The Middle East from the perspective of Chinese national security

In early July 2015, the Standing Committee of the Chinese People's Congress approved the National Security Law, which defines the general framework of the Chinese state, its goals and duties towards citizens and also the international Law, and the patterns of the state's political, economic, and social behavior. In addition, the Law defines in Chapter IV, specifically in Section II, the general principles of intelligence information. In Section III, the Law addressed risk prevention, assessment and warning. Section V tackled crisis management.

The Law, which is still in force, as shown on the (Law of China) database, highly esteems the role of the Party in political leadership, and in forming the community culture, emphasizing the supremacy of a unified and non-pluralistic cultural pattern within China, although article 26 of chapter I affirms the commitment to improve the system of ethnic autonomy, and to promote communication and harmony between the various ethnicities in the country.

Throughout its articles, "National Security" emphasizes the defensive approach on which foreign policy is based in terms of respect for sovereignty and non-interference in its affairs and the affairs of other countries, and it was clear that the Law was directed primarily to criminalize separatism, "subversive and terrorist" acts and collusion with foreign powers, in sharp reference to some provinces such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau.

A closer look at the position of the Middle East in the calculations of Chinese national security, it can be concluded that the Law did not distinguish the region, nor did it specify its role in achieving the goals and dimensions of Chinese national security. This does not mean that China's move in the region is not based on a central vision, as there have been multiple announcements of agreements and strategies that draw the general framework for Beijing's dynamics in the region, such as the document "China's Policy Towards Arab Countries" issued in January 2016, which crystallized the cooperation equation (1 + 2 + 3): number (1) refers to energy as a vital core interest, number (2) refers infrastructure as well as trade and investment, while number (3) refers to nuclear energy, satellites, and renewable energy sources. Middle East Geopolitics is also central to the Belt and Road Initiative-a link between the Far East, Europe, and Africa.

It is difficult to compare China's "national security" as a Law and concept, with its complex, multidimensional American National Security Law, with its geostrategic goals. The Chinese National Security Law is local or regional, unlike the one of Washington’s, constantly updates its "international" national security, which determines the sources of threat, mainly China and Russia, in addition to the priorities of the American state and its foreign policy directions.

Regional Hegemony as an Entry Point for Global Hegemony

The model of the neorealist theory presents a framing of the hegemonic state, based on classical realist principles (strengthening power to ensure existence, preserve interests, and deter adversaries) in addition to taking into account the geostrategic dimension that seeks international superiority on the basis of the regional dimension, i.e. the territory that gives the state it controls the advantage of controlling the course of international politics.

But before talking about expansion outside the region, neorealists emphasize that it is self-evident and inevitable that the state, aspiring to expand, will impose its influence on its immediate territory, firstly superior to its surroundings, and secondly that this superiority would not face competition from outside the region.

In this view, it is understood why Washington has the luxury of moving along the international span, as the U.S. fulfills the basics of hegemony in the Americas, with no serious challenge that hinders its regional security. China has yet to resolve sovereignty tensions in the South China Sea, in other words: assessments of China's international position, threatening American standing, are exaggerated by the neorealist model. China's national security Law reconciled and was consistent with this regional geopolitical reality, as it is not an international geostrategy, therefore its provisions included attention and securing the maritime domain.

So, it can be concluded that the Middle East is not a priority in China's national security calculations, due to the geographical distance on a hand, and Beijing's indecisiveness of its control over its territory on the other. This does not mean underestimating the position and stand of the region in the Chinese perspective. As mentioned earlier, Beijing issued the "1+2+3" equation, countries in the region joined the Belt and Road Initiative, and Beijing signed bilateral agreements ranging from strategy, partnership, and cooperation.

China is also monitoring some of the threats emanating from the region to its national security, such as the return of Uyghur fighters, disruptions to supply chains, and crises threatening the flow of petroleum, as China is the first importer of this vital commodity. 

American Repositioning: An Opportunity and a Challenge

After a decade of the war on terror, Washington has reassessed its higher orientation, to be more concerned with international competition with China and Russia. This is reflected in the Middle East by reducing the U.S. military presence in order to accumulate U.S. security assets in the Far East.

The Obama administration represented this transformation, as the then U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, published an article in Foreign Policy magazine in October 2011 entitled "America's Pacific Century" in reference to the description of the American century, that was launched to signify Washington's international position post World War II, thus reflecting the strategy of pivoting towards Asia, specifically towards the Far East, and the American determination to sustain its position, besides adapting to the realities and de facto taking place in the Pacific.

While the relative disengagement between Washington and the Middle East represents an opportunity to increase China's presence in the region, this disengagement also represents a challenge in that it comes to focus U.S. efforts to contain China in its region, in a manner that surrounds its expansion, preventing China’s regional hegemony, which -according to neorealists- is one of the foundations of the launch towards global hegemony.

The international system was shocked after the start of what the Kremlin declared a "special operation" in Ukraine, which sparked controversy over the actual end of unipolarity, driven by statements by Chinese and Russian leaders that the international system had entered multipolarity. A report published by Strategiecs in July 2022 entitled "The Necessary Balance: The Rise of China and American Control" touched in some detail on these proposals.

The reality and Future of China's Presence in the Middle East

Despite all the talk about the escalation of the Chinese presence in the region, the evidence confirms that Chinese projects, related to vital goals, are being obstructed by the United States. This presence has not taken anything away from the American influence in the region, which means that Beijing has a presence and not influence so far. 

With regard to foreseeing the future of this presence, it ranges between the following scenarios:

First: China's Partial Expansion

Beijing and Washington are likely to reach an understanding on permissible borders in the Middle East and the Far East, within broader geopolitical understandings, during which both countries offer guarantees and pledges of mutual respect for security requirements on critical issues, such as Iran, North Korea, and Taiwan.

The achievement of such understanding depends on building trust, bridging differences in visions, and increasing certainty in underlying intentions.

This scenario is driven by Washington's desire as a superpower to ease the burden of global leadership.

As for China, it is in its interest at this stage to assure the West of its peaceful rise, and that it does not aspire to challenge and break the rules governing the international system. The strategic understanding may send reassuring messages that reduces the economic competition it is exposed, to and calm the security concerns that drive the defense blocs formed by a U.S. administration such as "Quad" and "AUKUS". Nor does Beijing have the capabilities—perhaps the desires—to clash with Washington in its sphere of influence.

Second: Shift to Influence

Beijing may take advantage of a moment of U.S. preoccupation with local and non-Middle Eastern issues to transform its presence to be sustainable, breaking current taboos that prevent China from deepening its involvement in civilian fields, such as infrastructure related to the Silk Road, high-tech, and communications.

In this scenario, Beijing would have a clear military presence, fortifying its interests with hard power.

There are signs that there is an undeclared Chinese tendency, at the moment, to develop defense relations with countries in the region. For example: the 25-year agreement, signed with Iran, includes an explicit military dimension in joint cooperation in industries and technology related. The agreement opens up possibilities for the construction of Chinese military points near the Strait of Hormuz.

In Syria, the magazine "Breaking Defense" magazine published a report in late July 2022, in which it quoted Israeli sources as concerned about the visits of Chinese experts to Syrian military sites, in conjunction with China's supply of advanced communication equipment to Syria that could be of dual-use for civilian and military purposes. The sources also feared that Beijing would sell defense systems to the Syrian government.

Press organizations in recent years claimed that Washington has thwarted undeclared military, projects run or built by China in U.S. allies.

This frustration weakens the likelihood that China's presence will become a strong-willed influence, but China's growing economic interests in the region may generate, in return, a Chinese desire to secure those interests.

Third: Chinese Involvement

China is temporarily benefiting from the U.S. security umbrella in the Middle East, for it may establish economic partnerships without engaging in crisis management and leadership responsibilities.

In the event of a strategic U.S. withdrawal from the region, China – and Russia as well – may take charge of balancing and responsibility for safeguarding its interests. Given China's limited experience in managing international crises, it will have political and security suffering, undermining its economic presence and distracting its priorities.

What enhances this scenario is the decline in American interest in the region since the Obama administration. Even what U.S. President Joe Biden said at the Jeddah Summit for Security and Development, in July 2022, about Washington's "return" to the region, but this does not indicate the return of the strategic weight of the region in the American calculations, as the current energy crisis is related to the geopolitical situation in Eurasia. On another hand, Israel's security is determined by its multiple regional partnerships. While the goal of supporting democracy has proven to be difficult to achieve according to the American method due to societal, cultural, and political considerations. These three determinants governed U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East.

Fourth: Excluding China

Another fourth new determinant is the competition with the major powers: even if the importance of the three aforementioned determinants diminishes, Washington simply will not abandon the region in which it spent so much human, economic, and diplomatic effort.

Biden made this clear at the Jeddah Summit, saying that the United States would not leave a vacuum to be filled by China and Russia.

What enhances this scenario is Washington's success in enforcing its will to neutralize sensitive Chinese projects in the region. So far, the Chinese presence was not tested in terms of its ability to challenge U.S. prohibitions, and overcome Washington in some cases of competition.

The U.S. quest for regional development integration, involving its allies, could be considered as a strategy to ensure that Washington self-fills any vacuum that may arise by reducing its Middle East reach.

Beijing will also harness its capabilities to fortify its regional security before considering global hegemony, as stated in the clause "Regional Hegemony as a Prelude to Global Hegemony," which means that China will devote its capacities to "break the weight of the blockade imposed on it through the tight U.S security arc in the waters of the Pacific".

Of course, the visit of the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, to Taiwan at the beginning of August 2022, adds more pressure on Beijing, and pushes it to entrench itself more in its regional scope.

Managing the U.S.-China Antagonism in the Middle East

Most of the U.S. forward-looking scenarios show a kind of conflict of US-Chinese wills in the region, which requires anticipating potential US-China clash mechanisms to pre-hedge such clash repercussions on regional security.

The most prominent of these mechanisms are:

First: Clash of Armed Proxies

So far, there is no Chinese-backed armed group in terms of training and armament, or in terms of providing political cover for a group. However, if a scenario materializes, where Beijing strengthens its presence and moves it to the level of "influence", then China will defend its interests by military force where necessary, and wherever it can.

China may be forced to abandon its peaceful and non-interference approach of its foreign policy, as great power politics have historically been free from the use of military force to achieve goals.

Hybrid warfare, as well as fourth- and fifth-generation warfare, provided an entry point for the use of force with minimal direct engagement.

If this scenario materializes, the security burdens will double on the countries of the region, which some of its countries are classified on the state fragility index as fragile or semi-fragile. Such countries are considered attractive to foreign interventions, and also to the consequent repercussions on the regional environment.

Second: China's Coordination with Russia

Russia has a sustained military presence at the Hmeimim base on the Syrian coast. In addition, Wagner Group, which is said to have links with Russian figures, is accused of participating in fighting on some fronts in the Middle East.

To complement the first scenario, China may agree with Russia on developing a common vision on Middle Eastern issues, in which China would play an economic role and Russia would assume security roles.

Third: Exporting Models

Beijing presents itself regionally and internationally as an alternative model to U.S. policies based on development, benefit for all, and taking into account the specificity of countries with regard to rights and freedoms, which is commensurate with the nature of the countries of the region.

Samuel P. Huntington pointed out in his book “The Clash of Civilizations” that an unholy alliance between Islamic and Confucian civilization is the main threat to the West.

However, China's export of its administrative, cultural, and economic model faces structural obstacles that go beyond American influence, as China is a country that does not owe a divine religion, and is controlled by a party that imposes its principles on society, making China’s model be unilateral, not pluralistic.

With regard to respecting sovereignty and autonomy, China's excessive lending to some countries, that do not have the capacity to repay, may have consequences that may run counter to China's call for development, as happened recently in Sri Lanka.

All this stand as limits to the ability of the Chinese model to polarize regionally, so that the main enhancement of this polarization remains the legitimacy of rejection China has as a "strategic" alternative to countries that are not allied with Washington, or with countries that want to threaten to head East to improve their positions with Washington.

So far, the Chinese model has not played a pivotal role in any of the Middle Eastern countries in terms of economic, developmental, political, or cultural fields.

Fourth: Zero Economic Competition

The term zero-sum competition refers to an acute state of competition, where one party aspires to extract all gains at the expense of the other party. This situation, which there is only one winner, is related to politics that has to do with the interests and vital considerations of competing States.

 Some economic sectors cannot be isolated from politics, such as investment in energy, digital infrastructure, and physical infrastructure, especially when these investments are a regional link in an international chain, like the Belt and Road Initiative.

The zero-sum competition between Washington and Beijing may have an opportunity for the region’s countries, if they succeed in controlling their orientations and taking into account their national interests, so that the region’s countries would benefit from the two competing parties. But sometimes there is a "political price" for this benefit as a kind of implicit punishment for heading towards this or that country.

Regional Security First

The Middle East has always been an arena for renewed geopolitical competition, which requires careful reflection on the mechanisms that enable the countries of the region to immunize themselves from the repercussions of this competition. This immunity requires formulating common political positions to deal with this situation, as the positions of unilateral countries will not find benefit unless they are as consistent and coordinated as possible with their partners in the region.

The dilemma of choosing between the dominant power "the United States of America" and the rising "China" requires strengthening independence and self-reliance to move away from "great power politics" and conditions thereof. There has often been talk of the preferences of one side or the other for the Middle East. In fact the various parties move with a similar logic, based on achieving their interests and safeguarding their national security at minimum cost.