The Weapons of the Lebanese Hezbollah in the Post-War Reality

The third phase of the disarmament process of Lebanese Hezbollah has begun, after Israeli strikes on the party’s military facilities reduced its stock of precise and long-range missiles. This was followed by the deployment of the Lebanese Army and its control over Hezbollah’s military positions south of the Litani River. Finally, Hezbollah is now ready to discuss handing over its remaining weapons and military equipment. This represents the most significant breakthrough the country has seen since the Taif Agreement in 1989, as Hezbollah’s weaponry has been a source of controversy in Lebanon’s political structure ever since. It has become a tool to solidify its political, security, and military influence within Lebanon.

 This development is a result of Israeli military pressure, U.S. political influence, and the new Lebanese government’s commitment to restrict weapons in its hand, which led a senior Hezbollah official to tell Reuters on April 9, 2025, that Hezbollah is willing to negotiate with the Lebanese presidency regarding its weapons. Following this, a statement from the Lebanese presidency on April 10 indicated that Hezbollah showed flexibility on the issue of its arms.

“Gradual” Disarmament of Hezbollah

Hezbollah’s involvement in the war in the Gaza Strip proved to be a decisive factor in bringing the issue of its disarmament to the negotiating table. Since it began its participation as a secondary front on October 8, 2023, the group’s military capabilities have suffered a series of Israeli strikes. These strikes initially targeted Hezbollah’s infrastructure along the Israeli-Lebanese border, specifically within a range of 10 to 15 kilometers, during the early months of the war. Eventually, the scope of Israeli targeting expanded to include southern Lebanon, the southern suburbs of the capital, Beirut, and culminated in a ground operation launched by the Israeli army in early October 2024. These developments ultimately led to the dismantling of Hezbollah’s leadership structure and a significant portion of its military and missile infrastructure.

The losses sustained by Hezbollah compelled it to accept the U.S.-proposed ceasefire agreement, which came into effect on November 27, 2024. The agreement prohibits Hezbollah’s presence south of the Litani River and stipulates that the gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces is contingent upon the deployment of the Lebanese army south of the Litani and along the Lebanese-Israeli border. The agreement also established monitoring mechanisms through the formation of a five-party committee to oversee the implementation of its terms. At this stage, the Lebanese army is working to dismantle and take control of Hezbollah’s military positions, creating a new reality in southern Lebanon—one free of Hezbollah’s military presence.

However, the consequences of the war extended beyond southern Lebanon, also reshaping the country’s political landscape away from Hezbollah’s dominance, after the group lost much of the power and influence that had long underpinned its role and control in Lebanese politics. During this phase, the United States intensified its pressure to translate the outcomes of the war into political gains, aiming to form a new Lebanese government and elect a president, an office that had remained vacant since November 2022, without Hezbollah’s influence or participation. In February 2025, U.S. Deputy Envoy to the Middle East, Morgan Ortagus, outlined Washington’s red lines, emphasizing that Hezbollah and its allies must be excluded from the new government, and that the group must remain “disarmed and militarily defeated."

Indeed, political forces succeeded in electing Joseph Aoun as President of the Republic of Lebanon on January 9, 2025, and in forming a new government headed by Nawaf Salam on February 8. The new government prioritized the disarmament of Hezbollah as a central component of the internationally mandated reform process. On March 21, 2025, Salam affirmed that the chapter of Hezbollah’s weapons had been closed, declaring that the slogan “People, Army, Resistance” was now a thing of the past. The government’s policy statement included the adoption of a national security strategy to defend Lebanon.

Hezbollah’s Weapons Are on the Table

Hezbollah’s decision to bring the issue of its weapons to the negotiating table with the Lebanese president is not solely a response to the losses it has suffered or the pressures imposed on it during the previous three phases. In the past, the group had often succeeded in insulating its arsenal from surrounding circumstances.

Hezbollah had previously bypassed the provisions of the 1989 Taif Agreement, which ended the civil war in 1990 and stipulated the disbanding of all militias and the handover of their weapons to the Lebanese state. The group also violated the Baabda Declaration, issued by the National Dialogue Committee in 2012, which called for the regulation of arms and the non-use of weapons in regional conflicts. While these factors have contributed to a fundamental shift in the official and political stance of the Lebanese state toward Hezbollah’s weapons, the group now finds itself amid a broader set of changing dynamics that have compelled it to use its weapons as its final bargaining chip.

The war created turmoil within the ranks of the “Axis of Resistance” and dismantled many of the foundations of the “Unification of the Arenas” strategy, particularly after Hezbollah lost its strategic depth in Syria, which had served as a key corridor for weapons supply. The loss of this strategic depth has undermined both Hezbollah’s and Iran’s hopes of recovering from their setbacks. In addition to the mounting pressure on all fronts, Hezbollah’s decision to place its weapons on the negotiating table—long regarded as a matter of strategic leverage—coincides with Iran’s move to put its strategic file, namely the nuclear program, on the table of concessions in negotiations with the United States.

Moreover, Hezbollah is facing an increasingly complex and hostile Lebanese environment. While a broad spectrum of Lebanese voices—both at the official and popular levels—are calling for the group to give up its weapons, Hezbollah has lost the legitimacy of its armament, especially after the growing disconnect between its rhetoric and the actual outcomes became apparent. This loss of legitimacy has been further exacerbated by the continuation of Israeli attacks even after the ceasefire, and by Israel’s postponement of its withdrawal from positions it holds inside Lebanon.

In addition, Lebanon has suffered losses estimated at around $8.5 billion, according to the World Bank, at a time when the country is grappling with a severe financial crisis. This situation is further complicated by the international community’s decision to link the flow of reconstruction funds to the disarmament of Hezbollah by the state. This condition places the group in direct confrontation with both the Lebanese state and society. Since the most extensive destruction occurred in the southern suburbs of Beirut and southern Lebanon—areas that constitute Hezbollah’s social base—the issue of reconstruction directly affects the group’s image and position within Lebanese society, particularly among its supporters and voters.

Hezbollah’s Position in the New Lebanese Landscape

Hezbollah now finds itself at the heart of an existential equation imposed by the combination of the aforementioned factors and shifting dynamics: either give up its weapons in exchange for preserving its political and social role in Lebanon, or face escalating international pressure and growing official and popular opposition—which, if unaddressed, could push the country toward scenarios including internal conflict. As a result, the Lebanese state is holding firmly to dialogue as a means to voluntarily disarm what remains of Hezbollah’s arsenal. This reliance on dialogue appears to stem from the intensifying political rhetoric among Lebanon’s rival factions, as well as from the fact that Hezbollah still possesses weaponry that, while likely ineffective in a confrontation with Israel, remains sufficient to deter its domestic rivals.

Nevertheless, it remains unlikely that Hezbollah would resort to using its weapons to escape the mounting pressures, as it did during its attempt to take control of Beirut and parts of Mount Lebanon on May 7, 2008, following cabinet decisions to dismantle its telecommunications network and dismiss the head of security at Beirut International Airport. The group is well aware that any military move would likely provoke an Israeli response—something it cannot afford at this stage, given the extent of losses it has already suffered and the broader damage sustained by Iran’s regional axis.

Conversely, Hezbollah is well aware of the extent of the pressure surrounding its arsenal and the potential consequences of insisting on retaining it. At this stage, the group appears to be shifting its focus toward the political dimension of its activities. Alongside its ally, the Amal Movement, Hezbollah still holds a strong position in the Lebanese Parliament and maintains representation in the new government through key sovereign ministries, such as Finance. As a result, its ability to influence political life remains intact and is likely to persist as long as the 1989 Taif Agreement remains in effect.

Finally, Lebanon is undergoing profound transformations as a result of the fallout from the war in the Gaza Strip, which has inflicted significant damage on Iran’s regional axis, including Hezbollah. There appears to be a shared understanding among the Lebanese, as well as regional and international actors, of the need to seize this moment to disarm what remains of Hezbollah’s arsenal. In turn, the group finds itself compelled to make substantial and strategic concessions to preserve the political dimension of its activities.