U.S. Presence in Syria: Changing the Attribute of Participation and Presence

The debate over the future of U.S. forces in Syria has resurfaced once again following the U.S. Department of Defense’s April 18 announcement of a gradual plan to reduce by half its troops deployed in the north and northeast of the country. This move aligns with U.S. President Donald Trump’s preference to avoid involvement in the Syrian issue, which he views as a chaotic situation to steer clear of. It continues the approach he adopted during his first term (2017–2021), when he pledged in December 2018 to withdraw all U.S. forces following the announcement of ISIS’s defeat, before eventually reducing troop numbers from 2,000 to 900 soldiers.

However, Syria and the broader region have witnessed several changes since Trump’s first term, particularly in light of the shifting roles of key actors on the Syrian stage, changes in their tools of influence, and a transformation in the balance of power among them. This means that the future of the U.S. presence in Syria now depends on a renewed reading of the current realities.

The Controversy of U.S. Forces in Syria

The limited U.S. military presence in Syria represents a contentious issue within American decision-making circles, marked by tensions and hesitation regarding troop levels. During Trump’s first administration, particularly after the defeat of ISIS, the presence of U.S. forces in Syria was no longer viewed as a strategic priority. This sentiment resonated widely among many Americans who regarded military deployments in Syria and Iraq as a drain on economic resources, outweighing the initial objectives of targeting ISIS remnants and monitoring the influence of Iran and its proxies in the region.

Today, U.S. security officials view America’s military presence in Syria as a crucial component of the broader U.S. national security strategy. It is seen as a key factor in preventing ISIS from regrouping or recovering from its losses, and as a strategic tool for maintaining Washington’s influence in the Syrian context, especially given the deployment of U.S. forces in resource-rich areas with oil and water. Furthermore, the U.S. presence is pivotal in balancing the interests of foreign powers involved in Syria, such as Turkey, Russia, Iran, and Israel, while also managing relations with local forces through partnerships with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

Trump’s surprising announcement in October 2019 to withdraw all U.S. forces from northern Syria led to the resignation of both Defense Secretary James Mattis and the Special Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS Brett McGurk, which later prompted the administration to maintain a limited number of troops. Accordingly, the debate over the U.S. presence in Syria is directly linked to the American administration’s approach to its role there, an approach that changes from one administration to another.

During former U.S. President Joe Biden’s tenure, and amidst the war in the Gaza Strip, the number of American troops gradually increased, reaching a peak of around 2,000 soldiers following the fall of the Ba’athist regime in December 2024. This increase came in response to emerging threats generated by the war and to prevent a security vacuum that ISIS could exploit. It was also indirectly linked to supporting the American diplomatic stance toward the new authority, especially since the Biden administration showed cautious openness toward it.

In contrast, Trump’s attempts to withdraw U.S. forces, whether during his first or second term, stem from his approach of non-involvement in Syrian affairs. Shortly after taking office, reports indicated plans for a U.S. withdrawal within from 30 to 90 days.

The Changing Environment of U.S. Presence in Syria

U.S. forces are operating within a shifting environment, not only in Syria but across the broader region, where the United States plays a direct role in shaping its foundations and defining the roles of regional actors. In Syria, the American presence had initially served to pressure the former regime toward genuine political engagement, according to the Vienna peace talks for Syria. Other means of pressure included economic sanctions that prevented the regime from recovering or asserting control over the northwest area of Syria.

However, today, the U.S. military presence has evolved into a source of leverage for Washington to influence the shaping of the political process and to prevent the new authority from monopolizing political decision-making or reproducing the Ba’ath Party model.

Accordingly, the future of the U.S. presence is tied to two key issues: one, ensuring that the new authority does not become a source of regional instability—a goal linked to leveraging available resources in areas under U.S. control, particularly oil—and, two, guaranteeing balanced representation for the various components of Syrian society, especially the Kurds, who have been a reliable partner for the United States. Washington expressed a positive stance toward the agreement signed between the Syrian transnational government and the SDF on March 10.

The continuation of the American presence is also linked to keeping Syrian territory free of Iranian influence and preventing the resurgence of extremism and terrorism, whether from ISIS or Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Today, HTS remains under organizational and individual monitoring and is still classified as a terrorist organization by the United States, which has not ceased its ongoing demands for the extradition of HTS leaders, particularly those now holding government positions.

On a broader scale, the U.S. presence helps manage geopolitical tensions in post-regime-change Syria, particularly between Turkey and Israel. On one hand, Ankara is seeking to expand its influence toward the central part of Syria, with reports revealing its intention to establish an airbase in the Palmyra area near the city of Homs. On the other hand, Israel is working to solidify a security buffer in southern Syria and prevent any party from acquiring weaponry that could threaten its national security. In this context, Israel views Turkey’s potential influence as not necessarily aligned with its interests and possibly posing a direct threat, prompting Israel to carry out a series of airstrikes in March targeting the Palmyra military airport and the nearby Tiyas (T4) airbase.

Therefore, points of tension between the two countries center around Israel’s rejection of any Turkish moves that could alter the military deployment balance or shift the rules governing the use of airspace. Israel fears that a potential U.S. withdrawal could open the door a replay of what happened in 2019 when Turkey launched an attack on the SDF following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from northeastern Syria.

Constraints on Withdrawal and Mechanisms for Regulating the Vacuum

The future of the U.S. military presence in Syria is determined by the Syrian equation, regional interactions with it, and the establishment of a political and security environment that serves American interests and geopolitical calculations in the region without direct military costs. Accordingly, Washington is working to shape the geographical, security, and local environment to achieve these goals by clarifying its demands to the Syrian government, monitoring its response, and engaging in multilateral cooperation with its regional partner states.

The Syrian government is expected to meet American demands and define the nature of its relations with local components and regional actors, whether states or groups. Washington plays an active role in the ongoing talks between the Syrian transitional government and the SDF, and it sponsored the agreement between the two parties signed in March. It is unlikely that U.S. forces will withdraw before both parties fully implement the terms of the agreement. It wants to avoid a strategic vacuum that could allow regional powers—primarily Turkey—to position themselves within Syria as well as a resurgence of local conflict between the two sides, thus creating a turbulent environment that groups like ISIS and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard could exploit.

This is happening while Washington is holding talks with Tehran regarding its nuclear program. Implicitly, Washington aims to reduce Iran’s regional influence and ensure that any potential lifting of sanctions, in the event of an agreement, is not exploited to strengthen its network, which has been damaged by the Gaza war.

Among the most important American demands is the need to change the role of Syrian geography and its relations with neighboring countries. Washington has called for a ban on the activities of Palestinian factions supported by Iran on Syrian territory, and the government responded by announcing the arrest of leaders of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement on April 22.

Moreover, Washington, to achieve mutual interests, relies on multilateral cooperation with countries that share strategic relations with it, particularly Turkey, Israel, Jordan, and the Gulf states. For example, in January, Jordan announced the formation of a joint security committee with Syria to secure the borders and prevent the return of ISIS. This coincided with Turkey’s announcement of an agreement with Jordan to support stability in Syria and combat ISIS. In February, a joint regional coalition was launched to combat terrorism, including Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. In March, Jordan hosted the first security meeting of this coalition under the name “Meeting of Syria’s Neighboring Countries".

In the same context, Saudi Arabia plays a role in reshaping the relations between Syria and Lebanon. Following border clashes, it sponsored an agreement in March to coordinate on and demarcate the common border between the two countries. This path is expected to close the weak areas where Iran has long extended its influence to halt the supply path of weapons to Hezbollah.

In the same context, Trump announced on April 7 his readiness to mediate between Tel Aviv and Ankara, urging Israel to resolve its disputes with Turkey. This contributed to reducing tensions between the two sides, followed by the opening of a communication and coordination channel after their meetings in Azerbaijan in April. It is likely that Washington will play a role in opening intermediary channels through Arab or European countries to facilitate indirect coordination between the Syrian government and Israel.

Finally, after achieving and solidifying this, it can be said that U.S. forces may withdraw from Syria or change their legal status there and possibly their positioning, depending on the shift in the status of the Syrian government in Washington’s eyes—from a government listed as terrorist group to a friendly, and possibly allied, government following a path aligned with all its neighbors.