Israel Post-May 10th

May 10th of 2021 was possibly the most unusual day that Israel has ever witnessed. Instead of celebrating independence, which falls on May 14th, several fronts have opened up at the same time; the Israeli interior, the West Bank, Jerusalem, Gaza and the international community— these are challenges that vary in nature and require the use of different tools to simultaneously deal with, the matter which exacerbates the burdens on the state. On the one hand, the latter is pushing to prevent an unsecured nuclear deal with Iran. On the other hand, the domestic political arena has been in the midst of attempts to form a government coalition after four legislative elections within two years.

It was no surprise that these fronts broke out as long as the root of the conflict remained far from being resolved, namely, the continued obstruction of anything that would lead to the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state on the pre-June 4, 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital, as well as the inability of the Israeli government to rein in the tendency of religious extremists aspiring to change the status quo in East Jerusalem and the Al-Aqsa Mosque.

Almost all observers and politicians agree that the spark of the escalation in Gaza is due to attempts to seize housing in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood and settler incursions, protected by the Israeli police, to Al-Aqsa Mosque on Ramadan nights, which coincided with the Jewish celebrations of “Uniting Jerusalem”. Once again, everyone fails to draw on the spirituality of religions for rapprochement and tolerance, only for chronic tension to continue to be stalled waiting for a final solution that needs courageous leaders who have the bravery to make concessions and conclude full agreements ending the Palestinian-Israeli conflict or reducing the conflict to limits for a possible coexistence between the two parties.

Analysis of the recent escalation in Gaza has increased, but it has not highlighted the interaction of Israel's official and social structure with developments. This is what the report is trying to summarize with possible expectations in the coming period regarding the Palestinian issue and the future of the conflict.

1. Israeli Interior

One of the partial paralyses of the dynamics of Israel’s political process, one of the most prominent implications of the formation of a coalition government, is no secret. The latest complex escalation came after Netanyahu's official deadline for forming a government expired, casting a shadow over the ongoing political debate.

There are those who believe that the scenes of rocket attacks on Tel Aviv serve the right-wing narrative in Israel based on security and external threats, and that the political implications following what is happening will be in favor of Netanyahu's chances of forming a government, whether by attracting new Knesset supporters or heading towards elections that will be the fifth in 3 For years, supporters of “conspiracy” argue that it will see more turnout for Likud and its political and religious right-wing partners, leading Netanyahu's opponents to accuse him of “setting the state on fire in the service of his own political interests,” leader of Labor Party, Merav Michaeli, said.

On the other hand, another team of Israelis believes that Netanyahu's image as a master of security has fallen with the rocket attacks from Gaza falling down on Israel, pushing for the formation of a new government headed by Naftali Bennett away from Benjamin Netanyahu. However, the search for a political figure with a strategic program that includes the scenario of the end of the Gaza dilemma remains.

It cannot be said that the new government may have a different approach to resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as there is relative consensus on issues related to the Palestinian cause between right-wing and hard-right followers. In contrast, there are currents that openly declare their acceptance of the establishment of a Palestinian State, such as some parties, civil left-wing groups and many human rights groups.

There are those who argue that violence may soften extremist positions. However, what has happened recently has not reached the point of changing extreme right-wing convictions, i.e., what many Arab analysts describe as Israel's “consciousness-searing” seems emotional; because the escalation did not amount to the threshold for changing convictions so that all would despise warfare and want peace, as was the case in Europe post-WW2 which was followed by economic collaboration and then an integration within the EU.  

In addition to the above contradictions within the Israeli political structure, another contradiction emerges between the military and political level, as the Israeli army's chief of staff is pushing for prolonging the war until deterrence is restored and Palestinian factions pay the price, according to media statements and leaks. The Israeli government is burdened with international considerations and economic conditions that barely began to recover after the Covid-19 pandemic and a vaccination campaign that was considered the first in the world in terms of people vaccinated.

At this time of writing, there is no comprehensive assessment of the economic damage caused by the recent round of fighting, which has not only resulted in rocket attacks on important areas of Israel such as Gush Dan, but has also extended to the disruption of factories and the halting of the economic wheel in addition to the suspension of most of the flights to Israel, which was expected to be heavy due to the lifting of health restrictions and the resumption of the summer tourist season.

The previous two manifestations (partisan political contradictions and the disparity between the military and political level) may have been almost normal in Israeli interior recently. What must be read accurately, however, is the widespread unrest in mixed Arab-Jewish cities in solidarity with East Jerusalem and Gaza and a rejection of right-wing policies that attempt to impose a specific cultural model on a society of some 1.9 million Arabs; 20% of the population of about 10 million.

The protests and confrontations within mixed cities are unlikely to be a spontaneous reaction, reflecting the failure of Israelization processes aimed at pushing minorities to engage in their state independently of political, cultural and religious positions.

The “Judaism of the State of Israel” law passed in July 2018 may have provided pretexts for some to say that Israel considers Arabs second-class citizens. This law contains principles that can be classified as discriminatory, such as clause 1, “The State of Israel is the national home of the Jewish people”, “The right to exercise national self-determination is unique to the Jewish people”, and principle 6 states that “The state will strive to ensure the safety of the members of the Jewish people and of its citizens and shall act within the Diaspora to strengthen the affinity between the state and members of the Jewish people.” Supporters of this movement also argue that the Absentee Property Law, passed in 1950, allows the Ministry of Finance to dispose of property and land abandoned by its owners “any time between November 29, 1947 and the day it is declared that the state of emergency declared by the Interim Council of State on May 19, 1948 has been abolished.”

It should be noted that the debate over Israel's identity has returned to the forefront, as the educated secular elite fears that political Judaism will replace the semi-secular democratic Judaism, the matter which could undermine the foundations of Israel.

Although violence continues to flare up on more than one front, this elite has not hesitated to express rejection of the social incline toward the far-right, as implied in a May 2021 Washington Institute article in which the author used terms such as ethnic and sectarian violence and accused right-wing commentators of “making advantage of the timing of sectarian violence to score political points.”

2. East Jerusalem

Some refuse to consider the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to be religious and stress on its political, security, economic and human rights dimensions. It may be imprudent to deny the religious dimension of this endless war because this denial leads to a misdiagnosis of the scene, which will lead to an impractical and/or unconvincing proposition that is far from understanding reality.

What is happening in East Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa Mosque underscores the centrality of the religious dimension on what is going on in the Palestinian issue. Some may wonder why this Israeli insistence on gaining greater influence in the Holy City? What are the gains from provoking the feelings of the general Muslim community and pitting public opinion and the diplomatic street against its policies?

It would be wrong to assume that the dispute over the eastern part of Jerusalem is only religious not political as well. The growing religious expansion to society and politics in Israel has transformed Jerusalem from an issue of identity and legitimacy to sectarian issue, contributing to the aggravation of the Middle East sectarian situation that has been fueled by the unrest in Syria and Iraq and the regional rivalry for hegemony among the region's major capitals.

This religious growth is based on a popular base, most of which belongs to the Haredi groups, which have a population of about 1,240 million according to data from the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, as the largest proportion of whom - 36% - are concentrated in Jerusalem and in East Jerusalem settlements. Haredi Jews cling to the lifestyle and culture as stated in the Torah, and they are known for their high fertility rate, where the average birth rate in a single family is over 10 children, resulting in an increase in their proportion in Israeli society, as they now make up about 13.6% and are expected to reach more than 20% in 2028.

This presence has political and security implications for political life in Israel. The Haredi bloc has often clashed with the state over the prohibition of conscription into the army, and recently its followers have refused — for religious reasons — to abide by the government's precautionary instructions to contain the Covid-19 pandemic.

All this puts the Israeli government and the secular elite in a dilemma in which they have to balance legal and international political requirements on the one hand, with the religious requirements of this increasingly demographically and politically expanding group on the other. The Government is usually forced to identify with these requirements, which threatens with the maintenance of tensions. The Israeli State is seeking further steps to give a Jewish character to East Jerusalem, enacting laws and implementing projects aimed at isolating the geographical communication of Arab neighborhoods in the city with the rest of the West Bank, as in attempts to seize housing in the Sheikh Jarrah and Al-Khan al-Ahmar neighborhoods, the first enabling Israel to encircle the northern side of the city, while the other enables it to encircle the eastern part.

This means that these neighborhoods, despite their small population and area, have a distinctive “geo-identity” character, with which final solution issues cannot be raised without agreeing on the final status. State Department spokesman Ned Price said in a TV interview with Al Jazeera that Sheikh Jarrah's case was the cause of the escalation, in what could be seen as an implicit condemnation of Israeli efforts to evacuate the neighborhood by judicial decisions.

On the other hand, these actions lead Palestinians to accept the ideological proposition of political currents such as Hamas, providing a political pretext to attract frustrated and angry young people and recruit them behind the holy narrative, perpetuating tension in its religious dimension, which in turn complicates the chances of a sustainable and acceptable solution for all.

It was remarkable that the Palestinian factions initiated the launching of rockets at Israel in solidarity with the incursions taking place in East Jerusalem. This is the first time that factions in Gaza move operationally in response to events there, putting Gaza at the core of the equation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as stated in a speech by the head of Hamas' political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, in which he stressed that “linking Jerusalem with the Gaza Strip is reflective of equating resistance with identity.”

All of the above emphasizes the high risks inherent in the religious dimension of this conflict, as it perpetuates tension and inflames feelings to prevent a just solution that is consistent with international legal considerations and with the criteria to be followed to develop a real peace.

It is clear that hate speech has become a prominent feature of everything related to this conflict, requiring the agreement of all parties to legally binding criminalization of all those who promote it, and the cessation of all that would change the religious historical nature of the existing state. In the next phase, Israel is expected to find itself compelled to comply with international pressure in this regard.

3. Diplomatic Front

The diplomatic front is no less important than the fronts of military and security engagement, as the State's external interaction with the regional and international environment during and after the engagement provides clear indications that the international community accepts the narrative of one side or the other, which inevitably casts a shadow over the state's foreign relations after the engagement.

It is noteworthy that the recent escalation in which Israel has engaged on more than one level is accompanied by international discontent over its refusal in the early days of the battle to reduce the escalation on Gaza in preparation for a ceasefire.

The Biden administration is reported to have put pressure on Israel to reach a truce at a later stage of the military operations, after the administration at an early stage affirmed Israel's right to defend itself and failed three attempts to hold a security council meeting to discuss the situation in Gaza. This official US position has angered the progressive left wing within the Democratic Party, which has contributed significantly to Biden's election and increased party representation in the Congress.

This does not mean that there is a turning in US policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. At the height of this latest clash, for example, the Pentagon approved a $735 million deal to supply high-precision weapons and ammunition to the Israeli military, not to mention providing diplomatic cover for Israel against any organized international action that could condemn it, and restricting US media and US-based social media to anti-Israel rhetoric and sympathy for the Palestinian people.

Compared to the previous administration, the current US position can be assessed as reflecting a clear divergence on this crisis. This disparity between US institutions and high-ranking officials may be implicitly agreed to make an unbiased proposal and advance the peace process. It is worth mentioning that no high-ranking official has publicly criticized Israel, although some lower officials have expressed explicitly what could be considered the US position critical of Israel behind the scenes and closed debates, as such officials are free from political restrictions and electoral funding considerations.

Events in Palestine have not stayed away from the recent partisan debate, with senior administration officials including former President Donald Trump and Vice President Mike Pence boasting that what has been happening would not have happened under them, bringing the debate over foreign policy differences between the two administrations back to the forefront. For example, the Biden administration is not betting on the “deal of the century” to settle the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, but explicitly declares the need for peace based on international resolutions and in order to achieve a two-state solution. Biden's cabinet has also reversed some of Trump's policies, such as refinancing UNRWA and direct support for official Palestinian actors.

In order for this escalation not to be just a new episode in the confrontations between Palestinians and Israelis, the US administration must launch political momentum in order to reach a radical solution to the cause of the conflict and stop ignoring the Palestinian issue as a major Middle Eastern issue in favor of files such as Iran's nuclear program and counter-terrorism. What recent developments have confirmed is that the pillar of the Middle East peace file is the Palestinian issue; since terrorism is declining compared to the period of ISIS rise, and Iran's nuclear program is on its way to a nearby agreement.

The latter is a greater burden on Tel Aviv than rocket attacks from Gaza, not only for the risks of the economic and diplomatic return of Western relations with Iran, but also because reaching international and regional understandings with it robs Israel of a strategic paper of mobilizing the international position against the Iranian threat, which was one of the political justifications for countries that concluded peace agreements with Israel late in Trump's presidential term.

Egypt has also lobbied for a ceasefire between Gaza and Israel, condemning the Israeli aggression and warning of its consequences for peace in the region,  and Cairo has pledged to pay $500 million , without providing any explanation, to contribute to the reconstruction of Gaza, not to mention the symbolic position of introducing military ambulances to evacuate some serious injuries from Gaza and the extraordinary opening of the Rafah crossing to provide humanitarian assistance to the Gaza Strip.

Egypt's position may reflect anger at Tel Aviv, which is converging with Ethiopia to ensure penetrating the African and Horn of Africa's powerful depths into the Red Seacoast. According to many press reports, Ennahda Dam, which could threaten Egyptian water and national security, is secured by Israeli defense systems, which the Israeli Embassy in Cairo denies.

The pressures of Israeli diplomacy were not limited to Arab and American positions — to a lesser extent, of course — but also to Brussels, the political capital of the European Union, and some “unilateral” statements critical of Israel from European officials, most notably the condemnation of Irish Foreign Minister, Simon Coveney, of events at the Al-Aqsa Mosque, which includes a “peaceful Muslim gathering”, and the killing of children in Gaza.

French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian warned in an interview with the AFP news agency after a truce was reached that failure to reach a two-state solution or prolong the status quo would provide “components of a long-term apartheid” in Israel.

For London, it coordinates its positions with Washington and tries to work together with it, to compensate for the political loss of its exit from the European Union. Despite the right-wing and conservative presence in Europe — traditionally supportive of Israeli policies — the continent's major capitals want to turn the page on differences with Washington in foreign policy views that have damaged European-US relations under Trump.

All these events come at a time when the US intelligence community and the research centers of the decision-making departments insist on the need to strategically reposition towards the Far East to crowd out China's rise on the international scene and curb its geopolitical, technical and economic expansion. At a time when the strategic value of the Middle East is diminishing in US calculations, the strategic value of the Far East is growing, prompting Washington to strive to resolve the Palestinian issue so that it does not remain a source of crisis and stability.

Washington cannot achieve a gradual and calm withdrawal from the region without establishing a sustainable solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as maintaining the situation increases the statw of “uncertainty” and complicates the predictability of the course of events and alignments in the region, which means that US foreign policy needs to keep its military and security assets in the region in anticipation of any surprises, contrary to US interests and plans to reduce the cost of its deployment around the world.

Washington also fears that its inability to manage the conflict resolution phase could allow China and Russia to play influential roles in a “sacred” US file in which Washington has throughout its history had the upper hand in determining its international nature. Regardless of Russia and China's bias toward Israel, it cannot be compared to the US bias though relatively changing with the change of US administrations. For example, Russia and China have not used the veto power in the Security Council to block resolutions that are incompatible with the Israeli vision.

So once the dust of the battle clears, Israel will find itself faced with a mandatory review of its foreign relations in order to adapt to the developments reviewed in this item, and Tel Aviv will try to create tools and opportunities to compensate for the diminishing geopolitical importance of the Middle East in Western calculations, and Israeli diplomacy — traditional, digital and popular — will try to restore its image as “the only liberal state in the region surrounded by repressive dictatorships that violate human rights.”

4. Operationally

After 11 days of military operations, a ceasefire was reached between the two sides under international pressure, after which the next most important phase begins in which damages are inspected and field gains assessed. In the absence of a clear victor or defeat, this stage will be subject to political polarization, particularly within Israel.

This situation, in which the outcome of the battle is not clear militarily, is a feature of modern warfare. In an article published by Quartz, a business-focused organization, in December 2019, the author argued how victory has become nothing more than a myth that mimics people's imaginations and emotions. Given the high cost and widespread destruction, a party cannot claim victory even when it comes to a “semi-official” party such as organized armed groups, particularly since these groups can perpetuate violence even if major military operations end.

The change in the nature of the threats and the combat environment has been reflected in Israel's military strategy. The goal is no longer to achieve a victory once and for all through a ground incursion with advanced technical air capabilities — as in the 1967 war — but to “mow the grass”, especially with regard to Gaza, i.e., as a permanent task that cannot be fully accomplished because the risks are constantly increasing, and therefore the “mowing” strategy must be repeated in stages and in accordance with field and political requirements.

This doctrine is somewhat similar to Israel’s “battle between wars” logic to undermine the influence and presence of Iran and its allies in Syria. Over the years of the Syrian crisis, the Israeli air force has continued to strike specific targets, including technical assets and high-precision missiles belonging to Iran. This pattern of hybrid warfare requires an intensive intelligence effort and constant alert in anticipation of any reaction, as happened in the missile launched from Syria during Israeli fighter jets carrying out raids on targets there and reached the vicinity of the Dimona nuclear reactor. In this regard, STRATEGIECS published in May 2021 an article that addresses more broadly the reality of the hybrid warfare between Israel and Palestinian armed factions in the recent escalation, entitled “Hybrid Warfare and Bets of Victory and Defeat”.

Israeli planners are aware that what is operationally fit to deal proactively with security threats is not operationally suitable for military engagement at the time of the battle. The IDF therefore approved “Momentum Plan” in early January 2020 in response to lessons learned from the 2014 Gaza war, which lasted more than 50 days, as ground forces failed to achieve an effective ground incursion against the capabilities of Palestinian factions. The plan is to integrate and join hands with all military forces and operations to achieve a military achievement in a short time and through a large fire “momentum” so that 50-60% of the enemy's capabilities are destroyed and the situation resolved quickly without disrupting and damaging the Israeli home front for a long time.

This plan must be supported by internal government stability and an international and regional climate in favor of Israeli operations, which will result in severe civilian and infra structure losses. It is therefore likely that “momentum” did not take place against Gaza because the escalation remained at its first level and did not worsen to the peak with which the Government condones the international consequences of its operations and focuses on the field regardless of any pressure or even diplomatic threats from allies.

The Momentum Plan is not primarily directed against a mixed-natured threat (civilian and military) as in the Gaza front, but against Iran, Syria and Hezbollah, which have clear military headquarters and more organized military structures. In addition, the activation of this plan requires that the Israeli army take the initiative to fire, and in the latest escalation Tel Aviv did not set zero hours, although it politically caused the tension that led to the explosion.

In the face of these different arenas, and in the face of the divergent military strategies employed in response to the changes, the recent Gaza confrontation will impose itself on the agenda of the Israeli military leadership, which is crowded with Iranian, Lebanese and Syrian threats.  The unprecedented rocket attacks -- which have affected even the parties of Israel -- necessarily call for the evaluation of defense instruments, notably the Iron Dome, which has been subjected to a moral shock that will inevitably affect its marketing and sale plans to some States.

This assessment will result in amendments to military plans requiring the approval of the mini-ministerial council and the provision of the necessary funds. In light of such political divide, this file, which is supposed to be professional, will be influenced by existing political positions and government structure.

Voices inside Israel have begun to demand a new security policy on Gaza. In an interview with Israel's Channel 13, Israeli Settlement Affairs Minister and Likud member Tzachi Hanegbi said Tel Aviv would bomb military targets inside the Gaza Strip as soon as Hamas re-armed and prepared to launch attacks, as Tel Aviv would not wait for rocket fire to respond, adding that it was “a radical change of equation that we have never done before.” This change is similar to Israel's strategy in the face of Iranian positioning in Syria by carrying out limited, specific strikes that do not deliberately inflict casualties and prevent the accumulation of force.

In this regard, the question should be asked as to what Israel's strategic objective in the Gaza Strip is, as it classifies Hamas as a terrorist movement, which means that it is not permissible to communicate and understand politically directly with it, while at the same time it is not planning to end Hamas's control of the Gaza Strip and return the Palestinian National Authority to take over the administration of the Gaza Strip. The only objective may be to restore consensus within Israeli society on the principles of the Jewish State, but the recent events have shown ethnic and political contradictions as stated in the first item of this report.

Recent events have also demonstrated Israel's “limited” ability to perpetuate the military conflict, which has much to lose economically, politically and in terms of well-being, unlike the population of the Gaza Strip, which barely has the basic requirements of life, and its ability to adapt to emergencies is greater than that of the Israeli domestic front. This is not intended to be in line with the questionable proposition of the resilience of the Israeli interior, but rather to read the interaction of the Israeli structure with recent events, as stated in the Israeli press, which agreed on the existence of an operational intelligence flaw.

The most notable of these imbalances was the assessment of Hamas' intentions and capabilities after threatening to escalate against Israel unless Israeli forces and radical settler groups withdrew from Al-Aqsa Mosque. Tel Aviv did not seriously respond to this threat and assumed it was an internal Palestinian political message aimed at gaining support, and the Intelligence and Military Complex in Tel Aviv did not expect that Palestinian factions were prepared for a long confrontation in terms of camouflage of rocket launchers and increased efficiency of field communication and coordination.

It should be noted that Israel has been subjected to serious events prior to the recent escalation, which are likely to be part of its hybrid war with Iran and its allies, such as the fires in vital facilities and the cyber-attacks.

Thus, in the face of political and societal polarization in Israel, it will seek to restore regional deterrence and rebuild financial and moral deficiencies. This may be done only with a new confrontation, the field and zero hour of which is determined by it. Such confrontation may erupt against the backdrop of the assassination of a prominent figure or the bombing of valuable military assets.

What's next?

There is no doubt that recent events have restored attention to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a cornerstone of regional stability, and this political momentum must be built on to create a sustainable peace so that the recent war does not become a mere passing event in the series of crises of the Palestinian cause that are being constantly generated.

While the military fire dimension has ended in a truce, its political repercussions will continue to emerge in Israel this year, and they are expected to be as follows:

In Palestine, in the hope of gaining regional and international legitimacy, Hamas will seek to civilize its rhetoric and reduce the ideological nature of its behavior, hoping to gain regional and international legitimacy in preparation for the upcoming election which was supposed to take place earlier this year before it was announced to be abolished on the grounds that Israel refused to hold elections in East Jerusalem.

If a new date is set for the Holding of Palestinian Elections and the practical implementation of previous understandings on ending the administrative and political divide, Fatah will see a decline in its representation in favor of Hamas, which has recently consolidated its moral gains.

“The PA's strength in Gaza must be strengthened by tasking it with overseeing the restoration of the Gaza Strip and not transferring funds directly to Hamas,” Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz told reporters after the truce was reached, adding that “any progress in economic projects in the Gaza Strip must be made by finding a solution to the issue of Israeli prisoners and missing persons.” The population management of the sector will therefore face several living dilemmas, particularly as the widespread destruction of vital, economic and service civilian installations has been targeted.

With regard to East Jerusalem, the incursions into the mosque will continue in rejection of the Hamas equation linking Gaza to Jerusalem and not to be established as a fait accompli in the Palestinian mentality, so Israel aims to suggest that it has not bowed or been defeated in the Battle of Gaza.

As for attempts to seize the homes of the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood, Tel Aviv will avoid provoking an international and regional reaction — particularly from Jordan — so the issue will be frozen without recognizing the right of the Palestinian population and without expelling them.

Regarding Israel, as expected, Netanyahu did not succeed in winning the support of the necessary majority in the Knesset to name him prime minister, while a coalition of right, centrist, leftist and Arab political currents succeeded in winning the support of 61 Knesset members for a government rotating by a right-wing president, Naftali Bennett, and the head of Yesh Atid party, Yair Lapid.

The vote of confidence on the government will be at a Knesset session on June 13, 2021 (these lines were updated on June 9, 2021) amid loud protests by Netanyahu's supporters that amounted to incitement to right-wing lawmakers who would vote for the emerging coalition, which, if it won confidence, would be a fragile government that would be unanimous only on “rejecting” Netanyahu and ending his political future either through imprisonment or by pledging not to engage in political life. Therefore, the fragmentation of the government coalition in the near term is not ruled out.

At the social level, extremists feel that their government is being let down and that they are not doing what needs to be done, which leads them to “take the law into their own hands”, as some media outlets have quoted their own pages on social media platforms.

Arabs, on the other hand, will tend to express themselves within the Palestinian identity, and clashes that may take on a serious security character will be repeated, such as lone wolf attacks.

Regionally and internationally, the actors will seek to move the stagnant peace process by pushing new tools towards the peace process formally, and there are demands for removing Hamas from the US and European terrorist lists so that it can be communicated with it as a recognized political component, just as was the case before the Oslo Accords were signed when the PLO had been removed from terrorist lists.

This recognition of Hamas' political legitimacy could result in the deterioration of Tel Aviv's relations with Western capitals, which in turn are fed up with this suspended and destabilizing conflict. Recent events have brought the Palestinian issue back to the region's priorities, and Washington and its allies in the West will not accept that the situation will remain unresolved or without tangible progress on the path to a final settlement.

Washington may therefore reconsider the decision during the Trump-era to close PLO office in Washington, and may open a consulate in East Jerusalem as a kind of diplomatic representation in Palestine. Western recognition of Palestine as a member state of the international community may increase, increasing its representation from a non-UN observer State (recognized in November 2012) to a Member State.

The International Quartet for the Middle East peace process, consisting of the EU, Russia, the US and the UN, may be reactivated to act as a successful mediator seeking to implement a scheduled road map with a view to achieving comprehensive peace between the two sides.

Some Arab countries, particularly Jordan and Egypt, are expected to play a greater role in coordinating Arab positions and trying to develop a semi-unified position on the issues of the final solution, a difficult task witnessing competition between political authorities in the region. For example, Turkish officials occasionally propose the formation of a tripartite committee -- a Christian-Jewish Islamic -- to oversee the holy sites in East Jerusalem, thereby denying the Hashemite guardianship of the city's holy sites, which The King of Jordan, Abdullah II, considers an uncompromising strategic asset, and will seek with all his diplomatic weight to establish such guardianship in any UN agreement on final solution issues.

This solution requires a Palestinian system capable of ensuring the security requirements of the State and Israel, and international peacekeeping forces can be dispatched to monitor the agreements reached, while this international mission is working to rehabilitate the security, military and civilian structures of a fully sovereign Palestinian State.