A Call to Arab Countries: Support Our Shia Brothers’ Return to Their Arab Identity!

The opportunity for Arab countries to reclaim what has been lost these past few decades is now within reach. Despite the difficult situation in the region and the unprecedented humanitarian suffering due to the war in Gaza and Lebanon, a rare set of circumstances have provided Arab regimes—whose political, national security, and military decisions, as well as economic resources, are all tied to Iran—with a rare opportunity to return to their Arab and national roots. What is happening in Lebanon today is a perfect example.

Events in Lebanon have revealed a path through which the hijacked country can regain its identity, pluralism, and social and political diversity, closing the floodgates of war and restoring its position as a beacon of culture in the East. Beirut can once again become the economic, social, intellectual, and artistic hub of the Arab Middle East. The mission to take advantage of this opportunity is not solely the responsibility of the Lebanese people; Arab nations must adopt a different approach than what has prevailed over the past decades.

Today, Arab nations must capitalize on this historic moment to reshape the Lebanese landscape by dismantling the political alliances and balances that have long prevailed. This effort will not only serve the regional interests of Arab countries, but it will also protect Lebanon’s own interests, safeguard the lives of its war-weary citizens, reinforce its sovereignty, and promote its internal stability. Achieving these goals is more possible today than ever, despite what some may believe about a country that has lacked stability for more than 50 years.

The events unfolding in Lebanon, starting with Israel’s lethal “pager bombings” in mid-September, are not only unprecedented but also unexpectedly simple and timely. Since Israel began its offensive from southern Lebanon to the southern suburbs on October 1, the extent of Israel’s blatant infiltration of not only Iran-backed forces but within governmental ranks in Tehran itself has been exposed, allowing Israel to target and eliminate leaders so swiftly and easily that political analysts have struggled to keep up with the unfolding events and their implications.

Despite the lingering uncertainty around Iran’s true position (a complex topic that would require a separate, in-depth discussion), Tehran has taken actions that Arab capitals should have taken earlier. For instance, following its foreign minister’s recent visit to Lebanon, Iran sent military and political envoys, including its parliament speaker, to Beirut’s southern suburbs.

There is no doubt that Iran is keen on maintaining the influence of its armed proxies in Lebanon and other countries in the region. However, this priority remains conditional on Tehran’s tactical interests, no matter how long they last. Strategically, what Iran prioritizes is preserving its long-term alliance with the Arab Shiite component that enabled Iran to build military arms in the past and will allow it to build new proxies and direct them to other areas.

Iran’s alliance with a significant segment of the Arab Shiite community, while appearing to be one of partnership, fundamentally reveals the dependency of this community on Iran. This dependency didn’t emerge suddenly. It is the result of a complex interplay of various factors that have evolved over different historical eras, tracing back to the transformative efforts initiated by the Safavid dynasty and the political dynamics that emerged after the 1979 Iranian revolution.

The Safavids, whose dynasty ruled Iran 1501–1722, 1729–1736, and 1750–1773, played a pivotal role in establishing the Twelver denomination of Shia Islam as the state religion. Shah Ismail I, the founder of the dynasty, implemented a coercive campaign to transform Iran from a Sunni-majority state into a Shiite one. The shah’s motives were not only religious but also a strategic step to create a national identity that distinguished Iran from its Sunni neighbors, particularly the Ottoman Empire. Ismail “imported” Shiite scholars from regions such as southern Iraq and Lebanon to educate the public and legitimize his rule, thereby integrating Shiite Islam into the cultural fabric of Iran.

Over 200 years later, the 1979 revolution marked another significant turning point for Iran. Under Ayatollah Khomeini’s leadership, Iran portrayed itself as a leader of the Shiite community, not only in Arab countries but across the globe. By presenting itself as a defender of Shiite rights and promoting narratives about their historical victimization and Iran’s role in protecting them, Khomeini succeeded in strengthening the connection between sectarian identity and loyalty to Iran.

The ayatollah’s 10-year reign as Supreme Leader of Iran (1979–1989) also framed sectarian conflicts with blood relatives as an existential struggle. Additionally, it adopted a discourse aimed at undermining the legitimacy of local Arab Shiite elites while presenting Iranian elites as an alternative, promoting a version of political Islam that is Shiite and competitive with the already struggling Sunni version.

This transformation inspired Shiite communities across the Middle East, including Iraq and Lebanon, as they began to seek greater political representation and independence. The Iranian model of governance has also inspired many Arab Shiites who viewed Iran as a protector against Sunni-dominated regimes.

The new geopolitical landscape also influenced the alliance of Arab Shiites with Iran. Following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, Shiites in Iraq gained political power that was widely perceived as an extension of Iranian influence in the region. Many Arab Shiites began to view Iran not only as a religious ally but also as a strategic partner against what they promoted as “repressive” Sunni regimes.

Today, in light of the current political and field conditions, and with the increasing pace of events, as well as the exposure of Iran’s ideology and policies to the Lebanese Shiite community, there seems to be an opportunity for Arab Shiites to rediscover Iran, which does not hesitate to use any group it can as pawns in its regional conflicts. These conflicts have led to significant destruction and loss of life in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, among other countries.

It has also become easier to uncover the deep-rooted racism and religious discrimination within Iranian policies, where Persian identity often takes precedence over Shiite solidarity. There are countless examples—from literature, education, and politics—that demonstrate the longstanding Persian disdain for Arabs and their efforts to perpetuate a negative image of them in various cultural contexts.

I fully understand that the issue of loyalties, especially when rooted in religious sectarian dimensions, is a complex one that requires comprehensive and long-term solutions. However, this should not hinder Arab states from strategically investing their political capital to seize the opportunity presented today. For starters, their ambassadors and foreign ministers should urgently leverage all that Arab diplomacy can offer to extend a helping hand to Lebanon and its people, particularly the Shiite community that is suffering immensely today.

It is also essential for all Arabs to agree on a unified political vision that enables them to achieve immediate and tangible results on the ground while simultaneously addressing the root causes and long-term solutions of this issue. Emphasis should be placed on adopting social and cultural policies based on dialogue, tolerance, and the promotion of national identity—not only to implement these policies in Lebanon but to expand them to other Arab regions suffering from external interference in the name of creed or sect.

In order to complete all aspects of these policies, it is essential to enhance all forms of moral and practical support (politically, economically, and culturally) and to help meet the needs of Lebanese citizens—including all their components, factions, and orientations—who are facing a war that they could not avoid when it broke out and which they cannot confront at present. Regardless of the outcome of this war, both the Lebanese people and the state will be losers in every respect unless we can all transform the opportunity it presents into a historical event that changes Lebanon forever. Only then will every sacrifice borne by the Lebanese people be rewarded with a secure future and a unified national state.

Since politics tends to lean towards tradition, adherence, and commitment to public policies and pre-planned strategies, Arab states should coordinate their efforts through established political channels and methods. They should work together to consolidate their efforts within a clear and explicit Arab alliance supported by influential and politically impactful countries—foremost among them the Gulf states, Egypt, and Jordan—under the umbrella of the Arab League and the legitimacy of its role within the limits of its member states.

It also would be politically prudent for this alliance to benefit from its good relationship with the United States and the West to support anything that can protect Lebanon from the continuation of this war and spare it the devastation that is still capable of expanding and increasing as long as external parties continue to clash on its territory.

Today, Israel is determined to protect its northern borders at all costs, and the West continues to support it, no matter the cost. So, is there an Arab way to reduce the burden on the Lebanese people? If united, the answer is: Yes!