NYT: The President and A Former Terrorist Meet at the White House Tomorrow

Imagine a scene, if you will, in which Osama bin Laden strolls through the front door of the White House with his Kalashnikov rifle (now hanging in the CIA’s private museum) slung over his shoulder to meet with the American president, his administration, and leaders of Congress. In the White House and on Capitol Hill, the man responsible for the September 11 attacks on America that caused 2,977 deaths and the destruction of the Twin Towers in downtown Manhattan delivers lectures on freedom and democracy. After which, guarded by the U.S. Secret Service, he rides in a presidential motorcade to visit Ground Zero, where the World Trade Center once soared 110-stories high.

Would the American people ever accept such a spectacle? Of course not. 

So ask yourself, how is that twisted scenario any different from President Donald Trump welcoming the so-called head of the Syrian transitional government, Ahmed al-Sharaa (terrorist moniker: Abu Mohammad al-Julani), into the White House on November 10, 2025?

Less than a week after both Donald Trump Jr. and al-Julani/al-Sharaa attended the Future Investment Initiative conference in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in late October, the self-professed former terrorist became the first Syrian head of state to be invited to the White House in more than 80 years. Why? Well, the same man who has been associated with global terrorism for more than 20 years and who for decades declared his allegiance to one of the most prominent enemies of the United States, Osama bin Laden, is also the man desperate to rebuild Syria through hundreds of billions of dollars in lucrative reconstruction and development contracts, which the World Bank estimates to be worth between $216 and $345 billion.

This upcoming official visit that has been politely described by a wide spectrum of American political opinion as ill-considered at the very least and, off the record, as downright un-American. Moreover, it comes in the context of a troubled American foreign policy that is inconsistent with the values of the American people, especially since the shared issues between Syria and the United States do not require the acceptance or the appearance of this person’s presence in the most important strongholds of global democracy: the White House and the U.S. Capitol Building. 

Who is Al-Nusrah Front leader Abu Mohammad al-Julani/Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa?

Despite growing up in a well-to-do family in Saudi Arabia—he and bin Laden were both born in the capital city of Riyadh—the unelected Syrian president, who turned 19 one month after 9/11, was widely regarded as one of al-Qaeda’s “children,” not unlike the jihadist minors now being radicalized in Syria’s highly volatile Al-Hawl camp, considered one of the most dangerous breeding grounds for extremist ideology among the offspring of ISIS terrorists.

Having attended secret recruitment meetings in the suburbs of Damascus as a teenager, al-Julani/ al-Sharaa was eager, following the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, to leave his middle-class life behind and train as a terrorist under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the founder of al-Qaeda. He was arrested by American forces several times and was further radicalized by serving time in Abu Ghraib, a U.S. prison know for the torture and abuse of its prisoners.

When al-Julani/al-Sharaa was released from prison in 2011—the same year U.S. forces killed bin Laden—Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, gave the promising and ambitious young recruit money to go to Syria after the outbreak of its civil war and establish an official Syrianbased branch of al-Qaeda, which later became known as al-Nusrah Front. A proven leader with executive skills, al-Julani/al-Sharaa fulfilled al-Baghdadi’s mandate brilliantly: only one year later, in 2012, the United States declared al-Nusrah Front a designated terrorist organization.

To gain local support—al-Qaeda had alienated Syrian rebel factions and the local population—as well as to avoid being targeted by global military powers like the United States and Russia that opposed al-Qaeda, al-Julani/al-Sharaa very cleverly “rejected” al-Qaeda and rebranded its

Syrian branch as a nationalist entity focused solely on overthrowing the Assad regime rather than promoting international jihad.

Yet even that, along with changing the group’s name to Hay’at Tahir al-Sham (HTS), didn’t fool the U.S. government or the United Nations Security Council, which both amended the terrorist designation for al-Qaeda to include its aliases: al-Nusrah Front and HTS. Nevertheless, for good measure al-Julani/al-Sharaa also discarded his own terrorist alias when he overthrew Iraqi President Bashar al-Assad and reverted to his birth name, Ahmed al-Sharaa, before promoting himself as the rightful president of Syria.

One is reminded of the wisdom of poet and author Maya Angelou, who was awarded the U.S. Presidential Medal of Freedom in 2010: “When people show you who they are, believe them the first time.”

Why Americans, Arabs, and the West should be convinced that this Islamic terrorist is unfit to be the leader of any nation, let alone a country recognized worldwide as the “cradle of civilization”

The answer may be found in a book by Hani Nasira, a researcher specializing in political Islam: “Religious and Denominational Converts: A Study of the Phenomenon of Changing Religion and Denomination.” Nasira examines the process of transitioning from terrorism to politics in order to seize power, much like al-Baghdadi and his protégé al-Julani/al-Sharaa. The UN Security Council report currently published on its website explains this transition in detail.

The report identifies al-Julani/al-Sharaa as the leader of Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant, which it listed as an alias for al-Qaeda in Iraq. The NSC designated al-Julani/al-Sharaa a terrorist based on his association with al-Qaeda and other related individuals, groups, undertakings, or entities, as well as his involvement in financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or committing acts or activities in cooperation with, on behalf of, or in support of al-Qaeda, and in supplying, selling, or transferring arms and related equipment to al-Qaeda, recruiting for it, and gathering information on its behalf.

In 2011, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, an alias for Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai, the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) who was killed in a U.S. raid in Syria in October 2019, tasked al-Julani/al-Sharaa with establishing an al-Qaeda branch within Syria to strengthen its local presence there and wage combat operations. Al-Qaeda in Iraq provided Al-Nusrah Front with manpower, funding, weapons, and strategic guidance. The front’s formation under al-Julani/ al-Sharaa’s leadership was announced January 23, 2012. At the time, he stated that the group consisted of fighters from the Near East.

In a statement issued in late May 2012 by the White Minaret Media Foundation, Al-Nusrah Front’s propaganda wing, al-Julani/al-Sharaa was described as the “General Supervisor of Al-Nusrah Front.” He called on his followers in Al-Nusrah Front to launch attacks in retaliation for the May

2012 Houla massacre in Syria and urged the people of the Levant to unite under his banner. The resultant ambushes, IED bombings, and a complex suicide attack (one of five carried out in 2012) by Al-Nusrah Front under his leadership resulted in numerous civilian casualties. “We are a people who will either gain victory or die,” the group declared in a published statement.

In a statement issued April 10, 2013, al-Julani/al-Sharaa confirmed that al-Baghdadi had provided significant support to Al-Nusrah Front and had appointed him as leader of al-Qaeda’s operations in Syria. He also declared his intention to establish a state in the Levant—not only in Syria—by force and expressed his pride in raising the al-Qaeda flag in Iraq, declaring his and his organization’s allegiance to Ayman Muhammad Rabi al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda International, and their commitment to follow his directives.

Al-Julani/al-Sharaa’s media statements were published on the same websites that host official al-Qaeda media outlets. In June 2013, al-Zawahiri confirmed in a letter to al-Baghdadi and al-Julani/al-Sharaa that the latter was the leader of Al-Nusrah Front in Syria, where the group had carried out a number of terrorist attacks. The statement also noted that al-Julani/al-Sharaa was associated with the following individuals and entities: al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda in Iraq.

How can we understand, let alone accept, an Islamist terrorist inside the Oval Office whose name was removed from the U.S. watch list as recently as July 8, 2025—a mere four months ago?

The planned visit of Al-Nusrah Front leader Abu Mohammad al-Julani/Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa to the White House signals a seismic shift in U.S. foreign policy toward the region—a dangerous trend that reveals the sharp contrasts between Donald Trump’s preferences and perceptions with the institutional approach that has characterized U.S. policy for decades. Since the 1950s, Washington has cultivated its relationships with countries in the region based on strategic security, economic, and political considerations, establishing close ties with Arab regimes that, along with Britain, helped solidify arrangements serving both U.S. interests and the local balances of power within Arab states.

In marked contrast, al-Julani/al-Sharaa and his interim government do not appear to possess even the minimum requirements for Washington’s patronage and alliance. Not only does he not represent a well-established or institutionalized political system, he and his foreign minister,

Asaad al-Shaibani—a founding member of Al-Nusrah Front who went by five aliases before being elevated to his current position—embody pragmatic policies that are not accepted by the various factions and pillars of their nascent authority in Syria, particularly regarding their rapprochement with the United States and Western countries in general, and their lenient rhetoric toward Israel, both of which are widely viewed within their circles as a conciliatory approach that contradicts their ideological beliefs.

Therefore, separating the Syrian presidency from its power base, and endorsing and supporting it, represents a significant shift in Washington’s policy toward backing specific individuals rather than political systems—a policy that is untested and unprecedented in the history of U.S. foreign policy.

Whereas this visit is considered both pre-emptive and ill-timed, the administration of former President Joe Biden, following the regime change in December 2024, adopted a policy of exploratory steps, aligning reforms with Washington’s objectives to ensure that the new authority in Syria met at least the very minimum requirements for partnership with the United States. 

Therefore, the restoration of relations and the lifting of sanctions were contingent upon specific conditions imposed on the interim government. This policy reflected a consensus among U.S. decision-making bodies and institutions, including the White House, the Department of Defense, Congress, and the CIA.

Notably, with the rise of Trump into the Oval Office, al-Julani/al-Sharaa’s interim government became lax in implementing these conditions and violated all but a few of them. Instead, it consolidated its monopoly on power into the hands of HTS leaders and allies, retained foreign jihadist fighters and appointed them to high-ranking security positions, and failed to curb extremist rhetoric within the ranks of the newly formed security and military forces.

The Trump administration not only overlooked these violations but also went further, taking hasty and unilateral steps toward rapprochement. On May 13, it announced its intention to lift all sanctions on Syria. In late June, Trump himself signed an executive order formalizing the decision—despite Republican and Democratic lawmakers alike describing it as a “premature.” Then, on July 8, the State Department removed HTS from its list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations list. And, on November 4, submitted a draft resolution to the UN Security Council to lift its sanctions on alJulani/al-Sharaa, which it agreed to do this Thursday.

It is a gross understatement to say this does not reflect a well-considered American course of action, especially since its potential financial benefits appear likely to benefit The Trump Organization, where Donald Trump Jr. serves as executive vice president. Moreover, its complex repercussions could impact counterterrorism efforts, regional security in the Middle East, and America’s global reputation, while also heightening risks to U.S. national security.

What drives Trump to adopt and pursue this policy are personal motives as well as domestic and foreign policy objectives. His rapprochement with al-Julani/al-Sharaa, whom he first met in May 2025, and his public support for him are inseparable from his personal affinity for dictators. He gladly and with great fanfare met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska at a summit in August that produced no tangible or strategic results. He also met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in South Korea in late October and expressed his willingness to meet with North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-Un, telling reporters aboard Air Force One during his recent Asian tour: “I’d love to meet with him if he’d like to meet. I got along great with Kim Jong-Un. I liked him. He liked me. If he wants to meet me, I’ll be in South Korea.”

Interestingly, Trump’s rapprochement in foreign policy with dictatorial leaders aligns with his treatment of American domestic affairs, reflected in the accelerating federal militarization of the states, his attempts to restrict the independence of state governors—or at least those from the Democratic

Party—and his interference in their state laws and executive decisions. It is also evident in his efforts to influence voters by threatening to withhold federal funding from New York if Democratic mayoral candidate Zohran Mamdani won the mayoral election, which he did, and in his appointments based on loyalty to him rather than the U.S. Constitution or competence. The American public sensed this, as reflected in nationwide demonstrations by an estimated 7 million protestors in all 50 states under the slogan “No Kings!”

Given al-Julani/al-Sharaa’s upcoming visit and the recent victory of New York’s mayor-elect, it is important to emphasize the obvious: Mamdani’s success in the elections was not due to his Islamic faith; only about 4% of NYC voters are Muslim. His historic achievement was arguably split between a campaign platform that focused on providing a better life for all residents, not just his supporters, and the result of voters’ reaction to Trump’s arbitrary policies, particularly those undermining democracy, and his derogatory comments about Mamdani, whom he called a communist. In truth, perhaps Mamdani owes Trump a thank-you for the part the president played in creating a backlash that helped him become NYC’s first Muslim mayor in history. 

This is the America the world knows—the America that condemns Trump’s red-carpet welcome of al-Julani/al-Sharaa, a former terrorist whose hands are forever stained with the blood of innocents. 

What needs to be done—now

Ultimately, members of the Democratic Party and Republican Party who opposed lifting sanctions on Syria in May and June, must demand that the United States adopt its previously cautious and balanced approach in its relations with al-Julani/al-Sharaa and his interim government. 

The course pursued by the interim government, according to current developments, offers no clear guarantees of a genuine democratic transition from an interim government to one voted into office by the Syrian people. Certainly the current government is not founded on respect for social and intellectual diversity or the protection of freedom of opinion and expression—principles that the United States has long upheld in both its domestic and foreign policies.

From this standpoint, any U.S. engagement or direct support for the interim government must be approached with caution and close monitoring to avoid repercussions that could negatively affect Washington’s efforts in combating terrorism, global security, or its international standing as a leader of the democratic world order. Accordingly, maintaining continuous evaluation and linking any future steps to, at the very least, the interim government’s fulfillment of its commitments and preconditions is the most appropriate path to ensure the minimum balance between American principles and the true interests of the beleaguered Syrian people who deserve better.

In the end, a terrorist is a terrorist—whether his weapon of choice is a Kalashnikov rifle slung across a tunic or a briefcase filled with unsigned contracts worth hundreds of billions of dollars.