Russia and the Restoration of Strategic Presence in the Changing Syrian Landscape

In the aftermath of the December 2024 regime change in Syria, there was an almost unanimous view that such a shift would not have been possible without implicit Russian consent, while another perspective did not rule out the possibility that Moscow’s stance was a calculated concession, especially given the redirection of its strategic focus toward confronting the West in Ukraine.

Nonetheless, it is fair to say that Russia’s role in shaping future arrangements in the Syrian landscape will not come to an end. While Russia has indeed lost its most reliable ally and guaranteed economic privileges—as evidenced by the termination of the Tartus port agreement in January—it still retains its core strategic influence through its ongoing military presence at the Hmeimim Airbase and the naval facility in Tartus, both of which are vital to maintaining Russia’s global influence.

The Complex Dynamics of International Powers in Syria

The new phase in Syria has revealed a complex reassessment of power dynamics within the country and its international engagements. One of the most notable recent developments in Syria has been the shift in the delicate relationship between Russia and the transitional authority in Damascus led by Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa, the former leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). This shift reflects Moscow’s broader strategic calculations, balancing its regional interests and influence with its long-term objectives in its established strongholds along the Syrian coast.

Despite the high expectations demonstrated by Western countries regarding their relations with the interim government, it is unclear that the country is moving in a way that fully meets the Western model’s aspirations. Rather, the interim government appears pragmatic, seeking to balance the competing interests of external powers. 

Since last December, regional powers—particularly Israel, Turkey, and the Gulf states—have moved swiftly to fill the vacuum in Syria, each in its own way. Israel expanded its military operations to disarm southern Syria and destroy the heavy weaponry previously held by the former army. Turkey signed a comprehensive defense cooperation agreement with the interim government aimed at securing its borders. And the Gulf states have begun a broad-scale economic reengagement, viewing their investments in Syria as a means of supporting the interim government in its competition with other regional and international rivals.

As for the West, it perceives itself facing a reality of internal security chaos and human rights violations, creating a strategic dilemma that limits its engagement. The interim government’s reliance on force, its inability to control armed factions within state frameworks, and its failure to implement its reformist agenda on the ground indicate that this government does not represent a radical break from the past. Rather, it is a new iteration of a centralized system driven primarily by the motive of staying in power.

Reviving relations with Russia can be seen as part of this approach. The visit of a high-level Syrian delegation to Moscow in late July signals Damascus’s intent to leverage its relationship with Russia—either as a military shield against Israeli strikes or as an alternative ally to Europe and the United States if relations with the West reach a deadlock—essentially repeating the scenario of the previous regime.  

Russia’s Interest in Syria: Strategic Reorganization

Russia’s military intervention in Syria in 2015 was decisive in sustaining the Syrian regime, rescuing it at the time from imminent collapse. Moscow’s declared objectives were to “consolidate legitimate authority in Syria” and to create conditions “for a political settlement.” 

However, Russia’s long-term geopolitical goals involved leveraging its participation to expand its influence in the Middle East and challenge the U.S.-dominated unipolar system. The intervention successfully secured key strategic military assets, including the Hmeimim Airbase and the naval facility in Tartus—Russia’s only official military sites outside the former Soviet Union—and established Russia as an active and influential player in the Syrian file, both regionally and internationally. 

Nonetheless, the collapse of the Syrian army and the regime’s transfer of power without significant resistance, along with the limited Russian intervention in response to HTS’s “Operation Deterrence of Aggression,” indicate that Moscow most likely conceded its previous policies of protecting the regime. Instead, it prioritized safeguarding its own interests and military presence in Syria, while keeping the door open to consolidating its role as a potential partner to the interim government—especially given its prior contacts with opposition forces in its capacity as a mediator in several settlements between the former regime and the opposition. 

The visit of Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani to Moscow serves as a clear example of Russian policy. This was the first official visit of the interim government in Damascus, during which Al-Shaibani explicitly stated that Syria wants Russia by its side, despite the complicated history between Moscow and the opposition forces currently governing Syria. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov responded positively to this tone, affirming Russia’s readiness to provide “all possible assistance” in post-conflict reconstruction while reiterating its support for Syria’s territorial integrity.

Al-Shaibani’s visit also included launching a review of the existing bilateral agreements signed during the previous regime to determine whether they serve the interests of the Syrian people, indicating that both parties are negotiating the terms of their renewed relationship rather than simply reverting to previous arrangements. This not only signals a diplomatic opening but also lays the groundwork for deeper security, political, and economic cooperation. 

The emerging rapprochement appears to be based on shared interests rather than ideological alignment. For Russia, maintaining its military bases in Syria remains the top priority, as these facilities represent its only strategic foothold in the Mediterranean and a key resource for projecting influence across the Middle East and Africa. For the interim Syrian government, gaining international legitimacy and securing support for reconstruction are urgent priorities, while countering Israeli military operations constitutes an even more pressing security concern.

Russian Presence: A Tool for Pressure and Influence

Al-Sharaa, who led HTS under the nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Julani, has presented himself as a “pragmatic” leader with a reformist orientation. He has employed a theoretical discourse on “modernization, transparency, and inclusion,” encompassing minority integration, human rights, women’s rights, and transitional justice. This rhetoric has been primarily shaped as an effort to distinguish the new authority from the former regime and to encourage Western countries to engage with the interim government, particularly since the United States and Europe have tied their dealings with the interim authority and the lifting of sanctions to a set of requirements concerning human rights, minority rights, and women’s rights. 

Nonetheless, the interim government’s conduct has exhibited elements of chaos as the country entered a period of security vacuum, with retaliatory actions and violations against minorities carried out by the authorities themselves. Following the security operation on the coast from March 6–10, the interim government’s army and security forces committed widespread and systematic violations, including “extrajudicial killings and torture” of civilians in predominantly Alawite areas. A government-led investigation confirmed that some army personnel had carried out “extensive and serious violations against civilians.”

Similar behavior recurred after the army and government intervened to quell clashes in As-Suwayda from June 12–14, raising further questions and concerns about the interim government’s ability to represent Syria’s diverse communities—particularly among Western countries that had previously shown openness toward the government.

As a result of this behavior, Western countries have faced a strategic dilemma. They seek to support the interim government to prevent state collapse, which could create chaos and enable the resurgence of terrorist organizations and Iranian-backed militias, yet there are reservations about supporting a government that reproduces a history of human rights violations. This has led to a policy of conditional support, where sanctions are gradually eased rather than fully lifted.

However, this policy has pushed the interim government to seek alternative potential partnerships, including a renewed approach toward Syria’s traditional allies, foremost among them Russia, aiming to gain leverage against Europe and the United States. Moreover, Russia’s pragmatic approach is capable of quickly and easily adapting to the centralized—and even authoritarian—governance toward which the interim government is moving. Therefore, it is likely that the interim government will lean toward Russia, as Western demands regarding human rights and minority protections keep increasing.  

On the other hand, the West currently adopts a neutral stance toward the rapprochement between the new Syrian leadership and Moscow, especially since its clear contours have not yet taken shape. While the West seeks to achieve relative stability in Syria, it conditions this on steering clear of reviving the model of the former regime that Russia had supported. The growing Syrian-Russian relations will certainly heighten Western concerns over the potential reshuffling of the regional dynamics and the strengthening of Russia’s military and political influence—at a time when Western states are working to contain Russian power beyond its own borders, particularly after the war in Ukraine.

From this perspective, Western states will seek to obstruct Russia’s return as an influential power in the military and political spheres in Syria, similar to their attempts to curb Chinese influence—particularly in the areas of reconstruction and strategic sectors in Syria such as ports, airports, telecommunications, and others.

Russia and the Minority Card in Syria

The rapprochement between the interim Syrian government and the Orthodox Church represents a step with clear political implications. Shortly after the Syrian delegation’s visit to Moscow, Secretary-General of the Presidency Maher al-Sharaa, the president’s brother, visited Patriarch John X of Antioch to offer condolences over the church bombing. This was a public gesture toward the Christian community, which had previously criticized the government’s weak and merely symbolic response to the deadly bombing of Mar Elias Greek Orthodox Church on June 22, 2025.

This visit carries particular significance because Russia has long positioned itself as the patron and protector of the Orthodox Church in the Middle East. The head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill, is considered close to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Maher al-Sharaa’s visit to Patriarch John X—preceded by the Syrian foreign minister’s visit to Moscow—may signal that relations between the two sides are entering a new phase. It also stands as a clear sign of Russia’s soft power maneuvers aimed at reinforcing al-Sharaa’s legitimacy within Syria.

In a parallel context, growing evidence points to Russia pursuing a quiet strategy aimed at reintegrating the Alawites into Syria’s new military and security structure—particularly in the strategic coastal areas where this minority is concentrated. This comes amid serious concerns among the Alawites, who comprise between 9 to 12% of Syria’s population, regarding the transitional phase the country is undergoing.

Moscow’s long-term objectives are likely to include preserving its influence within the Alawite-majority coastal region, where Russia’s strategic military bases are located. By positioning itself as the protector of this minority, Russia can secure significant gains in this context, further strengthening its influence over both the Alawite community and the Syrian government.

Conversely, the interim government also has practical reasons to accommodate this Russian interest. Successfully reintegrating the Alawites would help reduce sectarian tensions and strengthen national stability, while the technical expertise of former regime security personnel could prove valuable in rebuilding effective state institutions.

Confronting the Israeli Threat

Ongoing Israeli military operations in Syrian territory pose a security challenge that could push the country closer to Russia despite Western support. Since the regime change, Israel has significantly expanded its military activities in Syria, taking control of the UN buffer zone and carrying out regular airstrikes against what it describes as security threats. These Israeli strikes have even reached the heart of Damascus, targeting the Army General Command (AGC) headquarters building.

Russia condemned the Israeli strike on the AGC headquarters, deeming it a violation of the country’s sovereignty and international law, while Western reactions remained cautious. In doing so, Moscow leaves the door open to playing the role of a diplomatic counterweight to Israeli actions, presenting itself as both a balancer against Israel and a mediator between Damascus and Tel Aviv—particularly since Moscow played a pivotal role in security arrangements in southern Syria during the Syrian crisis.

As for the interim government, Western support may come with unacceptable conditions related to political reform, the protection of human rights, and power-sharing arrangements that could limit its control and central authority. The United States went further by linking the easing of sanctions to progress in normalizing relations with Israel and combating terrorism—conditions that may be difficult to meet fully.

Conversely, Russia offers security cooperation without preconditions, including potential support in limiting Israeli operations. This difference in approach makes Russia a more attractive partner for the interim government, especially if Western demands conflict with its consolidation of power.

Finally, Russia’s approach toward Syria following the regime change demonstrates strategic flexibility and a clear pursuit of its interests. Rather than clinging to a former ally, Moscow appears to have focused its attention during the transitional process on preserving its key assets—military bases and regional influence—while consolidating its position as a potential partner for the interim government.

The emerging rapprochement between Russia and the interim Syrian government reveals the calculations of both sides. For Syria, Russia provides security cooperation without demanding political reforms; for Russia, the relationship allows it to safeguard its military assets in the Mediterranean and remain a player in international affairs.