Washington and Tehran: A First Round of Semi-Direct Negotiations

The United States and Iran concluded the first round of “semi-direct” negotiations following talks held in Muscat, Oman April 12 between U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. The talks, coordinated by Omani Foreign Minister Badr Al-Busaidi, and came as mounting pressure builds on Tehran, its allies, and its regional policies due to the aftermath of the war in Gaza. They also followed a March 5 warning by U.S. President Donald Trump that Iran has a two-month deadline to reach a new nuclear agreement or face military action.

Given this context, interpretations of the first round of negotiations vary, especially since official statements and indications regarding the outcomes have been extremely limited and vague. Accordingly, this analysis relies on a set of indicators and meetings conducted by STRATEGIECS Think Tank’s team with a group of American officials, who prefer to remain anonymous but are closely familiar with the negotiation process and internal White House discussions.

Why are the Negotiations “Semi-Direct”?

The first round of negotiations between Tehran and Washington, held in the Sultanate of Oman, was driven by a set of key developments. Iran entered the talks having lost much of its deterrent capability, as the damage sustained by its proxies and its presence in Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria significantly narrowed its room to maneuver at the negotiating table.

Moreover, the war in Gaza exposed Iran’s weaknesses in taking effective defensive measures. Israel managed to infiltrate Iranian territory through various means, including intelligence operations—such as the assassination of Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh on July 31, 2024—and military actions, such as the drone strike on a missile defense battery near the Natanz nuclear research facility on April 19, 2024. Additionally, Israeli fighter jets reportedly flew hundreds of kilometers into Iranian airspace and struck ballistic missile manufacturing facilities on October 26, 2024.

Meanwhile, the United States entered the military confrontation directly on March 15, launching an ongoing operation against the Houthis in Yemen. This operation is closely linked to Iran, as the weaponry and combat tactics employed, along with the geographical nature of some targets, mirror those associated with Iran’s nuclear facilities, many of which are built deep underground and in mountainous terrain.

Despite these developments, a U.S. source familiar with the negotiations in Muscat told STRATEGIECS Think Tank that Trump hopes for a peaceful resolution. He made this clear February 4 when he signed the U.S. National Security Memorandum. However, while the world may believe it understands Trump well, no one should take his policies and priorities for granted. Although he has expressed a desire for a peaceful outcome, his top priority remains eliminating the Iranian threat.

Since his first term in office (2017–2021), Trump has consistently maintained that Iran will not be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons, viewing such a development as an existential threat to the region and to U.S. forces stationed there. He believes it would trigger a nuclear arms race and widespread instability in the region. For that reason, he is firmly committed to preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons and is prepared to resort to military force if the negotiation track fails.

In fact, this perception is reinforced by the U.S. strikes on Houthi-held areas in Yemen, which reflect Washington’s seriousness in neutralizing Iranian capabilities. These actions also indicate a U.S. assessment that such a goal is now not only possible but within reach—whether through leveraging Iran’s current weaknesses to extract major concessions or by launching a decisive military strike. Both options have been backed by an unprecedented American military buildup and a shift in the posture of U.S. forces in the region from defense to offense.

From this standpoint, Washington has made direct negotiations a precondition, ruling out previous formats used in past talks—whether those held during former President Barack Obama’s administration, which led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015, or the Vienna negotiations between 2021 and 2022 under former President Joe Biden, which involved five mediators: China, Russia, the UK, France, and Germany.

This shift suggests that the current U.S. administration seeks to exploit Iran’s weakened position to impose terms rather than engage in a balanced negotiating framework aimed at mutual compromise. Thus, the negotiations are more accurately described as “semi-direct,” even if they technically took place in two separate rooms.

United States and Israel: The Intersection of Objectives and the Rotation of Roles

Recent developments in the region reveal a coordinated symbiosis between the American and Israeli roles on the frontlines against Iran and its proxies. While Israel carries out military and combat operations, the United States seeks to translate those actions into political outcomes.

In Lebanon, for example, Israel continues to violate the ceasefire agreement by seizing five strategic points and periodically launching strikes against Hezbollah. In parallel, Washington is intensifying its political pressure aimed at disarming Hezbollah. Deputy U.S. Deputy Special Presidential Envoy to the Middle East Morgan Ortagus has presented Lebanon with two options: disarm Hezbollah and partner with the United States or lose that partnership.

In Gaza, the U.S. administration is attempting to bring the war to a conclusion by alternately proposing the displacement of the population and insisting on the disarmament of Hamas. These efforts come amid ongoing Israeli military operations in the Strip, which resumed March 17.

Accordingly, this approach centers on intensifying military pressure and inflicting losses on the opponent across various fronts to compel concessions. This strategy has led to unprecedented developments in the case of Lebanon’s Hezbollah, especially as the group has reportedly put the future of its arms on the negotiating table, according to an April 9 Reuters report.

From this perspective, the U.S. decision to engage in negotiations with Iran under the shadow of warning and fire can be understood. These talks coincide with a massive display of U.S. naval and air power. At the same time, the aircraft carriers USS Harry S. Truman and USS Carl Vinson are active against Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen, and Washington has deployed a formidable air strike force—including B-2 stealth bombers to a U.S.-British military base on Diego Island in the Indian Ocean and the B-52 bombers already in the region.

It appears that the American direct military involvement in Iranian affairs is meant to signal a power projection that exceeds what Israel alone can achieve. All of this indicates that Washington and Tel Aviv are seeking Iranian concessions that would decisively resolve the nuclear issue, rather than reach negotiated settlements. The ultimate goal seems to be the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program, particularly after the failure of economic sanctions to curb its progress—evidenced by uranium enrichment levels reaching 60% in November 2024, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

This stance is further reinforced by the U.S. insistence on conducting direct negotiations—an approach explained by a U.S. official close to Trump in comments to STRATEGIECS Think Tank. According to the official, Trump’s goal is to pursue negotiations that are purposeful and result-oriented, aiming to resolve the issue decisively rather than managing the conflict in a way that future administrations would inherit. “The president wants a timeline for the negotiations,” the official said. “He wants them to be concise and direct, because the purpose is to reach an agreement, not to drag them out for years.”

This method has become a hallmark of the current U.S. administration’s approach to managing complex global issues. It is not limited to the Iranian nuclear file but also extends to other major international concerns—such as negotiations with Russia to end the war in Ukraine. These talks preceded the U.S.-Iran negotiations, with Saudi Arabia and Turkey hosting U.S.-Russia negotiations in February and March this year aimed at ending the conflict in Ukraine.

In reality, both events are interconnected. The U.S.-Russia negotiations indirectly neutralize Russia’s influence over the Iranian nuclear file by redirecting Moscow’s focus toward its own priorities—namely, improving relations with the United States, ending the war in Ukraine, and lifting Western sanctions.

Notably, the U.S.-Iranian meeting on April 12 was preceded by a meeting the day earlier in Moscow between Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff .

What About the Next Round of Negotiations?

The United States has entered the war-and-negotiation track in the Middle East with full strategic weight, aiming to resolve issues related to Iran—matters that have been a source of concern for Washington and regional countries over the past decade. The U.S. is engaging in negotiations with Iran from a position of strength, holding the upper hand against both Iran and its regional proxies.

On the other side, Iran recognizes the seriousness of the current moment and has agreed to participate in semi-direct negotiations—despite its persistent claims, echoed by its officials and media, that the talks remain “indirect.” This is happening even though the five previous intermediaries between the two parties have been excluded, and despite Oman’s insistence on remaining neutral, as per the principles of its foreign policy.

This shift indicates that the indirect channels that once helped ease tensions and moderate behavior are no longer in place. Iran’s decision to engage in negotiations signals its awareness of the potential consequences—particularly the possibility of making significant concessions regarding its nuclear program. These could even lead to its dismantling, in a scenario similar to that of Libya’s nuclear file, which was dismantled in 2003 after then-President Muammar Gaddafi announced his “voluntary renunciation” of the program and gave Washington its equipment and documentation.

In addition, Iran is fully aware of the difficulty of confronting the alternative—namely, a military strike against its nuclear program. Such an attack could spark internal mobilization against the political regime, especially since targeting Iran both abroad and at home would undermine the ideological and nationalistic foundations upon which the regime was built.

This comes in the context of past protest movements, from 2009 through 2022, and amid recurring domestic unrest fueled by various political, ethnic, and nationalist opposition movement. These challenges are further compounded by mounting economic pressures due to U.S. sanctions and the looming expiration of international exemptions related to Iran’s nuclear program, which is set for October this year. The expiration of these exemptions raises the likelihood of new actors joining the pressure campaign against Iran, including the IAEA and European powers involved in the nuclear file.

Finally, by entering negotiations, Iran seeks to preserve its territorial integrity, safeguard its political regime, and avoid a potential U.S.-Israeli military strike on its nuclear facilities. At the same time, it may also aim to buy time through the pursuit of long-term negotiations that could help it achieve both internal and external recovery and absorb the momentum of military buildups and threats.

However, even this objective appears to be well understood by the U.S. administration. As one U.S. official told STRATEGIECS Think Tank, “Washington will not be deceived. … We’ve seen how previous multilateral negotiations were filled with indirect talks that led nowhere.”

Thus, it has become clear that both Washington and Tel Aviv are aiming to achieve the objectives of a strategic confrontation and settle the Iran-related files, without getting entangled in prolonged negotiations. As a result, the next expected step may be a shift from “semi-direct” talks to fully direct negotiations.