My Third Message to Our Arab Shia Brothers: A Call to Reason and Reality

Arab Shia are witnessing a pivotal stage in their historical, political, and social trajectory that is likely to be among the most complex and sensitive since the death of Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him) in 632 A.D.

The regional and international shifts that followed the fateful events of October 7 have produced a new reality, particularly reflected in the decline of Iranian influence that for decades had presented itself as the protector and defender of Arab Shia and their interests. This decline offers Arab Shia a rare opportunity to reorder their internal priorities and literally reshape their identity. 

Historically, the primary difference between Sunnis and Shias lies in their beliefs regarding the rightful successor to Prophet Muhammad, who died without a male heir and never stated who should be his successor. While Sunnis believed that the leader, or caliph, should be chosen by consensus, Shias believed that it should be passed down through Prophet’s bloodline.

While the two share most of the fundamental beliefs and practices of Islam, they differ in doctrine, law, ritual, and religious organizations. Today, Sunnis are the majority in more than 40 countries, including Syria, Turkey, South Asia, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and other parts of the Persian Gulf. Shia Muslims constitute the majority of the Muslim populations in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Azerbaijan. (“Arab Shia” simply specifies that these Shia Muslims are of Arab ethnicity, as Shia communities exist in both Arab and non-Arab countries.) 

Through this article, based on an analytical and methodological approach, I renew my call to Arab Shia elites and actors to reestablish their connection with their Arab roots and national belonging. Strengthening their presence within the framework of the national state will ensure their stability and active participation in shaping a shared future founded on citizenship and Arab identity. This, I cannot emphasize enough, does not imply severing ties with their sect or its religious authorities.

Return to the Beginnings and a Call to Reason and Reality

Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem’s speech on September 19 urging the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to turn “a new page” with the Iran-backed movement and join it in creating a united front against Israel brought back to my mind the advice I had repeatedly given to my Shia brothers and sisters several years ago, urging genuine integration with the Arab world, beginning with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Jordan as an important axis of moderation. I expressed this clearly in an article published March 21, 2022 in both the Al-Arab (London) newspaper and the STRATEGIECS Think Tank entitled “The Saudi Plan to Contain Hezbollah, Free It from Iranian Influence,” as well as in another article I wrote, published in An-Nahar Al-Arabi on October 21, 2024, entitled “Bring Our Shia Brothers Back to Their Arabism.”

In the March 2022 article, I pointed to the necessity of working to persuade Lebanon’s Hezbollah to open serious channels of dialogue with Arab parties and to push it toward political engagement as a representative of a large segment of the Lebanese people. I stressed that the Lebanese do not need weapons to be represented or to enjoy their rights, and that this applies equally to Hezbollah supporters and its popular base once they are provided with sufficient and reassuring guarantees.

The article also affirmed that no one in Lebanon wishes to bequeath the civil war to future generations, especially after its initial causes have faded. In addition, there are growing indications of Iran’s inability to support Hezbollah—or of its distancing itself from it—which will become a popular Iranian demand in order to secure the international acceptance that Tehran will obtain under the nuclear agreement.

In a related context, I pointed out in my second article that Iran’s insistence on maintaining the influence of its armed proxies in Lebanon and other countries in the region remains tied to its tactical interests. Strategically, however, what Iran is most keen to preserve is its long-term alliance with the Arab Shia component.

I also noted in the October 2024 article the success of “Khomeinism” in both strengthening the link between a sense of belonging to the sect and loyalty to Iran, and portraying sectarian differences with brothers in blood as an existential struggle, which is not necessary in the coming period and will not serve the interests of either party. Moreover, the region will not benefit from promoting political Islam in its Shia version as a rival to the Sunni version, which was already faltering.

The Immediate Imperative: The Nation-State or Nothing

Since the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Iran has sought to cement an image of itself as a state defending the rights of the “oppressed,” foremost among them the Arab Shia. However, this role was not confined to symbolic or rhetorical dimensions. It was tied to a systematic process aimed at politicizing the sectarian identity of Arab Shia, severing them from their national and Arab affiliations.

This was manifested in practice through the establishment and support of dozens, if not hundreds, of armed factions and groups for which the Arab Shia formed the human base and essential component. In this way, Iran’s role shifted from merely supporting Shia communities to becoming their political and security custodian, reshaping their local reality and linking it to the trajectory of Iran’s broader regional project—one that has changed, or will inevitably change, with the regional and international transformations to come. 

Were Iran to take such a step, it would then be able to send a message to the Arab and Islamic world, as well as to the Western community, that it is adapting to current realities and supporting the concept of the nation-state—something that would certainly serve its own interests as well as those of our Arab Shia brethren.

Especially since the political memory of the region cannot easily forget the Iranian approach that stretched across a series of geopolitical and regional upheavals, beginning with the U.S.-led war on Iraq in 2003, encompassing the events of the “Arab Spring” in 2011, and culminating in the ongoing war in the Gaza Strip. Today, it can be said that the repercussions of this war have produced a highly complex and layered reality across the entire region—most notably for Iran itself, which has lost a significant measure of both its internal and external strength. It is clear that Iran is now working to reassess its positions with the countries of the region and the wider world. 

The political promises and regional projects that Tehran had offered for decades were laid bare in the immediate aftershock of the war. This was reflected clearly in its most prominent entity, Hezbollah in Lebanon, which suffered heavy losses: the collapse of a large part of its historic leadership structure, the erosion of its missile capabilities, and the decline of its political influence on the Lebanese national stage.

These realities show that Iran, over the past decades, has been keen to shift battles beyond its own territory in order to spare itself human losses—at the expense of Arab blood and lives. Ironically, Iran has now tasted a portion of the ordeals and suffering it had brought upon our Arab Shia brethren.

Iran must realize that hiding behind its familiar ideological rhetoric hostile to the United States and Israel is no longer effective, especially at a time when it has come to practically recognize the seriousness of the American-Israeli project aimed at reshaping the Middle East on the basis of eliminating the phenomenon of militias. However, Tehran—due to internal and external considerations—refuses to admit this publicly,  It must, rather, fulfill its moral responsibility and not abandon millions of Arab Shia to face their fate alone, relying on local forces that are themselves in gradual decline.

Such a course, at a coming political moment, would place this community at risk of becoming a group without effective representation and without meaningful power in the equations of their national states.

This reality, at its core, represents both a warning and a call to Arab Shia to reassess the current transformations, evaluate their outcomes, and anticipate the paths of the future. Accordingly, returning to their national and Arab sphere appears to be the most realistic and enduring option, as it provides the framework capable of protecting them, safeguarding their rights, and ensuring their fair representation and active participation in political and social life—away from dependence on cross-border projects that have already proven their limitations and negative consequences.

The “Axis of Resistance” in Decline: Its Ideology and Applications

The repercussions of the war in the Gaza Strip—whether on the direct battlefield, or in the mass displacement of most of its population, or in its humanitarian consequences, including the threat of famine and Gaza’s transformation into a geographical war zone overwhelmed by death and destruction—stand as a glaring indication of the limitations and failure of Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance” strategy.

These repercussions also clearly expose the shortcomings of the asymmetric armed resistance model in achieving its political and military objectives. On the contrary, it has contributed to deepening the humanitarian tragedy and exposing local communities to exorbitant costs, without producing tangible results in terms of regional power balances.

This reality also extends to the Lebanese arena, where a large portion of its southern population continues to live in long-term displacement far from their homes and sources of livelihood due to the ongoing Israeli military presence and repeated incursions. Meanwhile, the state remains unable to provide the necessary funding to rebuild what Hezbollah’s military adventures against Israel have destroyed. 

The same situation is repeated in Yemen in areas under Houthi control, where vital transport and energy infrastructure has been subjected to continuous Israeli strikes targeting Sana’a Airport, Hudaydah Port, power grids, and oil storage facilities. Despite the heavy costs borne by the Houthis as a result of these attacks, they persist in carrying out military operations of limited effectiveness. 

With the recent transformations, Israel has adjusted its national security strategy to more closely reflect the post-9/11 U.S. policy of “pursuing sources of threat wherever they may be found, regardless of their geographic distance.” As a result, all components of the region have come to recognize the possibility of being targeted by Israel.

If the leaders of Hezbollah, the factions in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen fail to recognize the new reality we live in today and persist in their current path and methods, they risk repeating the adventure of Hamas in the Gaza Strip—and they will bear responsibility for the blood of innocent people among their own populations. At that point, regret will be of no use, as they will be facing an adversary that has revealed its strength and ruthlessness, one they will neither be able to resist nor ward off its harm.

I am not here to showcase the disparity in power, but rather to state facts that many people still refuse to acknowledge or even listen to. Everyone can see how Israel launches its attacks across multiple fronts, inflicting upon them heavy and mounting losses, while they remain unable to mount an equivalent response that would save face—let alone anything more than that. 

Here, I once again repeat my advice to them: Break free from the loathsome sectarian trap, distance yourselves from the Iranian political project that serves neither you nor your people in any way, and move toward disarmament, integration into the state, and the exercise of your deserved role as committed citizens within its legitimate institutions.

In the same vein, this advise applies to the case of Syria. After Tel Aviv reduced the pace of its strikes against the Axis of Resistance, its attention began turning toward Syrian territory and the armed groups that managed to seize power there. The current from which this authority claims to have broken away—and all who support jihadist fundamentalist thought—has long been, and still remains, one of the most prominent adversaries of the United States and Israel. The prospect of a violent, existential battle against it remains ever-present in American and Israeli strategic thinking, depending on circumstances and exigencies.

This, of course, does not contradict the proposals we hear concerning possible security agreements between Syria and Israel. Yet it remains unclear how such agreements could be beneficial to Syria and the countries of the region unless their details are clarified and sufficient guarantees are provided to prevent the erosion of Syrian territory.

With an emphasis on the importance of Turkey managing its regional files with the same political acumen expected of it—particularly in light of the ongoing discussions about recalibrating regional power balances and containing undesirable expansion.

No Alternative to the Arab Nation-States

Despite all these transformations and the relative decline in power and influence, the Axis of Resistance blindly cling to their traditional rhetoric and agenda, which have proven ineffective and detrimental to the region. This is clearly reflected in Qassem’s message this month to Saudi Arabia: Let us mend our relationship and build a common front against Israeli hostility.

This stance indicates a continued preoccupation with traditional ideological discourse while ignoring the limited actual capabilities of the Axis of Resistance. For the concept of “resistance,” as employed by followers of the Iranian axis, essentially means the use of party and military activity in the service of Iranian policies in the region—a modern concept tied specifically to post-Khomeini Iran. I expect that Iran will either reframe it or allow it to enter a stage of deep dormancy.

This call cannot be regarded as a genuine self-critical review by Hezbollah.

First, it did not come from its earlier, more influential leadership that had better conditions to take more realistic positions but chose instead a cross-border sectarian rhetoric and the adoption of an Iranian agenda, ignoring their Arab identity and common bonds with their fellow countrymen. As a result, the rhetoric that had long glorified weapons directed against Israel has today lost all credibility.

Second, it confirms that Hezbollah still maintains its independence from the Lebanese state, and through this independence it effectively monopolizes the right to political representation of the Shia community in Lebanon. This reflects the ongoing disconnect between official rhetoric and national reality, as well as the clear gap between the interests of the community and the actual practices of its political component. 

This reveals the loss of connection Hezbollah leaders have with the real situation. What is required in these circumstances is the acknowledgment of reality and of the true limits of power. I firmly argue that such acknowledgment is not a humiliation, but rather an expression of strategic intelligence and political acumen.

As for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, it has never been distant from the path of cooperation and dialogue in its regional and international relations. In 1989, it sponsored the Taif Agreement, which marked a pivotal moment in Lebanon’s history, and the Kingdom continued—alongside many other Arab states—to support Lebanon and its stability despite the complexities imposed by the political reality.

Throughout that period, those states were keen to distinguish the Lebanese state and people from the entities operating outside the authority of the state. For this reason, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia neither negotiates with nor accepts any invitation from entities that transcend geography and fail to respect the concept of the nation-state. Rather, it consistently insists on engaging with the nation-state as the sole legitimate authority.

In the same context, our Arab Shia brethren face a fundamental challenge: to deeply reflect on the truths Iran and its proxies are trying to conceal from them and to question the presumed independence of their own decisions. Simply stated, the ability to read regional transformations and analyze the limits of Iranian influence is a key factor in enabling Arab Shias to reorder their priorities and loyalties in a way that ensures the protection of their national interests, fair representation, and effectiveness within the framework of the nation-state. 

What is clear and beyond interpretation is the realization that Iran has now reached a stage of internal erosion that prevents it from sponsoring any new expansionist project targeting us as Arabs and making our Shia brethren fuel for it. What is required of our Shia brothers and sisters in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen is to restore the value of their historically honorable national and Arab role; support the sovereignty and independence of the state on the basis of full citizenship; and learn from the lessons experienced by some countries in the region as a result of their misguided alliances. These seemingly simple goals, once accomplished, have the power to resolve problems, answer fears, and secure the interests of the Shia community.

At the conclusion of this article, my third appeal, I renew the call to our Arab Shia brethren: Let your belonging rise above all else and let your loyalty be to your Arab nation—away from involvement in any partisan or external orientation. Face the present challenges with a spirit of responsibility and courage despite the successive losses that have drained and weighed heavily upon you. Reassess your path with honesty and distance yourselves from false loyalties that have brought nothing to you and your homeland but blood, destruction, and calamities. 

The preservation of the blood and safety of Muslims and Arabs demands that we step out of the cycle of conflict and liberate ourselves from the mindset of deceptive nationalist narratives that have adopted the liberation of Palestine and Jerusalem as their storyline. 

I stress that what is required today is your full integration with your peoples and homelands for the protection of your families, your land, and your countries—not as a sect, but as an essential and vital component bound with others in a healthy relationship founded on inclusive national principles. And this is what Iraq can represent as a clear model—managing its resources in line with its political, economic, and military interests while benefiting from the decisive transformations taking place around it. 

Standing together, shoulder to shoulder, to prevent the tearing apart of the Arab fabric and to reject sectarian and denominational incitement in all its forms is the safe path and lifeline for us all. For despite all their diverse components, Arabs have always been, and still remain, the true protector in preserving the dignity and safeguarding the identity of all their brothers and sisters, without discrimination or exclusion.

And because I wholeheartedly believe in the Arab nationalist role and the moral responsibility toward our Shia brethren, I wish to lift the burden of this trust from my shoulders. O God, I have conveyed the message—bear witness.