Turkey and Syria Inching Closer Toward Resuming Good Relations

Turkish-Syrian relations witnessed a new round of discussion initiatives that could end the estrangement that began with the Syrian crisis in 2011. Statements from high-ranking officials from both parties confirmed their willingness to attempt reconciliation after a great effort was made by mediators like Russia and Iraq to bridge the gap between the two countries. Furthermore, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan plans to schedule a meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

These discussion initiatives, driven by a number of local, regional, and international changes, also face real challenges given the events, facts, and the complexity of the issues at hand.

Rapprochement Indicators

There are increasing indications that direct Turkish-Syrian talks aimed at resuming relations severed since 2011 are imminent. On June 26, Assad expressed an openness to initiatives to restore relations with Turkey. On June 28, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan hinted at the possibility of meeting with Assad, and, on July 7, he mentioned Ankara’s intention to invite the Syrian president to visit Turkey to the Anadolu Agency, a state-run news outlet.

Assad announced his readiness for a meeting if “fundamental issues” between the two countries are addressed. During the July 12 NATO summit, Erdoğan announced that he directed Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan to meet with Assad to begin the process of restoring relations.

The Turkish-Syrian rapprochement path is not new. Its manifestations have been apparent since 2022, especially after the resumption of relations between the two counties became a major goal for Russia in its role in the “Astana path” discussions since its launch in 2017. Moscow took various steps aiming to facilitate the discussion and bring together officials from both countries. The first official meeting was in late 2022, when the Turkish and the Syrian defense ministers meet their Russian counterpart in Moscow to discuss common issues.

In May 2023, the foreign ministers of Russia, Turkey, Iran, and Syria agreed on a roadmap presented by Moscow to serve the interests of both nations. In May 2024, the Iraqi prime minister announced Baghdad’s involvement in mediating between the two countries.

Rapprochement Motives

There are multiple rapprochement motives between the two countries. These include Russia’s desire to change the situation on the ground in northern Syria, especially given its preoccupation with the war in Ukraine and its need to reinvigorate its diplomacy in the Middle East, reaffirming its declared position since its involvement in the crisis in 2015. Additionally, Syria is eager to continue its path of regional openness, particularly after regaining its seat in the Arab League on May 7, 2023.

However, it is clear that the relations rapprochement is a more urgent matter for Turkey. This urgency is not only related to foreign policy issues, but it also has local implications fraught with risks affecting security, political, and economic levels. Turkey is experiencing an economic crisis. In late 2023, the Turkish lira fell to a historic low of 29.7 cents against the dollar, losing about 37% of its value. Additionally, annual inflation rates continue to rise, reaching approximately 68.5% in March 2024, exacerbating the crisis in living costs and prices, and increasing poverty rates by 14%, according to the Turkish Statistical Institute.

The economic crises have created numerous internal tensions, particularly regarding the Syrian refugees in Turkey, who number over three million, according to Turkey’s Directorate General of Migration Management. The country is experiencing unprecedented polarization concerning refugees, with anti-refugee rhetoric dominating the presidential and parliamentary elections held in May 2023. Both major parties, the Justice and Development Party and the Republican People’s Party, made the repatriation of refugees a central goal in their election campaigns.

Therefore, the refugees issue started to raise concerns that it will develop into acts of social violence. In August 2023, Syrians houses and businesses in Ankara were subjected to violent acts. At the beginning of July, Kayseri state witnessed violent acts against Syrian refugees and their properties and businesses. On July4, a Turkish Telegram group named “Turkey Insurrection,” which calls for violence against Syrians, leaked passport information that provided the location of more than 3.3 million Syrian refugees living in Turkey.

Racist abuse against Arab tourists, whether physical or verbal or online, affects Turkey’s tourism sector since Arab tourists constituted 10% of Turkey’s total visitors during the first quarter of 2024, amounting to 230,000 Arab tourists.

In addition, local acts of violence against Syrians undermine Turkey’s ability to maintain order in the areas they control in northern Syria. In early July, the regions of rural Aleppo and Idlib witnessed clashes between Turkish forces and Syrian protesters demonstrating against their treatment of refugees.

Resuming Relations Complexities

The current round of rapprochement, although indicating clear momentum in both countries’ desire—particularly Turkey’s—to restore relations, does not necessarily mean a clear path forward beyond the complexities surrounding their relations. Previous rapprochement initiatives have reached similar points only to later return to a state of stagnation.

In March 2023, attempts were made to arrange a meeting between the two presidents, but their positions prevented it, and it seems the current conditions have not changed.

Damascus continues to insist on linking the reconciliation process to the withdrawal of Turkish forces from northwest Syria and the restoration of the “pre-2011 status quo,” as stated by the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 13. This position is based on several reasons.

First, to prevent Turkey from using the discussion to “legalize the Turkish occupation in Syria,” as Assad stated in an interview with Sky News Arabia in August 2023.

Second, to rule out the scenario of expelling Turkish forces from Syrian territory by military means, making negotiation a primary Syrian strategy to achieve this.

Third, to end Turkish support for groups that Damascus considers terrorist.

On the other hand, Turkey is concerned about making a sudden shift in its approach to the Syrian issue, particularly regarding national security matters such as the refugee situation and the control of northeastern Syria by the Syrian Democratic Forces.

For instance, Turkey fears that if Damascus regains control over areas where Ankara plays a guarantor role, it could lead to chaos and conflict, potentially triggering new waves of refugees into Turkey. This concern is heightened by the possibility that armed opposition factions—especially Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) (formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra or the Al-Nusra Front), which is listed as a terrorist organization by the United States since the reclassification of Jabhat al-Nusra as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in 2018—may reject any Turkish-Syrian arrangements. Their priorities are entirely different from those of Syria and Turkey. Moreover, the Syrian Salvation Government, a de facto alternative government of the Syrian opposition in Idlib Governorate that administers the areas under HTS control, had previously rejected Turkish-Syrian meetings in 2022, considering them a threat to the lives of millions of Syrians.

In addition, Ankara does not wish to withdraw before ensuring that Syria can protect and secure its borders with Turkey, especially in terms of limiting the threat from Kurdish fighters to Turkish territory or their ambitions for self-rule in their controlled areas in northeastern Syria. Turkey launched Operation “Olive Branch” in 2018 to control the Afrin region (which was under the Kurdish People’s Protection Units) and Operation “Peace Spring” in 2019 to create a safe zone east of the Euphrates and prevent the establishment of a Kurdish entity on its border.

However, in light of both countries’ insistence on their preconditions for resuming relations, Turkey’s desire to add new mediators to the talks can be understood. During a July 14 joint conference between Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan, Fidan indicated that Saudi Arabia would cooperate with Turkey on discussion topics with Syria. This shift is due to Russian and Iranian initiatives aiming to change the current situation in areas with Turkish forces and impose Syrian army control over them. In contrast, the Arab model of rapprochement with Damascus, based on the “step-by-step” principle, appears to be more suitable for Turkey.

Finally, given the above, the future of Turkish-Syrian relations depends on both parties’ ability to make breakthroughs on the key issues of their dispute. Foremost is reaching an agreement on a mechanism for the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Syrian territories. It is likely that the parties will reach a compromise by setting a timetable as a result of any negotiations.

Additionally, the integration or dissolution of opposing military factions will require a joint mechanism to agree on the classification of each faction. Ensuring no border gaps that could exacerbate Turkish security concerns or create a vacuum that supports Kurdish aspirations for self-rule is also crucial.

However, the ability of both states to overcome these challenges raises significant questions about how they can impose their agreements on armed factions in northern Syria, particularly Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. HTS seeks to operate independently of both Ankara and Damascus, aiming to solidify its administration in its controlled areas as a de facto government and present itself as a moderate representative to the international community. This suggests that HTS is unlikely to accept a roadmap that leads to the return of the central government and the Syrian army’s control over its areas without military action against it.