself into the fabric of Jordanian society over the course of 80 years. Therefore, issuing a special law concerning eradication would help regulate the process, while avoiding violations and maintaining a dynamic and active political arena.

However, this does not mean that a legal approach alone is sufficient. It has become evident that the radical factions within the Brotherhood have already shifted to clandestine activity, acquiring weapons and planning to use them against the state. This is, in fact, reflected in the group’s statements issued abroad, including a call by the “Change Movement”—affiliated with the Brotherhood’s Egyptian branch—urging the banned Brotherhood in Jordan to confront the state and take up arms. This casts doubt on the likelihood that all members of the banned group will abide by the law and state directives, and it suggests instead that they may intensify the kind of underground operations historically carried out by the group’s branches abroad—particularly in Egypt during the 1950s and 1960s, again after the July 30, 2013 revolution, as well as in Syria in the 1980s and Algeria in the 1990s.

This means that the security and intelligence approach will remain active and essential in tracking the extremist remnants of the banned group, their communications, and their alignment with the agenda of the international organization’s branches and the regional powers invested in their continued presence and activity.

Finally, state’s actions against the banned Brotherhood only came after all peaceful solutions had been exhausted and were carried out in accordance with the law, following a series of the banned group’s escalatory positions and actions that placed it squarely within the realm of being a direct threat to Jordan’s national security—a red line that cannot be allowed to cross. This is especially significant given that these actions aligned with hostile and adversarial stances toward the country with Iran being their primary source.