Iraqʹs Return to the Regional Arena: Possibilities and Opportunities

Iraq has always been an essential element in the political, military, and economic equation of balance in the Arab region and the Middle East. This is due to its cultural, historical, spiritual and physical characteristics and the role it has played throughout the Arab and Islamic history. However, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was a major blow to Iraqʹs role and presence in the Arab and regional arenas although it had previously presented itself as a factor of balance to the regional security over the course of eight years during the 1980- 1988 Iraqi-Iranian war.

The U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003 completely excluded Iraq from the balance equation in the Arab region and the Middle East. The intervention has led to a radical shift in the balance dynamics at the domestic level, triggering a great controversy over the political and cultural identity of Iraq. In this context, the Kurdish identity was highlighted, capitalizing on the changing situation in the region to find an opportunity to gain independence. It cannot be denied that the collapse of Iraqʹs physical strength, particularly its military and economy, completely deprived Iraq of any advantages related to its potential role as an influential player to the regionʹs balance of powers.

Iran, like any country pursuing its vital interests, took advantage of a series of events for its benefit. These began with the fall of the Baʹath regime, the chaos that swept the country, the Shiitesʹ rise to power, in addition to the U.S. inability to control the situation and its insufficient knowledge in the details and complexities of Iraqʹs political and sectarian map. These factors have contributed to Iranʹs expansion in the Iraqi arena, which forced Washington to coordinate with Iran, especially at the security level, in addition to the recognition of its role and influence in Iraq.

What further pushed Iraq away from Arabs and out of the regional balance game was the Arabs themselves, who had no clear strategy in engaging with Iraq. They rather had suspicions towards the Iraqi state and the transformations in the countryʹs political experience and its implications in particular, which generally labeled the Arabʹs position. Moreover, some Arab countries dealt with Iraq after 2003 as an occupied country for many years, while others considered Iraq as an American affair. This created a political vacuum that Iran exploited to strengthen its security and military foothold in the country.

Furthermore, several factors have contributed to rendering Iraq as an arena for interactions among regional and international powers. These include the security turbulence and the civil war -which reached its peak in 2006 and 2007-; the proposed project to divide the country into three statelets in the south, center, and north; and ISIS enterprise to establish a state on the territories of Iraq and Syria. This has greatly exhausted Iraqʹs capabilities, making the Iraqi state always preoccupied with its domestic affairs and thus unable to invest its capabilities and resources to perform the regional and Arab role it has always played.

Iraq has witnessed a number of developments in recent years, particularly at the security level, the political experience, and oil production, coupled with changes in the Arab and regional arenas, especially regarding the Arab-Iranian relations. These factors pose several questions including:

Is it possible that Iraq would play an influential role again in the balance dynamics at the Gulf, Arab, and the regional levels during the coming period? Does Iraq meet the requirements of this role and has the will to play it? What are the obstacles that hinder Iraqʹs return to the regional and international arenas?

First: Iraqʹs Potential to Play an Arab and Regional Role

Iraq is one of the major and important states in the region, and thus it cannot be left alone with no influential role to play. Even if this role has been inactive for a while for domestic or external reasons, it can be activated and reconsidered by the Iraqi elites on one hand and the regional powers on the other hand as soon as the circumstances are ripe for that. When Iraqʹs potential to perform its regional and Arab role during the current and future stages is discussed, it can be argued that the country has old and new capabilities to play such a role, the most important of which are:

1- Financial Capabilities: Iraq has enormous economic capabilities. In addition to the abundance of water in the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and the arable land, the state has 147 billion barrels of oil reserves and more than 200 billion barrels of potential oil deposits, making Iraq the world's fifth-largest proven oil reserve after Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Iraq has 3,100 billion cubic meters of standard gas reserves, according to the United Nations data. Its current oil production capacity is nearly 3.9 million barrels with plans to be raised to about 7.5 million barrels per day by 2025. In July 2018, the Central Bank of Iraq announced that the country’s revenues from oil exports amounted to more than $700 billion since 2005.

2- The Cultural and Spiritual Elements "the Soft Power": While Iraq has a deep-rooted historical presence and a rich civilization that dates back to thousands of years, it also enjoys the religious-sectarian significance of Karbala and Najaf. These cities are two important spiritual destinations for millions of Shiites in the region and the world. Despite the close ties between Iraq and Iran since 2003, Najaf has always been perceived as a rival to the religious city of Qom in Iran. The rise of Najaf poses a challenge to Qomʹs legitimacy as it entails a threat to Iran's legitimacy and influence as a political and spiritual leader of the Shiite community in the world. On the other hand, this rise would strengthen Iraq's role in the regional arena.

3- The Democratic Experience: Despite the complex and problematic consequences following Iraq’s democratic experience since 2003, there have been indications that this experience might be heading towards the right path. First, despite the difficult security and political conditions that the country has experienced during the past years, this has not hindered the continuity of parliamentary elections and the political changes it involves. Four presidents have assumed the presidency since 2003, and several prime ministers have been elected. The process of political change has recently become smoother than ever. The second indication is the complex overlap among the sectarian considerations, the political process, and the options of voters. Third, the disputes among the political elites have become more rational compared to the past years. Fourth, the intervention of the religious institutions in the political process has declined significantly although they have previously had strong and direct intervention since 2003. This would undoubtedly and gradually boost the reliability in the Iraqi political experience in the eyes of the world, and thus increase global support of this experience.

4- Relative Stability and Preserving the State Integrity: In spite of Iraq’s serious security tensions after 2003 and the threats to the state integrity, there are important indicators of the country’s capability to gradually restore its stability and preserve its integrity. These include:

•  The failure of the projects once strongly proposed to divide the country after 2003.

• The failure of the Kurdsʹ secession, which received no regional or international support despite the 2017 independence referendum.

• Iraq's recent success in overcoming the most serious threat to the state integrity posed by ISIS despite the massive human and material sacrifices.

5- The Recognition of the "Role Potentials": The states possession of the capabilities and potentials that enable it to play a regional or international role is not solely enough, but requires several other conditions. According to the "role theory", the most important condition is the realization of decision-makers or the state’s political and cultural elites of Iraq’s ability and willingness to render the state influence abroad. The Iraqi political elites are clearly aware of the role Iraq can play at the regional level. This is evident in the Iraqi leadersʹ attempts to return Iraq under the Arab umbrella and mend the Iraqi-Arab relations in their various forms. Iraq’s insistence on hosting the Arab League Summit in 2012 -despite the country’s turbulent conditions and the weak presence of Arab leaders- was a clear expression of the desire to emphasize Iraq’s Arab connection and its potential regional role.

6- The Arab, Regional, and International Recognition of Iraqʹs Role: This is evident from the frequent visits of officials from various countries to Baghdad during 2019. The visits to Iraq in the light of the U.S.-Iran tension might clearly confirm how the world and the region perceive Baghdad and its potential role in this crisis. Within a few months, Baghdad received several Arab, European, and Iranian officials including Iranʹs President Hassan Rouhani in March 2019, Iranʹs Foreign Affairs Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif in May 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in the same month, and Turkeyʹs Foreign Minister Mouloud Jawish Oglu in April 2019. Some reports indicate that Turkeyʹs President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will visit Iraq by the end of 2019. In April 2019, a Saudi delegation consisting of nine ministers and headed by Minister of Commerce and Investment Abdullah Al Qasabi visited Iraq to discuss ways to improve relations and economic cooperation between the two countries. In June 2019, Iraq received Germanyʹs Foreign Minister Haikou Mas as well as Omanʹs Minister of Foreign Affairs Yusuf Bin Alawi, whose visit was the first of its kind since 2003 which followed a decision that was made to reopen Omanʹs Embassy in Baghdad. Moreover, there are reports that French President Emmanuel Macron will visit Iraq before the end of 2019.

7- An Arab Call for Iraqʹs Role: In addition to all that, there is an Arab call for an active role of Iraq, seeking a balance of power with Iran. This is manifested in a better Arab attitude towards Baghdad, especially by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Saudi Arabia, in particular, seems interested in strengthening its relations with Iraq amid its conflict with Iran. In 2017, Iraqʹs former Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi visited Saudi Arabia twice, the flights between the two countries resumed, and the Arar border crossing between the two countries was reopened. Riyadh also received the leader of the Iraqi Sadrist movement Muqtada Al-Sadr in July 2018, in addition to a visit by Iraqʹs Prime Minister Adil Abd Al-Mahdi in April 2019. Moreover, a Saudi-Iraqi Coordination Council was established and the Kingdom made some announcements, including a plan to build a sports city in Iraq; supporting the Iraqi state by one billion dollars; the establishment of four Saudi consulates in three Iraqi cities; the opening of the Saudi consulate in Baghdad in April 2019; signing 13 agreements and memorandums of understanding between the two sides; allowing Saudis to invest in Iraq  through 189 ventures; encouraging Saudi banks to open branches in Iraq; and opening a branch of the Trade Bank of Iraq in Saudi Arabia . These steps aimed at restoring Iraq as an element in the regional balance formula against Iran after Iraqʹs absence had caused a major imbalance to the power balance.

Second: Potential Forms and Entry Points of Iraqʹs Influence in the Arab and Regional Arenas

There are various effective means and approaches through which Iraq can exercise its influence in the Arab and regional arenas during the coming period. These mainly include:

1- A bridge between the Arabs and Iran: Iraq is going through a major crisis in its foreign policy and strategic options in terms of conciliating its deep and diverse relations with Iran on one hand, and its Arab relations on the other. Nonetheless, one possible prelude to enable Iraq to perform its political role in the Arab and regional arenas is to be a bridge between Arabs and Iran. This can be achieved either through mediation between the two sides or the contribution to establishing stable and steady frameworks for the Arab-Iranian relations.

In this context, we can refer to the Baghdad-hosted parliamentary forum of neighboring countries (i.e. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Turkey, Syria, and Jordan), which took place in April 2019. Held at the invitation of Iraqʹs Speaker of the Parliament Mohammed Al-Halbousi, the summit was the first gathering of its kind, bringing together participants with contradicting policies in the region. Iraq “has sought, through popular diplomacy, to bridge the gap between these states, especially since the summit was held after the parliament speaker had toured these countries in the previous months”.

The role of a "bridge between the Arabs and Iran" requires the will of the Iraqi decision-makers to play this role rather than surrendering to the hindering complexities and issues in the current period, during which the Arab-Iranian relations are witnessing considerable tension. However, Iraqʹs attempt to exercise the role of a mediator between Iran and the Arab countries presents a great challenge or even a dilemma. This is due to Baghdadʹs narrow and complex options related to this role.

2- A Member of an Arab Current with Different Priorities and Orientations: This means that Iraq can be part of an Arab bloc or current that works to re-steer Arab policies from focusing on the conflict with Iran to focus on other threats such as Israel. The Cairo tripartite summit in March 2019 which brought together Jordanian King Abdullah II, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El Sisi, and Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul Mahdi, may have prompted some observers and analysts to suggest an attempt for rearranging the Arab priorities, especially regarding current regional developments and the talk about the «Deal of the Century» to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict. Several Arab countries do not perceive the conflict with Iran as a major priority, including Morocco, Algeria, Kuwait, and Oman, amongst others.

Furthermore, some analysts suggest that Jordan, in light of the threat posed by the "Deal of the Century", would expand its options and boost its relations with Iraq and some other Arab countries, especially Morocco, Egypt, and others. The analyses also suggest that Amman has left behind the "Shiite Crescent" theory, of which the Jordanian monarch has warned after 2003, to another vision that Prince Hassan bin Talal has called for over years. He has argued that the Sunni and Shiite sectarian differences should not divide the Arab and Islamic world and that the Kingdom of Jordan, in particular, can serve as an umbrella for both sides.

3- An Influential Role in the Global Oil Market: A report published by Bloomberg in April 2019 said that Iraq has become a competitor to Saudi Arabia in influencing the global oil market. It also has an influential role in OPECʹs decision making regarding oil production and prices after years of being distant from the scene. The report added that Iraqʹs doubling of its crude oil production in the past decade has amplified its importance in the oil talks and pushed for its inclusion in the latest round of negotiations to cut oil production. Iraq has also joined the committee that monitors compliance with OPECʹs quotas. This step came after nearly two decades during which Iraq remained on the margin of OPEC due to its inability to raise oil production and thus ineligibility to have a say in regulating the prices and the decisions taken by the organization.

Iraqʹs increasing oil production and its expanding influence in the global energy market would undoubtedly boost its role and influence at the global and Arab-regional levels. At the international level, Iraq would become an active actor in determining oil prices globally, in addition to the increasing interest of the world countries in enhancing the economic and investment cooperation with Iraq. At the Arab region, the Iraqi-Arab economic cooperation would increase due to the growing national revenues as a result of increased oil production. This would open the door for a huge Iraqi economic activity especially at the domestic level –the reconstruction projects– or in terms of ties with Arab countries. Egypt, in particular, seems to be the most interested country among the Arab states in strengthening economic ties with Baghdad, especially in the energy and investment sectors.

Third: The Obstacles Facing Iraqʹs Return to the Arab and Regional Arenas

Iraq has many advantages that enable its return to play an important role in the regional and the Arab arena considering the undergoing regional changes and the internal Iraqi transformations. Nonetheless, there are several structural obstacles that hinder its return or limit its prospects, which lead to the conclusion that time will decide the fate of such a return. The major obstacles include:

1- The U.S. Influence: Although more than 15 years have passed since the U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003, the U.S. influence on Iraqʹs domestic and foreign policy is still present. This comes especially in light of the U.S. military presence in Iraq on one hand, and its role in the liberation from ISIS on the other. The impact of the U.S. influence on the Iraqi decision would undoubtedly narrow Baghdadʹs options and leave it in complicated situations with difficult choices.

2- The Iranian Influence: An opinion poll conducted in 2018 showed that the percentage of the Iraqi Shiites who favor Iran has declined from 88% in 2015 to 47% in 2018. The poll, which was carried out by the Independent Incorporate, a research firm specialized in the Middle Eastern affairs, also showed an increasing percentage (from 6% to 51%) of the Iraqi Shiites whose preferences were inharmonious with Iran, while the percentage of the Shiites who believe that Iran is a reliable partner to Iraq dropped from 76% to 43% during the same period. Nevertheless, Iran has an undeniable influence on the Iraqi decision making, which makes Iran perceive Iraq as an area of vital interests and influence. Some believe that Tehran is adopting different mechanisms to keep Iraq away from its Arab environment. Moreover, the U.S. itself is aware of the special nature of the economic relations between Iraq and Iran, leading to exempting Iraq more than once from the U.S. sanctions on Iran. The most recent exemption was in March 2019, allowing Iraq to import electricity from Iran. Iraq imports nearly 28 million cubic meters of natural gas from Tehran to its factories, while it directly purchases 1,300 megawatts of the Iranian electricity.

3- The Crisis of Options: The great tension between Iran and the U.S. poses a major challenge to Iraq, which finds itself in a difficult position choosing between Washington and Tehran. Since both countries have a significant influence on Iraq at the political, economic, security, and military levels, the alignment with one party might be at a huge cost that Iraq may not be able to afford.

The situation becomes more complicated whenever the Iranian-U.S. tension increases or the chances of talks and peaceful settlement between the two sides fade. On the other hand, Iraqʹs willingness to play the role of a mediator or a pacifier between Iran and Saudi Arabia is facing a major obstacle. Both sides, Iran and Saudi Arabia, demand Iraq to make its choice between them. Thus, Iraq is neither able to join the Arab alliance that is hostile to Iran, nor fully engage with the Iranian axis. Iraq would undoubtedly be among the most affected states in the event of an explosion or expansion of conflicts between Iran and Saudi Arabia or Iran and the U.S., with its internal arena to take the toll of such a development.

4- The Identity Crisis: This crisis began to surface visibly after 2003, especially with the Kurdsʹ rising aspirations of further recognition of their cultural, political, and economic rights. The crisis evidently appeared during the discussions that preceded the endorsement of the Iraqi constitution in 2005. Article 3 of the constitution states that "Iraq is a country of multiple nationalities, religions, and sects. It is a founding and active member in the Arab League and committed to its charter, and is part of the Islamic world." The text shows a difference between the current constitution and the previous ones of 1958-1990, wherein the statement "Iraq is a country of multiple nationalities, religions, and sects» replaced "Iraq is part of the Arab nation," which had been constant in all the previous constitutional texts. This identity crisis in Iraq clearly affects its role in the Arab and regional arenas and renders Baghdadʹs political stances unclear or contradictory in some cases. Perhaps the most prominent example in this regard is Iraqʹs position towards the final statement of the Mecca emergency summit held last Ramadan. While Saudi Arabia and some other Arab countries were seeking to strengthen relations with Iraq to distance it from the Iranian axis, Iraq objected the summit communiqué, which condemned "Iranʹs interference" in other countriesʹ affairs.

5- Vulnerable Security and Political Structures: The political experience in Iraq has come a long way and overcome several problems and threats it has encountered. It has also succeeded in achieving relative stability in the country, especially after the collapse of ISIS and the declining sectarian tensions. Nevertheless, Iraq still suffers from vulnerable political and security aspects. Despite the collapse of ISIS in Iraq, it can still be a security threat in some areas through the militants and cells that are still active. This indicates that although the security situation is improving, it remains unstable.

In light of the above, it can be said that Iraq has the potential to assume a role in the Arab and regional arena in light of the significant improvement in Iraqʹs sources and elements of power over the recent years. This was coupled with the emergence of other factors that contributed to an increasing interest in the role of Iraq in the region by many powers. At the same time, several reasons and challenges face this role, limiting its impact, whether during the current or the coming period. Hence, the discussion over an influential and decisive Iraqi role on the Arab and regional arenas may need some time.