Jordan and Syria: A Cautious Rapprochement Maneuver

There has been a remarkable development in Jordanian-Syrian relations over the past few months. On October 3, His Majesty King Abdullah II bin Al Hussein received a phone call from Syrian President Bashar al-Assad for the first time since 2011. In an official statement issued by the Royal Court, the call was described as “political in nature” where ways to enhance joint cooperation were discussed. Furthermore, His Majesty the King reiterated support for efforts to preserve “Syria's sovereignty, stability, territorial integrity, and people.”

Yousef Al-Hunaiti, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Jordanian Armed Forces, received the Syrian Minister of Defence and Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army, Ali Ayoub, in a two-day visit on September 19. Among the issues discussed by the two sides were coordinating efforts for the borders security between the two countries, the situation in the southern part of Syria, the fight against terrorism and jointly working against smuggling across the border, in particular drug trafficking.

While it is true that these issues are about borders, in depth, it can be inferred that Jordanian-Syrian interactions have begun to return to high levels of coordination, but remain far below the pre-2011 levels. The recent meetings and communications suggest that the discussion may extend beyond border and security arrangements to cover all outstanding issues between the two countries since the Syrian crisis began.

The most significant of these issues are related to the nature of the border military deployment, as well as removing any unofficial forces within 40 kilometers of the Jordanian border as part of a Jordanian-Russian-American agreement made in July 2017 that aims to deescalate the violence in southern Syria permanently. The Hunaiti-Ayoub meeting must therefore be viewed in light of the recent developments in Daraa, especially "Daraa al-Balad", which has been seized by the Syrian government, and where the security center has been reopened therein, while some fighters whom the Syrian government labels as terrorists have withdrawn towards Idlib.

These developments followed the chaos in the province; at the same time with reopening of the border crossings, insurgents cut off the international road in Syria and the Syrian army encountered armed factions and criminal groups. Clearly, the coincidence between the decision to open the crossings and the escalation of the situation indicates that there are those who do not want Jordanian-Syrian relations to resume unless they meet the requirements and criteria that serve their own interests and vision for the region.

The second issue is the return of Syrian refugees in Jordan, where, according to official figures, there are currently 1.3 million refugees, of which 664 thousand are registered with the UNHCR. Many Syrians are afraid of returning home for political reasons or because they will be arrested or have to undergo military service in Syria's army. Additionally, the security and economic conditions do not encourage Syrian refugees to go back and settle in their country.

The third issue concerns the reconfirmation of the water quotas from Syria to Jordan. Under the Jordan-Syria Water Agreement of 1987, Jordan will build a dam with a capacity of 220 million cubic meters along the Yarmouk River, while Syria will benefit from electricity generated by the dam.  In 2010, the Al-Wahda Dam was completed, but at half the capacity agreed upon. However, the dam was not filled as a result of the construction of 60 sub-dams in Syria and the expansion of underground wells, which prevented most of the river water from reaching the dam.

Since such strategic issues cannot be resolved on a military level, political communication between the two countries has become a possible option. Therefore, it is not surprising to hold a high-level meeting of a political nature in which new ambassadors are appointed. Meetings of this sort could occur anywhere in the world on the sidelines of international conferences, as happened when the Jordanian Foreign Minister met his Syrian counterpart at the 76th United Nations General Assembly. Their focus was on reaching a political solution to the Syrian crisis and addressing its consequences in all of their aspects.

Because the international relationships are based on exchanging interests, studying what each side can offer the other helps to draw a road map for Jordanian-Syrian relations that will enhance both countries' economies.

For Jordan, diplomacy can lead to the rehabilitation of Damascus on a regional and international scale. This can be achieves by obtaining more exceptions to Caesar sanctions, and by contributing to developing a formula for a comprehensive non-exclusive  solution that complies with international resolutions, particularly, the UN Security Council Resolution No. 2254, unanimously passed in December 2015, which called for the creation of a transitional government to oversee elections following the adoption of a new constitution.

While Damascus rejects such proposals, the resolution did not address the question of Syria's future presidency. In light of the situation on the ground in Syria, president Bashar al-Assad, can run in future elections. Yet Syria's higher interest requires that such elections must be part of a road map that qualifies an integrated political process in partnership with  political parties of the Syrian opposition, which will rectify its status and conform to the “new” constitution.

Amman can engage these actors in discussions with the Syrian government, in coordination with certain Arab countries that have previously embraced their activities.  It is no secret that the majority of countries of the Friends of Syria Group, which openly demanded a change of Syria's political system, have reconsidered their positions and re-evaluated the situation in light of several factors, including the rise of terrorism, the absence of an alternative capable of asserting sovereignty over the entire Syrian landscape, and the inability to end the "battle" in Syria without a complex and costly international intervention that has direct repercussions on the intervener.

Lebanese websites close to Syria claim that, following the Hunaiti-Ayoub meeting, Jordanian authorities issued instructions not to antagonize Syria, including using abusive language or any kind of intimidation, and not to use the previous "tone" towards Syria. Reports also indicate that the phrase “Syrian regime” has disappeared from licensed newspapers and electronic news websites in Jordan and has been replaced with  the phrase “Syrian government”.

Since the Jordanian-American-Russian agreement of July 2017, previously cited herein, the Jordanian government has decreased its contact with the Syrian opposition, and has started communicating with Damascus through the Russians or through unannounced communication in a closed circle, aside from the official bureaucratic nature.

Besides rehabilitating Syria diplomatically, the two countries can boost their economic relations too.  As of this moment, high-level technical meetings are already underway to supply Syria with gas and electricity through Jordan as part of the Arab Gas Pipeline project, which will also include Lebanon. Syria and Lebanon are both facing an economic crisis that is causing the local currency exchange rate to drop due to the political turmoil and the sanctions imposed by the US because of their relationship with Iran.

The Jordanian Ministry of Interior's decision to fully open the crossings between the two countries at the end of September 2021 will result in a noticeable increase in sea freight from the Port of Aqaba to Syria. President of the Syndicate of Owners of Clearance and Cargo Transport Companies in Jordan, Dhaifallah Abu Aqoula, estimated that the volume of goods arriving in Syria from Aqaba had increased by 600%. In a statement, he appealed to the authorities from ports and customs to provide the necessary facilities for transit through Jordan to Syria and Lebanon.

In return, Syria can offer Jordanian companies a stake in the anticipated reconstruction process, which has become a source of hidden competition in Syria, fueled not only by economic considerations, but also by a desire to shape Syria's future after the crisis. Therefore, media reports suggest that Tehran is trying to monopolize what appears to be an economic development process and exclude Arab companies by exerting pressure on Damascus.

As of the time of writing this report, official statements have been made regarding the meetings of the Syrian ministerial delegation visiting Jordan on September 28, 2021. Most notably, the meeting with Jordan's Prime Minister, Bishr Al-Khasawneh, in his political capacity, may reflect a desire for quiet progress to be made in bilateral relations.In a semi-official announcement that was practically posted on every Jordanian website, it was stated that it was expected that “There will be a vision for how to frame the economic relations between the two countries, and a way to enhance areas of cooperation aimed at serving the interests of both countries, especially in light of the instability in the region and the Coronavirus pandemic.”

While there is no room for over-optimism, and since the Syrian crisis is complex owing to the length of the conflict, the high number of victims, and the many international and regional parties involved, Jordanian-Syrian relations will encounter obstacles, including:

1. The absence of a coherent international strategy to deal with the Syrian crisis

So far, international response to the Syrian crisis remains temporary and reactionary, since there is no vision for a change in conflict circumstances. There may be a joint strategy between Moscow and Tehran in Syria, whereas the West lacks a coherent strategy that anticipates the next stage and attempts to influence it.

As a result, the Geneva process to resolve the Syrian crisis has failed, not only because the Astana process, which included Russia, Turkey, and Iran, has been more effective, but also because the ability of the West and its allies to impose their will on Syria has diminished. From the call for “overthrowing the regime” to “fighting terrorism,” Western policies toward Syria have been mired in confusion and contradiction between tools that are supposed to work in tandem and serve the same purpose.

In an interview in July 2021, the US Assistant Secretary of State, Joey Hood, outlined the central goal of the Biden administration in the Syrian crisis. He maintained that the United States is not seeking to change the Syrian regime, but rather to change the behavior of its government, stressing on the US support for a political process under the supervision of the United Nations to form a government that represents all Syrian people.

To "change behavior" and "form a government" means to put pressure on Damascus, which perpetuates the instability of the Syrian situation. Liberal human rights groups refuse to ease the US position on Syria until some issues are resolved, such as the accusations related to chemical attacks, conducting a UN investigation into whether systematic war crimes were committed in Syria, and identifying and punishing the responsible party.

Therefore, Jordan's diplomacy towards Damascus moves in an unpredictable environment, where the US and EU's position towards Syria may tighten at any moment. This lack of clarity is evidenced by several instances, the latest of which was a statement released by the US State Department on September 28, 2021, welcoming the return of commercial flights between Amman and Damascus. Few hours after this announcement, the US State Department responded to a journalist's question "whether the American welcome to the resumption of flights reflects any change in relations between the US and Syria." by saying that there is nothing to announce about the status of relations or policy changes, and what can be confirmed is that the State Department is reviewing the statement.

2. Iran’s Position

The nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 countries failed, and Tehran declined international demands for a comprehensive deal that addressed all controversial issues, including its regional policies and its influence in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria.

Therefore, progress must be made on the major and highly complex issues in order to move forward on less important issues in regional affairs, including Jordanian-Syrian relations. However, this does not mean that Tehran intends to pull Jordan away from Syria, because Amman, despite being an ally of Washington, has never expressed enthusiasm for joint military action against Iran, and has consistently called for dialogue, concessions, and confidence-building between Iran and its regional and international adversaries.

In the next stage, Jordan and Iran are expected to come to explicit and direct understandings regarding southern Syria, in order to confirm what was agreed upon with Syria and Russia, as the map of Syrian field control reveals that the area is under the control of the Fourth Division of the Syrian Army, headed by Major General Maher al-Assad. In addition, there are armed groups affiliated with the Lebanese Hezbollah and Iranian-run Afghan and Pakistani groups, such as the Fatemiyoun Brigade and the Zainabiyoun Brigade.

Thus, the Syrian Minister of Defense, Ali Ayoub, faces a difficult task to ensure that the Syrian territories are not used in any way harmful to Jordan, such as arms and drug smuggling.

It is noteworthy that Ayman Safadi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, received a phone call from Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, the Iranian Foreign Minister. The official statement stated that they discussed “efforts to resolve regional crises, communication, and dialogue pathways in the region to resolve disputes, as well as building regional relations that enhance security and stability while serving the interests of all its peoples and nations.” In addition, both ministers agreed on the importance of developing bilateral relations, which reflects a desire to resolve disagreements between the two countries.

3. Differences in Arab attitudes towards restoring relations with Damascus

The debate over the return of Syria's seat in the Arab league to the Syrian Government recognized by the United Nations has been raging since Abu Dhabi opened its embassy in Damascus in December 2018. For some Arab countries, the return of diplomatic relations with Syria is integral to deterring Iran, while others believe that the Iranian presence in the region must be crowded out by restoring full relations with the countries that form part of the so-called “Axis of Resistance”.

More recently, Iranian and Arab officials have met several times to find a solution to the crises swirling around the region, and logically, undeclared negotiations will include a “trade-off of positions.” For instance, Iran might give up its backing of the Houthis if Arab countries put pressure on the Syrian opposition to accept a settlement.

Because of this widespread turmoil, whose course is unclear, Amman will be forced to choose between its humanitarian and political obligations on the one hand, and the necessity for constructive communication with Syria on the other, which requires Jordan to be careful in drawing up the nature of its relationship with Syria.

4. Al-Tanf Military Base

The Americans have established a military base near the northern Jordanian border on the Jordanian-Iraqi-Syrian border triangle for the purpose of combating terrorism and supporting local groups against the Islamic State. In reality, the purpose of the base is to maintain an American foothold in Syria, as well as prevent geopolitical interaction between Iran and Lebanon because the base is located on an international road that connects Iraq and Syria.

For the same purpose, the United States supports Kurdish factions in northeastern Syria, most notably the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). In September 2021, for example, the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) reported that US forces used the Al-Waleedborder crossing to transport military and logistical supplies to their military bases in the Jazira region.

In northwestern Syria, there is a direct and indirect Turkish military presence to deter the Kurdish factions classified as terrorists on the Turkish lists. The Idlib region remains a hotbed for militants who were not included in previous settlements in the provinces that are now under the control of the Syrian army, and who were deported to the region under special arrangements with Syria's official authorities.

Syria classifies foreign military presence in the north and south of the country as an occupation and an assault on the state's basic rights under international law, and insist that no actual progress can be made without the withdrawal of these troops.

The Jordanian-Syrian relationship may clash with “Al-Tanf Base” when Syria's hardliners demand that Jordan should arrange to dismantle the base, which they believe was established through Jordanian arrangements to further the regional goals of Amman and Tel Aviv.

5. Israel’s international lobbying to keep the conflict going on

After Hezbollah and Iranian armed groups got involved in the Syrian conflict, the Israeli security community went into high alert and developed a strategy for “a battle between wars” to thwart the Iranian threat emanating from Syria. In this strategy, Israel implements continuous attacks in the Syri by bombarding sensitive targets with airstrikes and artillery without declaring its responsibility for these attacks.

At an early stage of the crisis, Tel Aviv may have sought to overthrow the political regime. However, with the increase of terrorism and consolidation of Iranian-backed groups' capabilities in Syria, Israel's goal has become to deter and contain these threats, even if it means keeping the Syrian leadership in place. In Israel’s view, the current Syrian leadership provides the best opportunity for preserving the status quo for many years.

Thus, Israeli officials are turning to Moscow to develop understandings regarding what Israel refers to as its "Northern Front," as the Syrian and Lebanese borders with Israel have become a security and military network ready for any attack on its borders. Therefore, Israel will reject any solution that would not alleviate its fears and concerns about the northern front, i.e. the border which is at the heart of Iran's deterrence strategy against Israel, as Tehran claims.

In this context, Israel acknowledged its inability to persuade the Biden administration to give up serious nuclear negotiations with Iran. Institutions close to decision-making circles, such as the web portal “Walla”, acknowledge this indirectly in official statements and directly through security analyses. For example, the website published a report in September 2021 in which it asserted that Israel had lost its biggest struggle in the past 20 year against the Iranian nuclear program. Meanwhile, Israeli assessments are recognizing that the Iranians have achieved what is viewed as a loss by Tel Aviv.

In this context, there does seem to be an official Israeli "anger" against the regional and international stance that is not enthusiastic about launching a war against Iran’s nuclear program. And given Tel Aviv's influence in the world through its lobbying groups, it is possible to vent Israeli anger against Iran through other fronts such as Syria, with international efforts to distance Iranian-backed factions from the Golan heights, the area that was occupied by Israel in 1967, over which the Trump administration recognized Israeli sovereignty. In return, Damascus rejects this recognition and considers the return of the Golan as a pre-requisite for any change in Syrian-Israeli relations.

6. Trust Crisis

Although Jordan and Syria held ministerial meetings to discuss technical details of their cooperation, as well as a private security meeting between Hunaiti and Ayoub, both sides are politically apprehensive about undeclared positions resulting from this rapprochement.

Accusations were exchanged between both sides over the course of the Syrian crisis. Syria openly claims that the Jordanian border was used to support terrorist actions against the country through the Military Operations Center "MOC" between 2013 and 2014. Jordan, on the other hand, believes Syria intentionally flooded the kingdom with refugees and obstructs their return. Moreover, Jordan believes Syria caused chaos on the border at an early stage of the conflict when its army, charged with securing the Syrian side of the border, withdrew, leaving it vulnerable to terrorists and criminal groups looking for a way into Jordan.

This crisis of trust has sparked a trend in Amman as well as in Damascus - in the ministry of foreign affairs, the armed forces, and the security services - that rejects a return to the way things were before 2011.

What's next for Jordanian-Syrian relations

After being at odds for a long time, Jordan and Syria are implementing a rapprochement maneuver. In any case, the upcoming interactions may have become clearer, and seem to be purely economic, with a political background. In that sense, the two countries can deepen their interactions if they are able to handle the emerging challenges.

Focus should next  be placed on the points of agreement and on highlighting the positive attitudes. For example, Jordan refused to suspend diplomatic relations with Syria despite international mobilization at the beginning of the crisis, and both countries' embassies continued to operate at a low level.Similarly, Jordan has rejected regional pressure requesting that its border with Syria be used as an advance front against the Syrian regime, like the Turkish-Syrian border. Therefore, Jordan has not engaged in any real efforts to change the regime in Syria.

Still, the most critical factor that could encourage a smooth return of Jordanian-Syrian relations is that Syria gets back to its normal state: A stable country whose sovereignty remains unchallenged by allies or enemies, capable of fulfilling both its core responsibilities to its people and its international obligations.

It would be wise not to leave the Jordanian-Syrian relationship subject to regional and international developments, because national interests require attention to bilateral geopolitical and social ties, and the two countries cannot wait for improvement of regional and international conditions before doing what is urgently needed.

The Greater Middle East is undergoing a transformation as a result of changes, including the Taliban controlling Afghanistan and American strategic efforts focusing on the Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, the Middle East was no longer a valuable part of US geostrategic efforts to contain the rise of China.

Moreover, due to the socio-economic downturn caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, the priorities of countries in the region have shifted from external to local, calling for the seeking development opportunities outside the "box" of political polarization.

Developing the region must be based on the logic of economic integration, similar to the European Coal and Steel Community, which was established after World War II and allowed European countries to exchange economic interests without ever addressing political concerns, until the group evolved into today's cohesive conglomerate known as the European Union.

Similarly, the trilateral development framework project between Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt can be seen as a stepping stone to Middle Eastern integration capable of expanding horizontally with the addition of Syria and Lebanon, and vertically by expanding potential economic cooperation with political and security dimensions in the future.