The Second Arab-Islamic Summit: Timing and Contextual Implications

The second joint summit of the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in the Saudi capital Riyadh, held November 11, exactly one year after the first summit, reiterated the the previous summit’s call for a halt to the war in Gaza and Lebanon and ending its impact on civilians.

A resolution issued by the Joint Arab Islamic Extraordinary Summit On Israeli Aggression Against the Palestinian People emphasized the importance of continued coordination with the international community to put an end to Israeli violations of international law and international humanitarian law, and it warned of the dangers of Israel’s escalation of the war spreading in the region and its regional and international consequences, noting Israel’s invasion of Lebanon without decisive measures from the United Nations. The resolution, which stressed Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem, called for the unification of other Palestinian territories, including Gaza, the West Bank, and Jerusalem.

The Heightened Intensity of the Second Arab-Islamic Summit

The second Arab-Islamic summit has remained focused on the same issues as the first, though with differing intensities, especially as the war in Gaza reached a critical phase and a new conflict erupted in Lebanon. The risks surrounding the future of the Palestinian cause and the two-state solution have grown, particularly in light of the changes expected in the U.S. government following Donald Trump’s victory in the presidential elections.

On one hand, the intensity of military operations in Gaza has escalated greatly since the November 2023 summit. The number of Palestinian casualties has increased and the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip has reached an unprecedented crisis compounded by Israeli restrictions on the entry of aid and the extensive destruction of vital infrastructure. Israel now occupies more than 90% of the Gaza Strip’s territory.

At this stage of the war, the entire Palestinian issue has entered a more ambiguous phase. Israeli positions have become more rigid in rejecting the two-state solution and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. In fact, certain factions within the government, especially from the far-right, are seeking to undermine the political presence of the Palestinian Authority and impose sovereignty over the West Bank.

On the other hand, Israel has opened a second front with military operations in Lebanon, following a series of preemptive strikes targeting key Hezbollah leaders, including the party’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. The focus of efforts has shifted to the war in the Gaza Strip, increasing the risks of Lebanon being drawn into a broader conflict after the exchange of Israeli-Iranian strikes.

All of this coincides with the most significant change since the war began: President-elect Trump takes control of the U.S. government on Monday, January 20, 2025. This event will have an impact on both wars in Gaza and Lebanon, as well as on the U.S. stance toward the Palestinian issue, particularly regarding the two-state solution, which current President Joe Biden continues to advocate for unsuccessfully.

Anticipated Changes Due to the New Trump Administration

The potential changes under a second Trump administration regarding the Palestinian issue can be anticipated based on two main factors.

First, his actions and positions during his first term (2017–2021). His 2020 peace plan to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which he called “the “deal of the century,” included the recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the occupied Golan Heights, the transfer of the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem after the U.S. recognized Israeli sovereignty over the city as Israel’s capital, and a series of other steps that favored Israeli positions while sidelining the Palestinian cause.

Second, the people he was selected for key positions in his second term: Pete Hegseth for secretary of Defense Mike Huckabee as U.S. ambassador to Israel. Both nominees have strong ties to Israel and views that align with the right-wing stance of the Israeli government.

These two factors are what gives the second Arab-Islamic summit significant importance, particularly regarding the likelihood of American and Israeli positions regarding the Palestinian issue being in lockstep. During his electoral campaign, Trump’s rhetoric aligned closely with the narratives of the Israeli far-right, particularly regarding the legitimacy of the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, the Israeli government continues to implement its plans in Gaza, including the separation of northern Gaza from the rest of the territory and permanent Israeli control of the three main axes: Netzarim, Philadelphi, and Mivlasim.

Additionally, the Israeli government has signaled its intention to assert sovereignty over the West Bank. Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich issued instructions to the Defense Ministry’s Settlement Directorate and Civil Administration, which he heads, to prepare for total Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and to build the necessary infrastructure to enforce this sovereignty by 2025. In addition, newly appointed Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar declared that the creation of a fully sovereign Palestinian state is no longer “a realistic goal.”

Thus, there is a growing Arab and Islamic conviction regarding the seriousness of the challenges and risks associated with the war and changes within the White House. This could explain the escalation in the rhetoric of Arab leaders regarding the war. For instance, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman emphasized that Israel’s ongoing crimes against innocent people and its continued violations of the sanctity of the Al-Aqsa Mosque undermine efforts to secure the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. He reiterated Saudi Arabia’s support for Lebanon and Palestine and called for Israel to respect Iran’s sovereignty and to refrain from aggression on its territory.

Similarly, King Abdullah II of Jordan called for intensified efforts to break the siege on Gaza, halt Israel’s military escalation in the West Bank, and stop its attacks on holy sites. His Highness posed a poignant question: “How can we address the generations in our countries? How can we justify to them the global failure to stop the Israeli aggression on Gaza and Lebanon? And how can we convince them that international law exists to protect all peoples and their right to life—without discrimination between one people and another, or one state and another?”

Recent speeches by other leaders in the region, such as Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, also reflected an escalation in Arab rhetoric against the Israeli war.

Post-Summit Issues and Questions

The continuation of the war raises several questions regarding the complex issues of the region and the capacity of Arab and Islamic countries to respond effectively to these challenges, particularly concerning Gaza, the West Bank, the future of the Palestinian Authority, and Lebanon’s political situation.

Among the most prominent of these questions concerns the day after the war, especially the timing and conditions for a ceasefire. What are the necessary circumstances for reaching one, and what Israeli and U.S. conditions might be imposed to achieve it? After a ceasefire, there are critical issues that will require Arab and Islamic countries to take a central role, such as maintaining a clear and unified position in rejecting any demographic or territorial changes in Palestinian lands. This includes the challenges of post-war reconstruction and community recovery in Gaza, as well as international efforts to enforce the two-state solution and ensure that it remains the only viable and just resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

These concerns are further complicated by Israeli actions aimed at undermining the Palestinian Authority and the two-state solution. One of the most recent developments in this regard was Israel’s move to ban UNRWA, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

In the case of Lebanon, questions arise about the duration and depth of the Israeli military operation there, the fate of Hezbollah both politically and militarily, and the future limits of its role in the Lebanese political system. There are also questions about the future of Iranian influence and the extent of Saudi Arabia’s readiness to resume its political and economic support for Lebanon.

In truth, the answers to the se questions will not only define the future and nature of Israeli-Palestinian relations after the war, but also Arab-Israeli relations, whether with countries that have peace treaties with Israel or those involved in negotiations.

The Riyadh summit and statements from Saudi officials confirmed that a secure and independent Palestinian state is the basis for any Saudi-Israeli peace agreement. The significance of this lies in the fact that the reconciliation paths witnessed in the region since 2021, which led to the resumption of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, have proven to be solid and strategic. This means that Arab and Islamic countries, collectively, have the ability to impose their visions and demands not only on Israel but also on the broader international community.

Finally, all of the above increases the importance of the second Arab-Islamic Summit and raises the need to repeat it in order to coordinate positions and enhance the ability of countries to respond to current challenges and those emerging from them. There is a need for the decisions of the summit to move from theoretical to practical implementation, especially at a time when the opinions and positions of the majority of the international community align with the second summit’s resolutions, thus increasing the chances of applying and translating them into action. This is particularly true in terms of activating the Saudi invitation to countries worldwide to join the international coalition to implement the two-state solution, which was launched by the Arab-Islamic Ministerial Committee chaired by Saudi Arabia in cooperation with the European Union and Norway.

Also, it includes activating the tripartite mechanism to support the Palestine causeigned by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Arab League, and the African Union Commission, in addition to leveraging the advanced relations of some Gulf countries with the incoming U.S. administration to support the summit’s decisions based on the notion that the United States’ interests in the region require this, especially given the priority that the new administration will place on China over other issues in the Middle East, Ukraine, and elsewhere.