Trump’s Gulf Tour and the Intersection of Regional and International Files

The Middle East awaits the arrival of U.S. President Donald Trump for a visit that includes Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. The visit, which concludes May 15, comes amid a turbulent time in the region marked by significant transformations and overlapping political, security, and economic issues on the international stage. Given the priorities and orientations of Trump’s second administration, the broader context of the visit, and the evolving dynamics of the region, the visit is expected to yield strategic outcomes that will help shape the next phase and redefine roles and balances among regional powers. This gives the visit a strategic dimension that goes beyond the primarily economic focus of his first visit to the region in 2017.

Trump Tour: Political Economy Files

Trump is embarking on his first tour of the Gulf countries since May 2017. Then, as now, he made Saudi Arabia the first destination on his trip. While both visits intersect in terms of the advanced economic relations between the Gulf states and the United States, especially since several Gulf countries quickly unveiled their investment and economic plans following Trump’s inauguration, Saudi Arabia announced a four-year plan that includes $600 billion in investments, with the potential for more, and the UAE announced investments worth $1.4 trillion over a decade.

Moreover, the Gulf states play a crucial role in the success of Trump’s economic policies, particularly regarding oil prices. Trump previously urged Saudi Arabia and OPEC to lower prices by increasing production and revisiting the OPEC+ decision in October 2022 to cut output by two million barrels per day.

In fact, lowering oil prices is a pivotal component of Trump’s monetary strategy, alongside his pressure on the U.S. Federal Reserve to cut interest rates. This approach is expected to reduce commodity prices and stimulate activity among both producers and consumers. The Trump administration believes that these measures will gain additional momentum following the imposition of tariffs on countries worldwide.

In this context, the goals of OPEC+ intersected with Trump’s financial agenda, as eight countries agreed on a plan to gradually raise their oil production, starting with an increase of 411,000 barrels in June.

Moreover, oil prices are interwined with ongoing geopolitical conflicts, especially in the Russian-Ukrainian war. Washington views the Russian oil exports as a key source for funding the war, and Trump draws a connection between lowering prices and increasing pressure on Moscow to push the Russian-Ukrainian talks toward positive results. The Gulf states hold influence over the course of the war. Under U.S. sponsorship, Saudi Arabia hosted the first round of talks between Moscow and Washington on March 23 and 24. It also hosted meetings between Russian and American officials in February.

Three Gulf states have succeeded in maintaining Russian-Ukrainian communication channels throughout the war, particularly through their roles in prisoner exchanges. These include the UAE’s mediation in March, which led to the release of around 350 prisoners from both sides, and Qatar’s mediation in February, which helped reunite several Russian and Ukrainian children with their families.

These efforts have taken place despite significant challenges, chief among them are former U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration and European countries maintaining strict sanctions on Russia and prioritizing military support for Ukraine over pressing for a ceasefire. However, a potential breakthrough may be imminent due to Trump’s pressure on both Russia and Ukraine to end the war. This is suggested by several indicators, including Russian President Vladimir Putin’s proposal on May 10 for direct negotiations with Kyiv without preconditions, following two rounds of indirect talks: Saudi Arabia, March 23–24, and Turkey, April 15–16.

Trump Tour: Context and Priorities

Trump’s visit to the three Gulf states comes amid a shifting regional landscape in which these countries, alongside the United States, play a central role in key issues such as the war in Gaza, the changes unfolding in Syria, and the transformation taking place in Lebanon. While it is true that the Gulf states and other Arab countries opposed Trump’s proposals this January regarding the displacement of Gaza’s residents, they offered an alternative plan focused on the gradual reconstruction of the Gaza Strip while preserving its population. This plan was adopted at the Arab Summit held in Cairo in early March.

Nevertheless, America’s ability to manage the evolving regional scene without the involvement of the Gulf states, Egypt, and Jordan is seen as highly difficult and uncharacteristic of traditional U.S. policy in the Middle East.

During Trump’s first term, Arab countries were integral to his regional approach, especially concerning the Palestinian cause. Jordan and Egypt’s opposition played a key role in halting the implementation of Trump’s peace plan, which he called the “Deal of the Century.” Multilateral engagement also helped deter Israeli policies. The Abraham Accords, signed between the UAE, Bahrain, and Israel in September 2022, led Israel to suspend its plans to annex the Jordan Valley, as stated in the joint declaration by Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and UAE Crown Prince Mohamed bin Zayed.

These recent developments reflect Washington’s commitment to multilateral regional policies and also reveal aspects of U.S.-Israeli disagreements. Washington is now seeking to capitalize on recent regional shifts and the outcomes of the war in Gaza and other secondary fronts to achieve strategic political gains. These include advancing Arab-Israeli relations, expanding normalization agreements, and extracting concessions from Iran regarding its nuclear program.

However, Israel’s unilateral actions are having counterproductive effects on its regional acceptance and the U.S. presence in the region. They are placing Washington in a vicious circle that Trump is trying to contain and Israel is seeking to expand. Israel continues to push its vision for the region’s future through military force against its opponents and through display of power against other states in the region. After Israel and Hamas reached a ceasefire agreement on January 19 brokered by Donald Trump before his inauguration, the war in Gaza resumed on March 17. On May 4, the Israeli Cabinet approved a plan to expand operations in Gaza.

Signs of this divergence also emerged in the preliminary May 6 U.S. agreement with the Houthis to stop reciprocal attacks, which did not include Israel. Additionally, the difference appeared in U.S. negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program, with four rounds of talks held in April and May this year despite Israeli pressures for a decisive military strike against Iran’s nuclear program.

This divergence has had a cost for the U.S. administration itself, as tensions have risen between proponents of negotiations and supporters of military strikes. This internal divide has led to the dismissal of National Security Advisor Michael Waltz and threatens further fractures within the administration.

Intersection of U.S.-Gulf Interests

The significance of Trump’s visit to the three Gulf states lies in what these countries, alongside other Arab nations, can offer to his administration’s domestic, international, and regional agenda. While domestic and global issues have already been discussed, the three Gulf states possess the status and capacity to contribute to the issues most vital to Trump’s Middle East policy. These include Iran’s foreign policy and its weaponized nuclear program; Arab-Israeli relations, particularly in the context of economic and military cooperation; and the U.S. policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

These three issues are interconnected. While the war has achieved certain strategic goals, such as curbing the role of non-state armed groups and diminishing Iran’s presence and influence in the region, the Middle East now stands at the threshold of a reconfiguration in power balances and future dynamics. While the Gulf states and the wider region closely watch Israel’s moves and its attempts to assert dominance, they are also aware that continued Israeli expansionism, backed by Washington, will ultimately clash with their priorities and visions.

This has a direct impact on sensitive issues such as Saudi normalization with Israel, which now also encompasses potential normalization with Syria and Lebanon. Saudi Arabia remains firm in its position that normalization with Israel must be tied to the establishment of a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders. In September 2024, it launched an international coalition to implement the two-state solution.

Additionally, Gulf and Arab countries are expected to play a pivotal role in shaping the “day-after scenario” following the Gaza war, particularly regarding security arrangements and reconstruction efforts. The UAE has stipulated the establishment of a Palestinian state as a condition for supporting this post-war phase, including its readiness to join a multinational force in Gaza, as stated by UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed on September 14, 2024.

It is noticeable that the Gulf-American convergence regarding the future of the region and the Palestinian cause has become more aligned compared to the Israeli-American position. Washington has created a parallel track with the participation of Arab countries, such as the May 2024 announcement of the merger of the U.S. Office of Palestinian Affairs with the U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem. This was followed by a May 7 Reuters report on discussions to establish a temporary U.S. administration in the Gaza Strip with the help of Palestinian technocrats. Then, on May 12, coinciding with Trump’s visit to the region, Hamas announced the release of American-Israeli soldier Idan Alexander after negotiations with the Trump administration.

Additionally, Riyadh arranged a meeting this January between Hussein Al-Sheikh, who was appointed vice president of the Palestinian Authority on April 26, and Trump’s special envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, as part of efforts to enable the Palestinian Authority to administer the Gaza Strip. On May 8, Al-Sheikh also met with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on his first official foreign visit as PLO vice president.

Moreover, the Gulf and Arab states are playing an important role in other critical files, including Syria and Lebanon, where Washington relies on multilateral cooperation with countries with which it has strategic relations, especially Turkey, Israel, Jordan, and the Gulf states. Also, Saudi Arabia is playing a role in reorganizing Syrian-Lebanese relations, sponsoring an agreement in March 2025 to demarcate and coordinate the shared border between the two countries.

Qatar, after receiving a waiver from the U.S. sanctions, contributes to Syria’s financial stability by providing Damascus with a monthly financial grant of $29 million to fund public-sector salaries. The Gulf states share a unified vision regarding Syria’s unity. For example, the UAE hosted Al-Sharaa on April 13. Despite Abu Dhabi’s denial of a report by the state-owned international news television network “France 24,” which cited three Reuters news agency sources, that the UAE had opened a covert communication channel between Israel and Syria focused on security and intelligence matters as well as the Syrian transitional government attempts to reduce tensions and ease Israeli concerns.

The Visit’s Expected Outcomes

The outcomes of the visit will be closely linked to the domestic and international priorities of the Trump administration and those related to the Middle East. This includes the impact on the economic and financial messages Trump will deliver to the American public, as well as his orientation toward peace and reducing the U.S. military footprint in the region in favor of a more protectionist approach. This implies the potential for breakthroughs in ongoing conflicts, whether in Europe, the Middle East, or the Far East. While Israel contradicts these directions by attempting to steer the administration’s agenda toward its narrowest limits, the three Gulf states appear willing and ready to take the initiative in supporting Trump on various American and international political and economic fronts.

Accordingly, the economic dimension resulting from the visit—including contracts, investment promises, and defense and arms deals—will occupy a significant portion of Trump’s focus in the post-visit phase. However, unlike the visit during his first administration that was primarily driven by economic interests, the three Gulf states will now offer Trump what he needs to promote politically, especially in light of the temporary setback he faced following his decisions to raise tariffs on countries worldwide. These decisions heightened fears of the U.S. and global economies slipping into recession, as demonstrated by the wave of protests in April against his policies in several American cities.

Conversely, Trump will be expected to make statements and announcements that align with the interests of those states, whether regarding the U.S. position on Syria, the war in Gaza, or the broader Palestinian cause. It is evident that U.S. engagement with the Gaza war has accelerated ahead of Trump’s visit. Reports indicate that direct negotiations have taken place between Washington and Hamas, during which Witkoff proposed a partial deal involving the release of 10 hostages in exchange for a 70-day ceasefire, during which a final agreement would be negotiated. The proposal received preliminary approval from Israel, as reflected in its decision to send a negotiation team to Doha on May 13 coinciding with Trump’s regional visit. This suggests that Trump could plausibly announce a ceasefire from Saudi Arabia.

Overall, the weight of these positions and announcements is not solely about aligning with the course of events, but rather it centers on the Gulf states’ efforts to balance and assert their political and diplomatic effectiveness in countering Israeli military actions and escalatory measures. This approach aims to limit the impact of Israel’s unilateral actions and, indeed, to impose political costs on it.

The most significant outcome of the visit would be the return of the region to a state similar to what it was before October 7, 2023, in terms of peace processes, reconciliations, and de-escalation. The key difference, however, would be the reduction in the roles of armed groups and non-state entities, especially Iran’s proxies, thus limiting Iran’s foreign policy, which during Trump’s first administration was characterized by escalation against the U.S. and regional countries. This shift would create a dilemma for the Israeli government and Netanyahu, as it would obstruct the plans of his extremist ministers and put them in direct confrontation with the Israeli interior.

Finally, while not all the outcomes of the visit may be publicly announced, it will serve as an important occasion to reflect a regional shift away from perpetuating conflicts. It will also establish Arab-American mechanisms to address ongoing wars and sources of instability, whether in Gaza, Lebanon, or Syria.