Will the Shifting Orientations of Iraqi Voters Decide the Upcoming Elections?

Iraq is undergoing profound transformations in public sentiment. Voters have grown increasingly aware and critical of the political elite’s performance and are therefore more eager for genuine change in state governance and institutions. As the 2025 parliamentary elections approach, the results are expected to bring unprecedented surprises, revealing the depth of these shifts in voter orientations fueled by the emergence of a new segment of voters from Generation Z as well as regional developments reshaping the country’s internal political dynamics.

Hence, these elections are decisive. All indications suggest they may define Iraq’s political trajectory for decades to come, determining whether the traditional frameworks will persist—and thus potentially drive the public beyond the ballot box and back to protest movements—or whether alternative forces will arise, carrying a national project that aligns with the people’s aspirations and restores Iraq’s sovereignty and standing both regionally and internationally.

The 2021 Elections: A Reflection of the Shift in Voters' Orientations

New movements and political forces—such as the Emtidad Movement, the New Generation Movement in the Kurdistan Region, and the Tasmim Alliance in Basra—collectively managed to secure approximately 7.75% of the total votes, equivalent to around 700,000 ballots. This figure approaches the number of votes obtained by the Sadrist Movement (also known as the National Shiite Movement), which won the parliamentary majority with roughly 900,000 votes, or about 10% of the total vote, securing 73 seats.

Tellingly, these emerging forces outperformed several traditional political coalitions that have long dominated the political landscape. The Progress Party (also known as the al-Takadum Movement) garnered around 7.20% of the vote, the State of Law Coalition received approximately 5.67%, and the Fatah Alliance secured about 5.23%.

Although these forces competed in elections with limited local constituencies, they demonstrated a remarkable ability to penetrate the traditional political structure in a short period of time. For instance, the New Generation Movement (NGM), founded in 2017, managed to challenge the two main Kurdish parties—the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). While the NGM won four seats in the 2018 elections, it exceeded expectations in 2021 by securing nine seats at a time when the two traditional parties largely maintained their seat counts: the KDP won 31 seats in 2021 compared to 25 in 2018, while the PUK obtained 17 seats versus 18 in the previous term.

Notably, these new forces, despite lacking the extensive organizational reach and resources of the traditional parties, succeeded in mobilizing what is known as the “silent votes,” particularly in central provinces that have always experienced low voter turnout due to widespread disillusionment with the ruling political class. Their influence, albeit limited, also extended to southern and central regions, with some securing seats in Babil, Karbala, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah. This indicates that the phenomenon is not confined to Sunni or Shia constituencies but also extends into the Kurdish region, despite its distinct organizational and political complexities.

The preceding analysis indicates a growing awareness among broad segments of the Iraqi population, particularly youth and activists, of the need to move beyond political disengagement and exert real influence through more informed electoral choices. This shift has facilitated the entry of new forces into parliament at the expense of a noticeable decline in some traditional parties, such as the Fatah Alliance, which fell from 48 seats in 2018 to just 16 in 2021.

Although this transformation remains geographically limited—concentrated in provinces where traditional political entities still maintain a substantial support base, such as Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, and Maysan—the 2021 election results clearly reflect the expanding desire among Iraqi voters for change and their pursuit of political alternatives that represent their aspirations beyond the confines of the old party structures.

The 2025 Elections: Political Shifts and Regional Dynamics

The upcoming elections, scheduled for November 11, 2025, will occur within a broader context of rapid transformations at both the local and regional levels. Among these are pressures facing traditional forces aligned with regional axes, particularly following developments in the Gaza conflict, despite their success in passing a new electoral law that serves their interests.

In addition to these political shifts, the entry of a new segment of first-time voters in the 2025 elections—those born in 2006 and 2007, an estimated 1.9 million young men and women belonging to what is globally known as Generation Z. This generation, which has been at the forefront of popular worldwide movements demanding reform and improved living conditions, is expected to have a tangible impact on political participation in Iraq that will only strengthen the momentum for the anticipated change.

Thus, the 2025 elections are not merely a routine process but a pivotal moment in redefining the relationship between citizens and the state as well as determining the nature of political representation that the Iraqi public seeks after two decades of upheavals and conflicts.

The question today is no longer solely about who governs, but how Iraq is governed—and about the ability of political forces to respond to a society that has become younger, more aware, and less inclined to be bound by narrow identity rhetoric or traditional loyalties.

In this context, the forces capable of realistically adapting to and responding to this shift–such as the Reconstruction and Development Coalition led by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al Sudani—appear best positioned to translate popular sentiment into a practical political project, one that establishes legitimacy through tangible achievements rather than mere slogans.

Accordingly, the Reconstruction and Development Coalition should be viewed not merely as a technical extension of the government but as a mature political expression of executive experience that has earned its legitimacy on the ground. Through this framework, al-Sudani has been able to present a hybrid model that transcends the traditional divide between “traditional” and “new” political forces.

While this coalition maintains ties with certain segments of the traditional forces, it has intelligently and strategically embraced the core characteristics that fueled the rise of new political forces in the 2021 elections. These include emphasizing national sovereignty, rejecting dependence on external axes, and championing a unifying Iraqi identity alongside a firm commitment to economic development, anti-corruption measures, and tangible reforms in education, healthcare, and essential public services.

Thus, Iraq’s next phase requires a balanced model that combines the tools of practical governance, institutional capacity, and administrative experience with a reformist discourse that resonates with the aspirations of young people, the middle class, and marginalized groups—the very segments that spearheaded the protest movements of 2019.

The forces capable of bridging political realism with popular aspirations are likely to constitute a sustainable political alternative, not as a transient electoral phenomenon like the Tishreen Movement but as a firmly established political vision. Such a vision could reshape the parliamentary landscape, redefine the social contract, and serve as a cornerstone for building broader coalitions that reflect a unifying national identity.

The Iraqi National Project: A Guarantee for Stability

What Iraq needs at this stage is to build upon the achievements of its current government and transform its service-oriented approach into a comprehensive national vision that reorders the country’s priorities—beginning with consolidating independent national decision-making, strengthening the state’s role as the center of authority, and directing national resources toward building a productive economy and a cohesive society.

As the country approaches parliamentary elections, Iraq’s national project must rise above mere electoral considerations and media campaigns. It represents an imperative course of action at a time when the Iraqi people can no longer endure another cycle of unfulfilled promises. Iraqi society has changed significantly in recent years, not only in its political sentiment but also in its priorities and criteria for choosing its representatives.

The orientations of Iraqi voters in the 2021 elections, favoring new forces outside the umbrella of traditional parties, were a direct expression of this shift—an attempt to reclaim their voice through the ballot box rather than the streets. However, disappointment over the positions and actions of some of these forces once in parliament, the fragmentation of others, and the fragility and lack of vision and tools revealed by their experience have brought the most important question back into focus: What is the real alternative?

In reality, a genuine alternative can be identified by encouraging voters to focus on electoral programs rather than campaigns. The former directly impacts parliamentary performance and government implementation, whereas the latter ends once the candidate enters parliament. Focusing on electoral programs also addresses the root causes of public discontent—a matter of utmost importance—before new waves of protests resurface, particularly among younger generations, including Generation Z.

The relative calm in the Iraqi streets today is temporary and largely the result of the approach, achievements, and priorities of the current government, which took office in October 2022 following a severe political crisis and an extended four-year wave of protests. This indicates that reform is possible from within the system. Since its formation, the current government has focused on addressing the legacy of previous administrative and governmental failures by implementing a balanced political approach rooted in sovereignty and development as the foundation for state-building.

Al Sudani has gone beyond promises, coupling them with tangible achievements in vital service and economic sectors. His current proposal for the “Iraq First” project, with its developmental and sovereignty-focused agenda, represents an effort to sustain the emerging stability under his government and to spare Iraq from a renewed cycle of protests and political deadlock.

In conclusion, with the upcoming parliamentary elections approaching, electoral campaigns must build on the tangible achievements already realized and respond to the aspirations of an Iraqi society that has genuinely changed—a society no longer willing to tolerate policies of denial or procrastination. At the same time, the stakes of these elections, both locally and regionally, represent a serious test of citizen awareness and a rare opportunity to renew the social contract between the state and its people, while redefining Iraq’s position among the nations of the region and the world.