Gaza’s Society: Roles and Effectiveness in Light of the Political and Security Vacuum

Israeli policies aimed at the systematic dismantling of Hamas’s governing structure in the Gaza Strip have focused on the intensive targeting of its sources of power and authority—namely, its administrative, security, and institutional infrastructure, including ministries, municipalities, unions, local councils, and police stations. This has created a vacuum in governance and in the management of public services and security, leading to the emergence of local alternatives in Gaza’s clans and local actors whose activities have recently expanded in providing services and maintaining security.

Against this backdrop, the paper examines the anticipated role of clans and other social structures in Gaza, considering their position as civic and social actors. This involves both their historical roles in civil and functional affairs and the substitution of primary social bonds for the centralized organizational structures previously dominated by Hamas. These roles are shaped by the expected vacuum during the transitional phase following the day after the war, the deteriorating living conditions affecting all aspects of life, as well as the political considerations that will influence the long-term future of the Strip.

Dismantling Central Governance in Gaza

Since the outbreak of the war, Israel has pursued a systematic and escalating policy to dismantle the central governing structure in the Gaza Strip, focusing on targeting the bureaucratic, institutional, and administrative bodies linked to Hamas. This strategy has sought to undermine the central roles Hamas plays in managing societal affairs, paving the way for post-war arrangements on the civil level.

These measures align with the provisions of the “Day After” war document approved by the Israeli Security Cabinet in February 2024 that stipulates the administration of the Strip in the subsequent phase should be entrusted to local figures with administrative experience who will be responsible for overseeing civil affairs and public order.

At the structural level, Israeli airstrikes during the first three weeks of the aggression, October 7–28, 2023, destroyed no fewer than 79 government headquarters, including the ministries of Interior, Finance, and Education, in addition to banks and telecommunications networks. Throughout the initial months of the war, critical buildings continued to be targeted, such as the Legislative Council, the high courts, security centers, police stations, municipalities, and Hamas offices, including the office of the head of Hamas’s political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, in October 2023.

In addition, Israel continued a series of assassinations throughout 2024 and 2025 targeting the heads of several municipalities as well as leaders and members of Hamas’s police force in Gaza, including Police Chief Mahmoud Salah in Khan Yunis in January 2025.

Israel also relied on implementing and testing a parallel containment policy aimed at contributing to the dismantling of central governance by attempting to employ the clan structure as an alternative for managing local affairs. In January 2024, Israeli sources revealed a plan to distribute aid and provide basic services outside of Hamas institutions by dividing the Strip into areas administered along tribal lines.

After March 2024, Israel explored preparing the clans to implement this plan; however, several clans refused to cooperate with Israel. A statement issued by a coalition of clans in March 2024 emphasized that they were part of the national movement and not a substitute for it, while some families and sheikhs in Gaza publicly rejected Israeli offers to distribute aid without coordination with local security.

These Israeli efforts were accompanied by threats from Hamas against the clans. Nevertheless, as the war continued into its second year, tangible shifts emerged in the roles assumed by traditional social formations under Hamas’s rule. The weakening of the governance system led to the rise of clan-based initiatives that undertook tasks, such as maintaining security and distributing aid, in an attempt to fill the vacuum caused by the collapse of governmental structures and the absence of a central alternative capable of managing the civil landscape.

Social Structures and the Evolution of Roles in the Palestinian Situation

Traditional social structures play central roles in Arab societies, including Palestinian society, where they have assumed active roles over the past century and its successive periods.

At the End of the Ottoman Era

The Palestinian context in this period shared many features with other Arab societies under Ottoman rule, particularly in the Levant and Iraq. The Ottoman authorities empowered certain landowning families—such as Abd al-Hadi, Abu Hijleh, Abu Ghosh, Al-Jayyusi, al-Husayni, Nashashibi, Alami, Dajani, Al-Shawwa, and Tuqan—and integrated them into the network of local state powers through the tax system. At the same time, family rivalries emerged around religious and political representation (notably between the Husseini and Nashashibi families), alongside the rise of elite figures in the major cities, some of whom were members of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies, as well as intellectuals and writers.

In this period, the primary influence rested with the landowning families and their leading figures—religious, political, and local leaders—while the traditional tribes of Bedouin origin and the peasant families in villages and rural areas did not hold a clear influence in the political, social, or economic life of the country.

1917–1948: The British Mandate Era

This period witnessed significant changes in the roles of Palestinian families and elites. The influence of the traditional landowning families increased, along with the rise of their political roles, for example, AL-Shawwa family in Gaza, the Tuqan family in Nablus, and the Husseini and Nashashibi families in Jerusalem and other areas. At the same time, new elites emerged in economic, political, and media spheres.

1948–1967: From the Nakba to the Naksa

This period witnessed fundamental changes in the roles of Palestinian families. These roles largely came to an end in most of historical Palestine due to the establishment of the State of Israel on 78% of the country’s territory and the forced displacement of most of the Palestinian population (more than 800,000 out of 1.4 million). During this period, the issue of Palestinian refugees emerged, and they assumed central roles in Palestinian political life within the refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, the role of the traditional landowning families declined, except for limited and largely symbolic roles held by some families.

1967–1994: Israeli Military Rule over the West Bank and Gaza

Clans and families resumed multiple and significant roles during this period due to direct subjection to Israeli military occupation, which, from the outset, sought to develop the British authorities’ approach of employing influential family leaders within the governance system to varying degrees. These leaders contributed to stabilizing security and social conditions in areas under Israeli military rule.

Although these Israeli policies did not achieve decisive success—due to fundamental shifts in the roles of families in favor of Bedouin-origin clans, refugee families, and remaining traditional family figures in the West Bank who were closer to the Palestine Liberation Organization or the Jordanian government—some family leaders still played independent roles in political, social, and economic life.

This was especially true for certain families—Dudeen in Hebron, Al-Khatib in Ramallah, Qumsieh in Bethlehem, Sawalha in Nablus, Al-Hantouli in Jenin, and Odeh in Qalqilya—during the establishment of the “Palestinian Village Leagues” in 1978 by the Israeli Civil Administration in the West Bank . However, this role declined significantly in the mid-1980s due to pressures from the Palestinian and Jordanian leaderships and disappeared entirely with the outbreak of the First Palestinian Intifada in 1987.

The situation in the Gaza Strip was relatively different, mainly due to the high proportion of refugee families living there (around 70%) and the fact that the Strip was not included in the Village Leagues project adopted by Israel in the West Bank. This particular context produced four distinct levels of roles played by Gaza’s clans and families during the period of direct Israeli military rule. 

National: actively engaged in resisting the Israeli occupation both militarily and politically, as seen in the refugee families and in the Abdel-Shafi, Bseiso, Hilles, Al-Surani, Al-Agha, and Adwan families, among others, who contributed to the founding and leadership of Palestinian factions and organizations, especially Fatah and the Popular and Democratic Fronts.

Economic and social role (pragmatic/moderate): maintained good relations with the national movement without adopting an anti-Israel stance, as seen in al-Shawwa and Mortaja families. Specifically, the political and social role played by Rashad al-Shawwa, the Palestinian mayor of Gaza from 1972 to 1982, and the economic role played by the Mortaja family’s companies.

Social role (distant from politics): limited to maintaining traditional roles within the framework of reform, adherence to inherited values, and public service. This was evident in the role of clans of Bedouin origin and their notables and leaders, and, to a lesser extent, in the role of some mukhtars (village chiefs), some of whom maintained relatively good relations with the Israeli civil administration, as in the experience of the Council of Mukhtars led by Mousa Abu Shaaban in 1967.

Direct collaboration with the Israeli occupation: limited to a few small families or some individuals from the Bedouin clans in Gaza and Sinai. Most of them were gathered in the village of Dahaniya, which was established by the Israeli authorities in Gaza in 1977. These individuals had no social presence, not even relatively, and were accused of collaborating with Israel.

Social Structures in the Gaza Strip and Their Relationship with Hamas

After the end of the period of direct Israeli military rule over the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Authority quickly recognized the importance of the role played by clans and families in Palestinian society. From the outset, the Palestinian Authority issued Decision No. 161 of 1994, establishing the Department of Clan Affairs under the Presidential Office. Hamas also recognized this importance after taking control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, establishing the General Administration for Clan Affairs and Reconciliation under the Ministry of Interior in 2008.

Later, the Palestinian Authority issued Decision No. 89 of 2012, establishing the High Commission for Tribal Affairs in the southern governorates of Gaza. It functioned as a body directly affiliated with the president in the West Bank and carried out tasks such as resolving disputes and conflicts between people by adjudicating them and taking the necessary measures to settle them. It was later dissolved by a presidential decree in 2019.

In fact, since assuming power in the Gaza Strip, Hamas has begun reshaping the security and social landscape to ensure its central control over governance. It faced social formations in which political divisions overlapped with entrenched clan and class balances, as well as traditional components that held social and armed influence independent of the factions. This prompted Hamas to adopt a dual strategy: military repression and institutional integration/containment. To understand the nature of the relationship and the limits of interaction or confrontation between social structures and Hamas’s governance system before the war, social formations can be divided into several levels based on their social presence in the Strip.

Traditional Clans with Tribal and Bedouin Extensions

The clans of Bedouin roots, especially those with extensions in Sinai, the Negev, and the southern West Bank—such as the Tarabin and Azazima clans—represent a conservative population bloc with growing influence in southern areas like Rafah and eastern Khan Yunis. These clans did not engage in direct confrontation with Hamas and its government. Nevertheless, Yasser Abu Shab, from the Tarabin clan, was accused of collaborating with Israel by receiving support to establish an armed militia known as the Popular Forces, which operated in the eastern areas of Rafah. These accusations of collaboration with Israel prompted his clan to publicly disown him in an official statement.

Urban Families

In the Gaza Strip, there are urban bourgeois or middle-class families—such as Al-Shawwa, Al-Shanti, Al-Sourani, Al-Rayes, and Al-Qudwa—not affiliated with clans. Part of the civil elite before the 1948 Nakba, they played prominent economic and administrative roles without direct involvement in armed conflicts or ideological polarization. For example, the Al-Shawwa family established major economic institutions, most notably the Bank of Palestine in 1960. Despite this economic influence, these families remained politically neutral under Hamas’s rule.

Large Families

These are mostly rural or semi-rural families with partisan and factional extensions, such as  Hilles, Al-Astal, Al-Masri, and Doghmush families. Unlike the urban families, Hamas engaged in armed confrontations with some of these families, including Doghmush and Hilles. The movement fought armed clashes with the Doghmush family in 2007 and 2008 that resulted in fatalities.

Under Mumtaz Doghmush, the family led an armed faction known as the Army of Islam that was allied with Al-Qaeda and was involved in weapons smuggling. In March 2024, reports indicated that Hamas executed a mukhtar from the Doghmush family who it accused of stealing aid and selling it in collaboration with Israel. The Hilles family also represented one of the main security challenges for Hamas due to its traditional affiliation with Fatah. Armed clashes erupted in the Shejaiya neighborhood in 2008 between family members and Hamas forces.

Refugee Families

These families make up about 70% of the total population of the Gaza Strip. They include, among others, the al-Batrawy, al-Sheikh, and al-Najjar families, refugees from the city of Ashdod; the Almadhoun, Zaqout, and Sinwar families, refugees from al-Majdal (Ashkelon); the al-Saafin and al-Jabali families, refugees from Al-Faluja; and the al-Makadmeh, Abu Shamala, and al-Mashharawi families, refugees from the village of Bayt Daras.

Traditional Local Leaders

Hamas worked to integrate the system of local notables and mukhtars, who had maintained their social presence since the era of the Palestinian Authority, treating them as local reference figures in social matters. They were incorporated into official frameworks with limited authority, with most mukhtars retained despite their general allegiance to Fatah. In 2008, Hamas established the Department of Clan Affairs and Social Reconciliation within the Ministry of Interior, assigning it the tasks of dispute resolution and management of community reconciliation under direct supervision of the security apparatus.

Reconciliation committees affiliated with Hamas were appointed to regulate this role and tighten oversight, reducing the mukhtars’ independence in traditional adjudication without completely dismantling it. The movement also relied on some local notables to distribute social, relief, and health services, though not as intermediaries within its administrative apparatus.

In addition, during the current war, in November 2024, Hamas established a new police division known as the Arrow Unit, composed of members from the Internal Security Service and clan members (in cooperation with local clan committees) tasked with supporting internal order and protecting aid.

Community Structures as Independent Actors Amid Collapse

In contrast, the near-total collapse of governance institutions in the Gaza Strip gave rise to forms of informal community agency that, within what could be termed “bottom-up governance,” sought to play roles in managing civil affairs, such as service provision and the distribution of resources and humanitarian aid.

Popular and Clan Committees

Popular and clan committees, particularly in northern Gaza, became central to attempts at reorganizing daily life, especially during periods of blockade and Israeli military control over the Strip’s crossings. These committees undertook the securing and distribution of aid, particularly in the absence of international humanitarian organizations that had withdrawn from northern areas. Nevertheless, they were directly targeted. Dozens of their members were killed in Israeli airstrikes while coordinating aid entry, leading them to suspend operations temporarily in March 2024. With the escalation of looting and theft of aid, however, the committees managed to secure some aid trucks in June 2025.

Grassroots Initiatives/Self-Support Networks

Alongside the efforts of the committees, independent grassroots initiatives emerged to serve the immediate needs of the population. These networks of self-support focused on providing food and daily meal kitchens, especially in northern Gaza. Such initiatives often receive financial support by promoting their activities online and providing services to a segment of citizens, in some cases reaching thousands of families and displaced persons.

Organizational Committees in Displacement Camps

With the rising numbers of displaced people and the expansion of camps, hundreds of local committees emerged within these communities to manage residents’ affairs, distribute resources, and organize relations with relief organizations. According to the June 2025 update by the United Nation’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, more than 682,000 displaced persons live in overcrowded camps partially managed by community committees formed from the camp residents themselves. These committees play a role in involving the local community in displacement sites, ensuring the representation of marginalized and vulnerable groups, and providing them with supplies and services.

Traditional Networks and Population Management in the Post-Hamas Phase

The complete collapse of governing institutions in the Gaza Strip has given rise to signs of transformation within the local social structure, leaning toward the reactivation of traditional clan and family networks as temporary administrative substitutes. This comes under the pressure of humanitarian need and the breakdown of Hamas-affiliated institutions in the Strip, followed by a security and service vacuum that has been intermittently filled by informal local actors.

This role does not necessarily reflect the rise of clans as alternative ruling powers as much as it signifies the return of primary bonds that typically become active in moments of societal collapse. In such contexts, certain functions of the state or central authority are transferred to social actors due to the emergency and absence of an organized alternative, aimed at regulating public behavior and maintaining basic daily services. In the case of the Strip, this is most evident in relief operations and the distribution of humanitarian aid.

However, this reality cannot be separated from Israel’s political calculations and objectives. These transformations intersect with a clear Israeli orientation that seeks to encourage a new “Village Leagues” model in Gaza, similar to what was imposed in the West Bank during the 1970s. This model relies on employing local social structures (clans, families, and local notables) as frameworks for depoliticized civil administration, tasked with crisis and service management, without offering any organized political alternative. At the time, this represented a practical model for administering Palestinian areas under direct Israeli control.

It appears that the south, particularly the Rafah area, represents an early testing ground for this approach, given the presence of clans with cross-border extensions, some of which have had past or current relations with Israel, the Palestinian Authority, or Arab actors. This could allow them to be used as local intermediaries in future security or service arrangements during the transitional phase. Signs of attempts to form local civilian units have begun to appear in some parts of the Strip, especially in the south.

Although clans have rejected coordination with Israel, the latter has continued to work on empowering social groups on the ground. In June 2025, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that his government had already begun activating and arming certain clans in Gaza hostile to Hamas as part of a confrontation strategy aimed at reducing Israeli army casualties. This was reflected in practice through Israel’s support for militias (armed individuals), such as the Popular Forces led by Yasser Abu Shabab, to expand their influence in Rafah and participate in aid distribution.

This use does not amount to genuine empowerment of the clans; rather, it is closer to a logic of “utilization without empowerment,” whereby certain groups are granted limited symbolic and material capacity in exchange for carrying out procedural civil roles without being allowed to form a power base or an alternative political structure. Israel’s aim is not to establish a clan-based governing system but rather to employ local field intermediaries capable of sparing the Israeli army the burden of policing tasks and direct contact with a civilian population experiencing an unprecedented state of collapse.

In this context, we may witness attempts to confer legitimacy on these local actors through logistical support from international organizations or relief channels. However, this would not take place within a unified administrative framework across the Strip, but rather according to a logic of decentralized administration that is easier to control and steer.

Finally, although this scenario lacks sustainable foundations—given the absence of institutional structures within these formations and their reliance on partial traditional legitimacy rooted in humanitarian necessity imposed by the reality on the ground—it nonetheless reflects a pragmatic trend that redefines social roles—not as a political alternative but as a transitional actor amid the collapse of central authority, starting from the social base.

This was seen, to some extent, in the role played by clans in the Gaza Strip during the 1967–1994 period of direct military rule: a social role detached from politics, limited to maintaining traditional roles within the framework of reconciliation, adherence to inherited values, and public service, alongside the roles played by other families.

This space served as a safe zone between internal rivalries on one side and the conflict with Israeli military rule on the other. This could develop into a similar, but not identical, role as previously seen in Gaza under direct military rule, given shifting circumstances, changing actors, and the potential involvement of other groups representing newer social segments in this transitional phase.